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Runtime Verification for HyperLTL

  • Borzoo BonakdarpourEmail author
  • Bernd Finkbeiner
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10012)

Abstract

Information flow security often involves reasoning about multiple execution traces. This subtlety stems from the fact that an intruder may gain knowledge about the system through observing and comparing several executions. The monitoring of such properties of sets of traces, also known as hyperproperties, is a challenge for runtime verification, because most monitoring techniques are limited to the analysis of a single trace. In this tutorial, we discuss this challenge with respect to HyperLTL, a temporal logic for the specification of hyperproperties.

Keywords

Temporal Logic Atomic Proposition Execution Trace Model Check Problem Runtime Verification 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgment

This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the Collaborative Research Center 1223 and by Canada NSERC Discovery Grant 418396-2012 and NSERC Strategic Grants 430575-2012 and 463324-2014.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McMaster UniversityHamiltonCanada
  2. 2.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany

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