Abstract
The Austrian Cartel Act 2005 (hereinafter “Cartel Act”) contains a general prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position. Section 5 Cartel Act reads as follows:
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Notes
- 1.
Federal Law against Cartels and other Restraints of Competition, Kartellgesetz 2005, KartG, BGBl. I No. 61/2005 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 13/2013.
- 2.
The ban on abusive practices in Section 5 Cartel Act is complemented by a ban on retaliatory measures in Section 6 Cartel Act: Proceedings in order to terminate an abuse of a market-dominant position […] may not be taken as a reason by the dominant undertaking to exclude the undertaking directly affected by the abuse from further supply or demand on reasonable conditions.
- 3.
The Cartel Act provides for a specific definition of market-dominance in Section 4 (which goes back to the historical registration obligation for market-dominant undertakings and is also relevant for merger control):
Section 4. (1) An undertaking shall be regarded as market-dominant for the purpose of this Federal Act, who, as a supplier or demander
1. is not exposed to any or only negligible competition or
2. has a superior market position compared to the other competitors; thereby considering, in particular, the financial strength, the relations to other undertakings, the access possibilities to the procurement and sales markets as well as the circumstances that limit market access for other undertakings.
(1a) Two or more undertakings shall be regarded as market-dominant, if there is no substantial competition between them and if they, in their entirety, fulfil the conditions of (1).
(2) If an undertaking as a supplier or demander on the relevant market
1. has a market share of at least 30 % or
2. has a market share of more than 5 % and is exposed to the competition by not more than two undertakings or
3. has a market share of more than 5 % and belongs to the four biggest undertakings on this market, which together have a market share of at least 80 %, then it bears the burden of proof, that the conditions of (1) are not fulfilled.
(2a) If an entirety of undertakings as suppliers or demanders on the relevant market
1. has a market share of at least 50 % and consists of three or fewer undertakings or
2. has a market share of at least two-thirds and consists of five or fewer undertakings,
the undertakings involved bear the burden of proof, that the conditions of (1a) are not fulfilled.
(3) An undertaking shall also be regarded as market-dominant, if it has a superior market position in relation to its demanders and suppliers; such position is, in particular, deemed to exist, if those are dependent on maintaining the business relationship to avoid severe economic disadvantages.
- 4.
Erläuternde Bemerkungen (Explanatory remarks) RV (Regierungsvorlage, government bill) 1804 BlgNR (SupplementsNo.) 24. GP.
- 5.
Which came into force on 1 January 1989.
- 6.
However, see the provision concerning the reversal of the burden of proof to the detriment of the dominant undertaking, which has been introduced in the law together with this additional example in 1999.
- 7.
The Cartel Act 2005, which entered into force at 1 January 2006, is still the current Austrian Cartel Act.
- 8.
Federal Law on Improvement of Local Supply and Competitive Conditions, Nahversorgungsgesetz, NahVersG, BGBl. No. 392/1977 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 50/2012.
- 9.
See also Section 3 Act on Local Supply (which corresponds to Section 6 Cartel Act), which provides that proceedings pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 Act on Local Supply may not be taken as a reason by the defendant to exclude the undertaking affected, by a conduct as defined by those provisions, from further supply or demand on reasonable conditions.
- 10.
Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 1984, UWG, BGBl. No. 448/1984 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 49/2015.
- 11.
Federal Law on the Establishment of a Federal Competition Authority, Bundesgesetz über die Einrichtung einer Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (Wettbewerbsgesetz—WettbG), BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) I No. 62/2002 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 129/2013.
- 12.
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (BWB).
- 13.
Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003—TKG, BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) I No. 70/2003 as last amended by BGBl I No. 44/2014.
- 14.
Pursuant to Section 35 (1) Telecommunications Act an undertaking is considered having a significant market power, if this undertaking either alone or together with other undertakings holds such a strong economically position, that it has the possibility of acting, to a considerable extent, independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately the consumers.
- 15.
See Section 43 (2) Austrian Telecommunications Act.
- 16.
Erläuternde Bemerkungen (Explanatory remarks), RV (Regierungsvorlage, government bill) 473 BlgNr. (SupplementsNo.) XIII. GP, 36.
- 17.
See www.bwb.gv.at; english version.
- 18.
Decision of the Cartel Supreme Court (“Kartellobergericht”, KOG), 11 October 2012, 16 Ok 1/12—ÖBB/Westbahn II; see also Cartel Supreme Court, 19 January 2009, 16 Ok 13/08—Telekom “KombiPaket”; for further evidence see Gruber, Österreichisches Kartellrecht2, § 5 KartG E 31.
- 19.
Cartel Supreme Court, 16 July2008, 16 Ok 6/08—Asterix bei den Olympischen Spielen, with further references.
- 20.
Cartel Supreme Court, 19 January 2009, 16 Ok 13/08—Telekom “KombiPaket”, with further references.
- 21.
Cartel Supreme Court, 17 October 2005, 16 Ok 43/05—Die NEUE Zeitung für Tirol.
- 22.
Cartel Supreme Court, 19 January 2009, 16 Ok 13/08—Telekom “KombiPaket”; with further references.
- 23.
In German: “Rechtsprechung und Lehre unterscheiden zwei grundsätzliche Missbrauchsvarianten: Die Beeinträchtigung von Wettbewerbschancen und damit Gefährdung von Wettbewerb (Marktstrukturen) einerseits und die davon unabhängige Übervorteilung von Abnehmern (Lieferanten) andererseits. Für die Unterscheidungen haben sich die Bezeichnungen “Behinderungsmissbrauch” und “Ausbeutungsmissbrauch” durchgesetzt”, e.g. Supreme Court (“Oberster Gerichtshof”, OGH), 28 January 2009, 9 Ob 66/07g—Donaukreuzfahrten.
- 24.
See e.g. Cartel Supreme Court, 5 September 2001, 16 Ok 3/01 for exclusionary abuse and Cartel Supreme Court, 14 June 1993, Okt 3/93 for exploitative abuse.
- 25.
E.g. Supreme Court, 30 June 1998, 4 Ob 165/98p—Reparatur von Leasingfahrzeugen.
- 26.
See e.g. Cartel Supreme Court, 9 October 2000, 16 Ok 6/00—Abonnementpreise; Cartel Supreme Court, 11 October 2012, 16 Ok 1/12—ÖBB/Westbahn II; Cartel Supreme Court, 19 January 2009, 16 Ok 13/08—Telekom “KombiPaket”.
- 27.
Notably the amendment was not based on European Law but was modelled after the German provision Section 19 GWB, which has been criticized for containing strict formal criteria not in line with European practice, e.g. F. J. Säcker, G. M. Gosse, M. Wolf in: Münchener Kommentar Kartellrecht (2008) § 19 GWB para 39; on consequences see F. Schuhmacher, G. Muntean, Die Kartellgesetznovelle 2013 – Eine Beurteilung der wesentlichen materiell-rechtlichen Änderungen, wbl 2013, 181 (187).
- 28.
In Austrian antitrust law, it is the Cartel Court and not the Federal Competition authority which rules on antitrust infringements—for details, reference is made to Chapter 5.2.
- 29.
Cartel Court, 28 November 2011, 26 Kt 70-72/11-21—ÖBB-Westbahn II.
- 30.
Cartel Supreme Court, 11 October 2012, 16 Ok 1/12—ÖBB/Westbahn II.
- 31.
ECJ, 26 November 1998, C-7/97—Bronner/Mediaprint, para 30.
- 32.
See, e.g., Cartel Supreme Court, 16 July 2008, 16 Ok 6/08—Constantin Filmverleih.
- 33.
Until March 2013, only decisions of the Cartel Supreme Court were published in an anonymous version, while decisions of the Cartel Court (as court of first instance) were in general not disclosed. With the reform of the Cartel Act in 2013, summaries of legally binding rulings of the Cartel Court have to be published (cf. Section 37 Cartel Act). However, e.g., if parties agree on settlements in a private enforcement proceeding (i.e., the claim of abuse of dominance was submitted at the Cartel Court by a private party and not the BWB), or if a claim is withdrawn, there is no obligation to publish. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 37 Cartel Act, decisions of the Cartel Court are only published when the Court actually finds an infringement of competition law. Consequently, a rejection of a claim is not reflected in the summary of decisions of the Cartel Court, but only, on anonymous basis, if the Cartel Supreme Court on appeal decides so.
- 34.
Cartel Supreme Court, 26 June 2014, 16 Ok 12/13—Sports Direct/Adidas.
- 35.
Cartel Court (in first instance), 28 October 2014, 27 Kt 23, 24/09—LPG.
- 36.
Cartel Supreme Court, 28 February 2011, 16 Ok 4/10—Firmenbuch.
- 37.
Cartel Supreme Court, 26 June 2014, 16 Ok 10/13—Reclay/Altstoff Recycling.
- 38.
Cartel Supreme Court, 11 October 2004, 16 Ok 11/04—Telekom Austria Minimumtarif.
- 39.
Reidlinger/Hartung, Das österreichische Kartellrecht2, p. 85.
- 40.
EC 2009/C 45/02.
- 41.
Cartel Supreme Court, 11 October 2012, 16 Ok 1/12—ÖBB/Westbahn II.
- 42.
Cartel Supreme Court, 16 July 2008, 16 Ok 6/08—Constantin Filmverleih.
- 43.
Cartel Supreme Court, 16 December 2002, 16 Ok 10/02—Wintertarif.
- 44.
Cartel Supreme Court, 12 December 2011, 16 Ok 8/10—Radiusklausel IV.
- 45.
See Annual Report („Tätigkeitsbericht“) BWB, 2011, p. 45.
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Fussenegger, G., Schuhmacher, F., Tahedl, R. (2017). Austria. In: Këllezi, P., Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P. (eds) Abuse of Dominant Position and Globalization & Protection and Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46891-4_2
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