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Mutual Inclusivity: A Sine qua non to National Implementation of Complementarity

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Abstract

A mutually inclusive interpretation and application of complementarity is the way forward for state parties particularly African states to implement complementarity at the national level. Admittedly, no two criminal justice systems can be the same and no African states’ criminal justice system can effectively mirror the ICC. However, as noted previously, complementarity was adopted in the Rome Statute without any specific direction on how it can work in practice. However, since it was imperative to preserve sovereignty, complementarity was adopted by states, to be implemented by states, for the benefit of states, the ICC as well as for the benefit of the international community as whole. This implies that the future of the ICC and international criminal justice is necessarily domestic. This chapter sums up the analysis in this book that rather than wait till situations arise in their territories, African states should take steps to adopt implementing legislation, ensure capacity building and take advantage of Article 93(10) to request legislative, technical as well as physical assistance from the ICC well in advance. The policy oriented method (New Haven School), is suggested for African states to implement complementarity as a mutually inclusive concept. The ICC’s Legal Tools Project is recommended for African States to enhance their willingness and ability to implement complementarity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Stahn (2009) (Noting that if international criminal courts wish to leave a ‘lasting footprint’ on domestic societies, they must develop strategies to empower domestic institutions); Slaughter and Burke-White (2006), pp. 327, 346–350.

  2. 2.

    Nouwen and Werner (2010), pp. 948–949. See also Williams and Schabas (2008), pp. 560 and 716 respectively.

  3. 3.

    ‘Inactivity’ was developed by the OTP based on the theory of ‘uncontested admissibility’ (Text to notes 133–140 in Ch 2).

  4. 4.

    Politi (2011), pp. 142–149.

  5. 5.

    See Muthaura et al; Saif Al-Islam and the Germain Katanga cases (Text to notes 86, 94 & 98,102 respectively in Ch 2).

  6. 6.

    See Thomas Lubanga, Muthaura et al and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi cases (Text to notes 88, 86 & 94 in Ch 2).

  7. 7.

    See ICC, ‘Situation and Cases’ Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (Accessed 3 February 2014).

  8. 8.

    See ‘Admissibility and Trigger Mechanisms for ICC investigation’ (Text to notes 76–86 in Ch 2).

  9. 9.

    Robinson (2002), p. 1867.

  10. 10.

    See generally CICC, ‘Questions and Answers: ICC Implementing Legislation’ Available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS_CICC_Implementation_Legislation_en.pdf (Accessed 3 February 2014).

  11. 11.

    AI (2012).

  12. 12.

    The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Hussein ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I on the Admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 31 May 2013. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf (Accessed 5 February 2014).

  13. 13.

    Ibid; paras 88, 108, 133, 200, 201.

  14. 14.

    Ibid; paras 134, 135, 219.

  15. 15.

    See Stone and du Plessis (2014). Out of the 34 African states parties to the Rome Statute, only four, namely; South Africa (2002), Senegal (2007), Kenya (2009) and Uganda (2010) are known to have implementing legislation to date.

  16. 16.

    Bekou and Shah (2006).

  17. 17.

    Text to notes 133–144 in Ch 4.

  18. 18.

    Rome Statute, art 7.

  19. 19.

    Greppi (2008).

  20. 20.

    As for example the trials taking place in the SCCED in Sudan and in Kenya.

  21. 21.

    See, for example, the domestic prosecution in the DRC which uses military tribunal and relies on the Military Penal Code of 2002. Although the Code criminalises international crimes, yet there are gaps in the provisions which made the military court to apply the Rome Statute definitions in some cases. See the Songo Mboyo case (Text to notes 48–71 in Ch 4).

  22. 22.

    Text to notes 114–121 in Ch 4.

  23. 23.

    For example, Colonel Kibibi Mutware was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity by the DRC military tribunal in a trial that lasted for only 10 days (Text to note 65 in Ch 4).

  24. 24.

    Jon Heller (2012), pp. 86–134, 87.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Kleffner (2003), p. 98. See also Seman (2010), pp. 259, 266.

  27. 27.

    Jon Heller (2012), pp. 87–89.

  28. 28.

    See Ellis (2003); Ambos and Stegmiller (2008).

  29. 29.

    Jon Heller, 87–89.

  30. 30.

    See Schabas (2002), p. 1505.

  31. 31.

    Bergsmo et al. (2010), p. 801.

  32. 32.

    Robinson (2012).

  33. 33.

    See Rome Statute, articles 17(1)(c) & 20.

  34. 34.

    Robinson.

  35. 35.

    Rome Statute, art 17(1)(a)–(c).

  36. 36.

    Rome Statute, arts 17(1) (a) & (b), 20.

  37. 37.

    Robinson.

  38. 38.

    Saif Al-Islam case (n 12).

  39. 39.

    Ibid, paras 111, 112, 113.

  40. 40.

    Keppler (2012).

  41. 41.

    Text to notes 135–136 in Ch 5.

  42. 42.

    See Celebici case (Text to note 35 in Ch 5) paras 611 & 618.

  43. 43.

    Text to notes 138–186 in Ch 5.

  44. 44.

    Some of the political challenges include the hypocritical stance of some of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the United States exceptionality (text to notes 195–205 in Ch 5).

  45. 45.

    Nsereko (2004), p. 262.

  46. 46.

    Hazan (2012), p. 9.

  47. 47.

    Kaplan (2014).

  48. 48.

    Garapon (2012), p. 20.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    See Nahamya-Ibanda (2010).

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    Saif Al-Islam case of 31 May 2013 (n 12) para 213.

  54. 54.

    Ibid, para 85.

  55. 55.

    See Rome Statute, Article 17(2)(c).

  56. 56.

    Rome Statute, Article 17(3).

  57. 57.

    See, for example, the analysis of Corruption in the Nigerian Judiciary (Text to notes 152–168 in Ch 6).

  58. 58.

    See the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, s 17(2)(e).

  59. 59.

    Intimidation takes varying forms; from kidnappings, to threats to life, to assassinations (Text to notes 187–204 in Ch 6).

  60. 60.

    Aluko (2002), p. 398.

  61. 61.

    Ibid, 399.

  62. 62.

    Ake (1991) cited in Aluko.

  63. 63.

    Burleigh (2013) (Noting that ‘public office is so lucrative that people will kill to get it’).

  64. 64.

    A Nigerian Legislator earns a basic wage of approximately £122,000 which nearly doubles what the British MPs earn and more than what the President of America earns. Yet 70 per cent of Nigerians live below the poverty line of £1.29 a day. See Burleigh Ibid.

  65. 65.

    Aluko, 399.

  66. 66.

    Former President Olusegun Obasanjo during his campaign for the PDP Governorship election in Delta and Rivers States noted that the party must win at all cost. See also Segun Olatunji, ‘I’m Ready to Spend N1bn to win Ekiti Election-Kashamu’ 31 August 2013 Punch Nigeria http://www.punchng.com/politics/hotseat/im-ready-to-spend-n1bn-for-pdp-to-win-ekiti-election-kashamu/ Marietu (2009), pp. 47–54.

  67. 67.

    See Burleigh citing an instance of a text message sent to Ayo Fayose former Governor of Ekiti State by the ‘Fayose M Squad’. ‘M’ stands for ‘murder’; the text message stated that they had stabbed and bludgeoned a third candidate to death on his own bed.

  68. 68.

    Akhaine (2013).

  69. 69.

    UNODC (2006).

  70. 70.

    Chen (2000), p. 409.

  71. 71.

    Barry (2000), p. 9.

  72. 72.

    See Article 55 of the UN Charter which emphasises universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms as indispensable to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among states. See also the UDHR 1948.

  73. 73.

    Lung-Chu Chen (2000), p. 86.

  74. 74.

    Lung-Chu Chen.

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    Ibid, 85.

  77. 77.

    See Part 9 Rome Statute relating to International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, particularly Articles 86–89.

  78. 78.

    Saif Al-Islam case.

  79. 79.

    ibid paras 204, 205, 206, 215 & 216.

  80. 80.

    Germain Katanga, case (Text to note 98 in Ch 2).

  81. 81.

    Ibid, para 20.

  82. 82.

    Ibid, para 78.

  83. 83.

    Bergsmo et al. (2010), pp. 791–811.

  84. 84.

    Article 93(10)(a) says that the Court may, upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a state party conducting an investigation into a trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting state.

  85. 85.

    Review Conference Resolution para 17(1)(a).

  86. 86.

    The Project comprises of four main components which provide distinct services; Case Matrix, the Elements Digest, the Proceedings Digest and the Means of Proof Digest.

  87. 87.

    The ICC’s Legal Tools are available on www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/ Accessed 10 May 2012.

  88. 88.

    Bergsmo et al. (2010).

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Human Rights Law Centre (HRLC), ‘National Implementation Database of the International Criminal Court’(hereinafter ‘NILD’) http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/newsholding/news2009/nationalimplementinglegislationdatabaselaunchedoniccwebsite.aspx (Accessed 15 November 2013).

  91. 91.

    NILD.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    The South African and Kenya implementing legislation are the only African models that have adopted the Rome Statute crimes and also adjusted other local laws, including provisions on immunities, that conflict with the provisions of the Statute.

  94. 94.

    Review Conference Resolution para 17(1)(b).

  95. 95.

    Ibid para 17(1)(c).

  96. 96.

    Rome Statute, Article 115.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, Article 116.

  98. 98.

    Per Lord Denning in Macfoy v UAC Ltd (1961) 3 WLR (PC) 1405.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, 1409.

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    Ovo Catherine Imoedemhe

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Imoedemhe, O.C. (2017). Mutual Inclusivity: A Sine qua non to National Implementation of Complementarity. In: The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46780-1_7

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