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Abstract

The problem of security protocols correctness is one of the main security problems connected with communication in computer networks. Several automatic tools for verifying properties of such protocols have been proposed and used. These tools allow to find weaknesses in many variants of the protocols proposed so far. However, these tools are not entirely bug-free. In this paper, we investigate some selected problems of well known, and widely used tools for protocols verification such as AVISPA, Scyther, VerICS or PathFinder. In our considerations, we propose a few examples of protocols that cannot be used in practice or do not ensure security goals, but are positively verified by some tools. We discuss problems connected with these observations and compare how different verification tools can solve them.

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Correspondence to Mirosław Kurkowski .

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Kurkowski, M., Kozakiewicz, A., Siedlecka-Lamch, O. (2017). Some Remarks on Security Protocols Verification Tools. In: Grzech, A., Świątek, J., Wilimowska, Z., Borzemski, L. (eds) Information Systems Architecture and Technology: Proceedings of 37th International Conference on Information Systems Architecture and Technology – ISAT 2016 – Part II. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 522. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46586-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46586-9_6

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