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Appendix: Some Basic Concepts of Philosophy of Science

  • Alexander Linsbichler
Chapter

Abstract

A brief outline of some basic concepts of philosophy of science over and above being a worthwhile end in itself prepares for the application of these concepts as analytical tools in the main body of the monograph. Particularly, a syntactic view of scientific theories, axiomatic systems, the idea of falsification, and the dichotomies analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori are surveyed. Finally, the logical structure of explanations and predictions according to the DN model is presented and exemplified.

Keywords

Syntactic view of theories Axiom Universal sentence DN model Explanation and prediction Falsification 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Linsbichler
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ViennaWienAustria

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