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Monetary Policy and the European Central Bank: A Progressive Divorce from the Bundesbank Legacy?

  • Enrico Marelli
  • Marcello Signorelli
Chapter
  • 1.1k Downloads

Abstract

This chapter begins with consideration of the key features of the European Central Bank (ECB), from its institutional set-up to its main economic features (such as the much debated independence and conservatism). The ECB’s operation and behaviour – concerning inflation (and other final goals), monetary strategies and key instruments (key interest rates) – are investigated through comparisons with those of other central banks (in particular the Federal Reserve in the United States).

Keywords

European Central Bank (ECB) Federal Reserve (FED) Inflation Euro Key interest rate 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enrico Marelli
    • 1
  • Marcello Signorelli
    • 2
  1. 1.University of BresciaBresciaItaly
  2. 2.University of PerugiaPerugiaItaly

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