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APDU-Level Attacks in PKCS#11 Devices

  • Claudio Bozzato
  • Riccardo FocardiEmail author
  • Francesco Palmarini
  • Graham Steel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9854)

Abstract

In this paper we describe attacks on PKCS#11 devices that we successfully mounted by interacting with the low-level APDU protocol, used to communicate with the device. They exploit proprietary implementation weaknesses which allow attackers to bypass the security enforced at the PKCS#11 level. Some of the attacks leak, as cleartext, sensitive cryptographic keys in devices that were previously considered secure. We present a new threat model for the PKCS#11 middleware and we discuss the new attacks with respect to various attackers and application configurations. All the attacks presented in this paper have been timely reported to manufacturers following a responsible disclosure process.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claudio Bozzato
    • 1
  • Riccardo Focardi
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Francesco Palmarini
    • 1
  • Graham Steel
    • 2
  1. 1.Ca’ Foscari UniversityVeniceItaly
  2. 2.CryptosenseParisFrance

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