Abstract
Near the end of the Protagoras there is a famous argument in which Socrates appears to deny the possibility of weakness of will (akrasia). The passage is part of a longer examination of whether virtue can be taught and of the unity of the virtues. Socrates and Protagoras discuss whether it makes sense to say, as people commonly do, that they sometimes choose to do things they know are not best for them because they are “overcome by pleasure.” Supposedly “the many” hold that the good is pleasure, and that one chooses what is less good because it is most pleasant. Socrates takes Protagoras through a kind of elenctic examination that purports to show that the many’s claim to being overcome by pleasure in akrasia is absurd or ridiculous. They can’t really do what they claim to do, choose the less good for the more good; thus, and the claim that they do is a misdescription of what really happens. People act in these cases due to ignorance of what is truly the most good (pleasant). In order to prevent people from choosing things that are not best for them, or to save them, Socrates says that what is needed is an art or science of measurement (357a–b). In this paper I want to focus on the idea of such an art or science of measurement.
I am grateful to participants in the Bergen conference in June 2014 for questions and comments, and in particular to Vivil Valvik Haraldsen for written comments and suggestions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Interestingly, this term is not actually used in the dialogue.
- 2.
- 3.
Of course, Protagoras is best known for his famous saying that “Man is the measure of all things” (“panton chrematon anthropon metron”, Theaetetus 160d6–7). We should recall what Socrates asks about Protagoras in Theaetetus: If what each man believes to be true through sensation is true for him … then how, my friend, was Protagoras so wise that he should consider himself worthy (axiousthai) to teach others and for huge fees? And how are we so ignorant that we should go to school to him, if each of us is the measure of his own wisdom (metron onti eautoi hekastoi tês autou sophias, Theaetetus 161e)? See also Coby (1987), who suggests that the science of measurement in Protagoras is itself an implicit reference to Protagoras’ doctrine that man is the measure of all things (153).
- 4.
Richardson (1990) uses The Statesman to describe a higher criterion for a science of measurement at 284e–287a: it should give a unified and systematic account of a field while also adding quantitative precision (31). But the measurement here provides only qualitative evaluation. Compare this to Phaedo 69a, which speaks of trading virtues for things that are larger, as if they were coins. But in the Phaedo Socrates clearly does not mean that wisdom is a kind of good to be maximized. “Rather, it is itself a regulative grasp of the true good or goods that serves to specify appropriate definitions of the virtues” (Richardson 1990, 31).
- 5.
For more, see Gonzalez (2014, footnote 30, part B, p. 50).
- 6.
Richardson (1990) does refer to the science as having a “fact-finding role,” but he does not pursue the thread I do here, concerning the particular power of this technê to counteract deceptive appearances.
- 7.
See Richardson (1990, n. 47) for several references to measurement in other dialogues, including Republic 7.522c, Statesman 285a, and Philebus 55d–e. Richardson cites a comparison passage in Philebus that lists examples of the art of measurement for the technê of building.
- 8.
- 9.
See Moss (2012).
- 10.
See Freeland (2008).
References
Annas, Julia. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon.
Arieti, James A. 1991. Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama. Savage: Rowman and Littlefield.
Balaban, Oded. 1987. The Myth of Protagoras and Plato’s Theory of Measurement. History of Philosophy Quarterly 4: 371–384.
Brumbaugh, Robert. 1993. Four Types of Plato Interpretation. In Plato’s Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations, ed. Gerald Press, 239–248. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield.
Coby, Patrick. 1987. Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato’s Protagoras. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.
Freeland, Cynthia. 2008. Nearer Means Bigger: Artistic Imitations and Pleasure-Illusions in Republic IX, X and the Philebus. Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift (Norwegian Journal of Philosophy) 43(2): 137–147.
Gonzalez, Francisco. 2014. The Virtue of Dialogue, Dialogue as Virtue in Plato’s Protagoras. Philosophical Papers 43(1): 33–66.
Lavery, Jonathan. 2007. Plato’s Protagoras and the Frontier of Genre Research: A Reconnaissance Report from the Field. Poetics Today 28(2): 191–246.
Moss, Jessica. 2006. Pleasure and Illusion in Plato. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 503–535.
Moss, Jessica. 2012. Pictures and Passions in Plato. In Plato and the Divided Self, ed. R. Barney, C. Brittain, and T. Brennan, 259–280. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nehamas, Alexander. 1999. Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic X. In Virtues of Authenticity, ed. A. Nehamas, 251–279. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plato. Protagoras. 1982. Trans. B.A.F. Hubbard and E.S. Karnofsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Plato. Protagoras. 1991. Translated with Notes by C.C.W. Taylor. Plato Series, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
Plato. Protagoras. 1992. Trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell and Introduced by Michael Frede. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Reeve, Christopher. 2010. Blindness and Reorientation: Education and the Acquisition of Knowledge in the Republic. In Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, ed. M. McPherran, 209–228. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, Henry. 1990. Measurement, Pleasure, and Practical Science in Plato’s Protagoras. Journal of the History of Philosophy 28(1): 7–32.
Russell, Daniel C. 2000. Protagoras and Socrates on Courage and Pleasure: Protagoras 349d ad Finem. Ancient Philosophy 20(2): 311–338.
Shorey, Paul. 1933. What Plato Said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, C.C.W. 1983. Review of Plato’s Protagoras. Trans. B.A.F. Hubbard and E.S. Karnofsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. The Classical Review, New Series 33(2): 332–333.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1956. Introduction. In Plato’s Protagoras. B. Jowett’s Translation Extensively Revised by Martin Oswald, ed. Gregory Vlastos. New York: The Liberal Arts Press.
Woolf, Raphael. 2002. Consistency and Akrasia in Plato’s ‘Protagoras’. Phronesis 47(3): 224–252.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Freeland, C. (2017). The Science of Measuring Pleasure and Pain. In: Pettersson, O., Songe-Møller, V. (eds) Plato’s Protagoras. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 125. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45585-3_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45585-3_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-45583-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-45585-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)