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Equality

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The Fundamental Principles of EEA Law

Abstract

This chapter explores the principle of equality in EEA law. The principle of equality is established in 4th recital of the EEA Agreement. According to this recital, the objective of the EEA is to establish a dynamic and homogeneous EEA, based on common rules and equal conditions of competition and providing for the adequate means of enforcement including at the judicial level, achieved on the basis of equality and reciprocity and of an overall balance of benefits, rights and obligations for the Contracting Parties. This presumption of equality is explored through three examples, which show the importance of the presumption of equality between the two pillars of the EEA as well as for the actors within the two pillars.

The views expressed in this text are the private opinions of the author and are in no way to be seen as the point of view of the Finansinspektionen.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the chapter by Philipp Speitler, Judicial homogeneity as a Fundamental Principle of the EEA, section 4.2, and the chapter by Carl Baudenbacher, Reciprocity, section 1.

  2. 2.

    “The principle of homogeneity therefore leads to a presumption that provisions framed in the same way in the EEA Agreement and EC law are to be construed in the same way.” See Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, L’Oréal Norge AS v Aarskog Per AS and Others and Smart Club Norge [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 259, paragraph 27.

  3. 3.

    Cf. 4th recital of the EEA Agreement.

  4. 4.

    Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 47. See Bonneau (2016), pp. 365 et seq, and Stage (2016), p. 156.

  5. 5.

    Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ 1989 L 334, p. 30.

  6. 6.

    Point 29 to Annex IX (Financial services) of the EEA Agreement. This point was repealed in the EEA as late as 2013, through EEA JCD No. 118/2013 (OJ 2013 L 318, p. 20). Article 11 IDD did not apply in the EEA.

  7. 7.

    See Welch et al. (2005).

  8. 8.

    Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16.

  9. 9.

    Point 29a to Annex IX (Financial services) of the EEA Agreement. Incorporated through EEA JCD No. 38/2004 (JO 2004 L 277, p. 7), adopted 23 April 2004. Confirmed e.i.f. 1 June 2005. Provisionally applicable between 23 October 2004 and 1 June 2005.

  10. 10.

    Lycke (2013), p. 186; Samuelsson et al. (2005), p. 168.

  11. 11.

    Recital 12 MAD.

  12. 12.

    Recitals 19, 38 and 39 MAD. Cf. Article 14 MAD.

  13. 13.

    Thiele (2014), pp. 494 et seq.

  14. 14.

    Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ 2014 L 173, p. 1 and Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), OJ L 173, p. 179.

  15. 15.

    In Sweden, the legislation implementing Article 23.1 MAR introduced the possibility of the Financial Supervisory Authority to conduct “dawn raids” under conditions similar to those of the Swedish Competition Authority under the Swedish Competition Act.

  16. 16.

    See Recital 31 MAD-CRIM. On the Danish exception from Chapter V of the TFEU as an exemption from supranational co-operation and the freedom of Denmark to participate as long as co-operation remains intergovernmental, see Adler-Nissen (2015), p. 117.

  17. 17.

    In a judgment from 2010 the Norwegian Supreme Court decided that the competent court concerning insider trading of shares registered on the Oslo stock exchange would be Oslo. The Court found that this was the place where the offence had been committed. Judgment 11 June 2010, HR-2010-01008-A. It is unclear whether these findings also apply to market abuse committed on regulated markets outside of Norway. Cf. Verdipapirhandelsloven § 3-1.

  18. 18.

    Norwegian legislation provides sanctions of market abuse on regulated markets and MTFs in Norway, but not market abuse on OTFs. Market abuse on MTFs and OTFs outside of Norway is not sanctioned in Norwegian legislation. See Verdipapirhandelsloven §§ 3-1 and 3-8.

  19. 19.

    Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ 2010 L 331, p. 84.

  20. 20.

    Article 1(5) of ESMA Regulation.

  21. 21.

    Article 2 of ESMA Regulation.

  22. 22.

    Article 6 and 60 of ESMA Regulation.

  23. 23.

    Article 40 of ESMA Regulation.

  24. 24.

    Chapter II of ESMA Regulation.

  25. 25.

    Article 17(6) of ESMA Regulation.

  26. 26.

    COM(2016) 319 final.

  27. 27.

    COM(2016) 319 final, p. 7.

  28. 28.

    Baur (2016), p. 49 and Temple Lang (2016), p. 526.

  29. 29.

    Sjöberg (2013), pp. 197 et seq.

  30. 30.

    Baur (2016), p. 67.

  31. 31.

    The scope of the challenge is clear from the time it took the contracting parties to incorporate the ESMA Regulation in the EEA.

  32. 32.

    Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, OJ 2001 L 125, p. 15.

  33. 33.

    Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190.

  34. 34.

    Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1.

  35. 35.

    Point 16c of Annex IX (Financial services) of the EEA Agreement. JCD No. 167/2002, OJ 2003 L 38, p 28. JCD adopted 6 December 2002. Confirmed e.i.f. 1 August 2003. Provisionally applicable between 7 June 2003 and 1 August 2003.

  36. 36.

    Case E-28/15, Yankuba Jabbi, [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 577, paragraph 62.

  37. 37.

    For a discussion on the ‘widening gap’, see Fredriksen (2016), p. 105, with further references.

  38. 38.

    One judgment of the ECJ that concerns Slovakia will not be dealt with here. See Case C-526/14 Kotnik and others EU:C:2016:570.

  39. 39.

    Case E-18/11, Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. v Kaupþing hf [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 592, Case C-85/12 LBI hf v Kepler Capital Markets SA and Frédéric Giraux EU:C:2013:697, and Case E-28/13, LBI hf v Merrill Lynch Int Ltd. [2014] EFTA Ct. Rep. 970.

  40. 40.

    Baudenbacher (2016), pp. 187 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Irish Bank, paragraph 97.

  42. 42.

    Irish Bank, paragraph 99.

  43. 43.

    Irish Bank, paragraph 93.

  44. 44.

    For a discussion of this judgment in a wider context, see Schmauch (2013).

  45. 45.

    LBI v Kepler, paragraph 17.

  46. 46.

    LBI v Kepler, paragraph 23.

  47. 47.

    LBI v Kepler, paragraph 36.

  48. 48.

    LBI v Merril Lynch, paragraph 23.

  49. 49.

    LBI v Merril Lynch, paragraphs 27–33.

  50. 50.

    LBI v Merril Lynch, paragraph 34.

  51. 51.

    LBI v Merril Lynch, paragraphs 44–45.

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  1. Finansinspektionen, Stockholm, Sweden

    Magnus Schmauch

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  1. EFTA Court, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Carl Baudenbacher

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Schmauch, M. (2017). Equality. In: Baudenbacher, C. (eds) The Fundamental Principles of EEA Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45189-3_10

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