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Aristotle, Frege and “Second Nature”

  • Raffaela Giovagnoli
  • Philip Larrey
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Universal Logic book series (SUL)

Abstract

Aristotle proposed a “naturalistic” epistemological perspective that rests on some fundamental notions:
  • Perceptual judgment (passivity and activity),

  • Simple propositions (subject and predicate),

  • Complex propositions (syllogisms).

As is well known, the “Square of Opposition” provides the possibility of a fruitful classification of reality that is made of things, species and genus. Frege introduced a new form of notation that is exemplified in his Begriffschrift and changed the Aristotelian square. He introduced a conception of judgment that entails a fundamental relationship with a “second nature”. Starting from this background, McDowell and Brandom present two original views of the “second nature” which are subject to some criticisms.

Keywords

Second nature Concepts Rationality Normativity 

Mathematics Subject Classification

00-02 03AXX 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyPontifical Lateran UniversityRomeItaly

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