Electoral Rules and Proportionality in Spain: Estimating the Impact of some Swedish Rules Through the 2011 Electoral Data

  • Jose M. Pavia
  • Fernando Toboso
Part of the Studies in Political Economy book series (POEC)


In democratic countries policy making is always framed by many procedures and rules. Some of these rules are particularly critical for allowing more or less proportionality in legislative chambers, though the behavior of political actors also matter. The rules used for technically converting votes into political representatives often exercise such an important role in western countries. In this chapter we provide an estimation of the impact upon proportionality between seats and votes that might have resulted in the 2011 Spanish general elections if some Swedish electoral rules had been applied, ceteris paribus. As we are aware that electoral reforms favouring proportionality may hinder the emergence of stable majorities our findings should therefore be considered only as a contribution for a deeper examination and informed discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of the current Spanish electoral system.


Political Party Electoral System Proportional Representation Electoral Rule Constitutional Reform 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



We wish to thank Tor Lundberg and Henrik Hannebo (Swedish Election Authority, Valmyndigheten) for their help in answering all our questions about the Swedish electoral system. Any responsibility resides, however, on the authors. This workbenefited from the support received by the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness under grant CSO2013-43054-R.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.GIPEyOP, Department of Applied EconomicsUniversitat de ValènciaValenciaSpain

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