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Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Time

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Book cover Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding

Part of the book series: The Frontiers Collection ((FRONTCOLL))

Abstract

The conception of time as an absolute, eternal and imperishable entity is commonplace in several religious and philosophical systems. In the context of classical Indian philosophy, this position was advocated by the Nyāya school of logic and epistemology. This article presents an outline of the critique of the Nyāya concept of time put forward by Śrīharṣa, a 12th-century scholar in the Advaita Vedānta school of philosophical theology. In his philosophical treatise, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, Śrīharṣa dismantles the Nyāya position based on a critical examination of its definition of causality and time-forms. The dismissal of the ontological reality of time is also discussed with reference to the works of two later Advaitins, namely Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    All technical terms used in this article are in Sanskrit.

  2. 2.

    For the view that Śrīharṣa’s method of argument was essentially deconstructionist, i.e., aimed at showing that the opponents’ doctrines contradicted themselves, see Granoff [9]; for the argument that he had a positive program involving a personal defense of Advaita teachings, see Phillips [15].

  3. 3.

    For a general treatment of time according to Nyāya(-Vaiśeṣika), see: Balslev [6]: 25–43, [7, 8] [10]: 205–228, [12–14]. The following discussion is based especially on the first two references.

  4. 4.

    Generally speaking, Nyāya accepts seven such categories: 1. substance (dravya); 2. quality (guṇa); 3. activity (karman); 4. generality (sāmānya); 5. individuator (viśeṣa); 6. inherence (samavāya); 7. absence (abhāva).

  5. 5.

    For a more detailed discussion of this proof, see [7]: 184–187.

  6. 6.

    We must keep in mind, however, that Śrīharṣa does not himself present the Advaita view on the subject but, given the nature of his work, confines himself to a critical treatment of other schools. As far as we know, there exists no detailed treatment of time from the perspective of Advaita Vedānta in secondary literature. For general treatments, see: [11, 14]. Reference [6] has a short section on Advaita Vedānta (pp. 57–72) in which he also briefly addresses Śrīharṣa’s rejection of the Nyāya position.

  7. 7.

    The letters in brackets refer to the corresponding sections of the Sanskrit text in the Appendix. We have introduced these subsections for the sake of clarity.

  8. 8.

    Prior absence means the non-existence (abhāva) of something that is yet to come to existence (e.g., the absence of a house about to be constructed); posterior absence means the non-existence arising from the annihilation of something that was existing previously (e.g., the absence resulting from the demolition of the house).

  9. 9.

    In Nyāya literature, the term pratiyogin (counter-positive or adjunct) is abundantly used. In the sentence, "that pot was broken," the counter-positive of the absence of the pot (as a result of being broken) is the pot itself. Such type of counter-positive is generally referred to as abhāvapratiyogin (absential counter-positive) in contradistinction to bhedapratiyogin (differential counter-positive) and sambandhapratiyogin (relational  counter-positive). It is understood here that both the destruction of prior absence and the prior absence of destruction are essentially counter-positives themselves. As the saying goes: prāgabhāvadhvaṃsaḥ pratiyogirūpaḥ, dhvaṃsaprāgabhāvo ‘pi pratiyogirūpaḥ.

  10. 10.

    In the cognition of a cow, what is cognized is an entity that is endowed with the general property of cowness; this cowness is technically referred to as the qualifier (prakāra) in the cognition.

  11. 11.

    pratyakṣāgocaratvena paratvāder alingataḥ | svarūpato ‘nimittatvāt upādhau niṣphalatvataḥ || divākaraparispandapiṇḍasaṃgatisaṃbhavāt | vyāpinaś cetanād eva kathaṃ kālaḥ prasiddhyati || (Tattvapradīpikā: 510).

  12. 12.

    kālas tv avidyaiva tasyā eva sarvādhāratvāt (Siddhāntabindu: 66).

  13. 13.

    janyānāṃ janakaḥ kālo jagatāṃ āśrayo mataḥ (pratyakṣakhaṇḍa, kālanirūpaṇa, v. 45) (Kārikāvalī: 195).

  14. 14.

    san nāpy asan nāpy ubhayātmikā no bhinnāpy abhinnāpy ubhayātmikā no | sāṅgāpy anaṅgā hy ubhayātmikā no mahādbhutā 'nirvacanīyarūpā (v.109) (Vivekacūḍāmaṇi: 45).

Abbreviations

KKK:

Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya

TP:

Tattvapradīpikā

References

Primary Sources

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Newton International Fellow, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Jonathan Duquette

  2. Cell for Indian Science and Technology in Sanskrit, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Bombay, Mumbai, India

    Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian

Authors
  1. Jonathan Duquette
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  2. Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jonathan Duquette .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Podar Educational Complex, R. N. Podar (CBSE) Podar Educational Complex, Mumbai, India

    Shyam Wuppuluri

  2. Centre for Theoretical Physics, Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy

    Giancarlo Ghirardi

Appendix

Appendix

The Sanskrit text presented here is based on the printed edition of the KKK in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series no. 146, pp. 1233–1247 (see References ).

[A] evaṃ kāraṇalakṣaṇaṃ nirasya tadviśeṣībhūtakālakhaṇḍanam upakramate. niyame ca prākkālīnatayā ’bhidhīyamāne prāg ity asya vyavacchedyau vartamānabhaviṣyatkālau, prākkālaś ca vyavacchedako vivecanīyaḥ, na ca tadvivecanaṃ śakyam. vartamānādibuddhaya eva svaviṣayavaicitrye pramāṇam iti cen na. tathā hi vartamānādibuddher eva ko viṣayaḥ? kālaviśeṣa iti cen na.

[B] kālasya viśeṣaḥ svābhāvika aupādhiko vā. nādyaḥ kālasya bhavadbhir ekatvābhyupagamāt. ya eva kālo vartamānaḥ pratīyate sa eva pūrvaṃ bhāvīti paścāt bhūta iti ca na pratīyeta. trividhasvabhāva evāsāv iti cen na. bhedaprasaṅgāt vyavasthānupapattiprasaṅgāc ca. yadaiva vartata iti pratyayas tadaiva vṛtto vartiṣyata iti pratyayaprasaṅgāt.

[C] dvitīyaś ced upādhir abhidhīyatām. sūryādikriyāsambandhabhedaḥ sa iti cen na. bhūtabhaviṣyator api kriyāsambandhapratyayasyāvaśyaṃ vaktavyatvāt. ya eva divasaḥ sūryagativiśeṣāvacchinno vartata iti pratītaḥ, sa eva hi tadavacchinno vṛtta ity avagamyate vartsyann iti ca.

[…]

nanu satyam etat, paraṃ yadā tadupādhisambandhas tasya svarūpeṇāvatiṣṭhamānas tadā vartamānapratyayaḥ, yadā sa eva vinaṣṭo bhavati tadā bhūtapratyayo, yadā ’nāgatas tadā bhaviṣyatpratyaya iti naitad asti.

yady atra laṭo vivakṣito ’rthas tadā tajjñānasyaiva tajjñānopāyatvam ity ātmāśrayānavasthayor anyataraprasaṅgaḥ […]

[D] kriyāvacchinnaḥ kālo vartamānaḥ tatprāgabhāvāvacchinno bhūtas tatpradhvaṃsāvacchinno bhaviṣyann iti cen na. atītānāgatapratītikālo ’pi kriyāvacchinnaḥ pratīyata iti vartamānapratyayaprasaṅgasya tādavasthyāt kriyānavacchinnasya tatprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsabhāvāvacchedānupapatteḥ.

prāgabhāvaś ca prāgarthāniruktau kathaṃ na duradhigamaḥ? pradhvaṃsasyāpi prāgabhāvāt kathaṃ viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ? abhāvo vināśī prāgabhāva, utpattimān pradhvaṃsa ity anayor viśeṣa iti cen na. ko hi prāgabhāvasya vināśo yena vināśīty ucyate? yadi pratiyogibhūto ghaṭādiḥ pradhvaṃsasyāpi prāgabhāvavat pratiyogīti so ’pi vināśī prāptaḥ. utpattimāṃś ca pradhvaṃsa ity utpattipadārtho vivecanīyaḥ. yady asāv asataḥ sattvaṃ tac ca sāmānyaṃ, tadā ’bhāve ’sambhava eva. atha svarūpasattvaṃ tadā prāgabhāve ’pi prasaṅgaḥ, tasyāpi kadācid asattvāt. pūrvam asataḥ paścāt sattvaṃ vivakṣitam iti cen na. pūrvedānīṃpaścādarthasyaivānirūpaṇāt. etena kāraṇāvacchinnaṃ sattvam utpattir ity api nirastam. pūrvāparanirvacanam antareṇa kāraṇārthānirvacanāt.

[E] astu tāvad atītānāgatayor yathātathā niruktiḥ. yatkriyāvacchinno yaḥ kālaḥ sa tatkriyāpekṣayā vartamāno, na tv anyāpekṣayeti cet tadapekṣayeti ko ’rthaḥ. kiṃ tadupadhānena, uta tadavadhikatayā, uta tatpratiyogikatayā, uta tena prakāreṇety eva?

nādyaḥ, upādhyavacchinnasyātītānāgatapratipattiviṣayatvam api tasyety asakṛd uktatvāt.

nāpi dvitīyaḥ, asmād ayaṃ dīrgha itivad asmād ayaṃ vartata ity avadhyapekṣām antareṇa pratīyamānatvāt, sarvadaiva ca trividhāvadhyapekṣayā āsīd asti bhaviṣyatīti pratyayāvyavasthāprasaṅgāt.

ata eva na tṛtīyaḥ.

nāpi caturthaḥ, atītānāgatapratītikāle kriyāvacchedaprakāreṇa vartamānapratyayaviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt. nāsau kriyāvacchedalakṣaṇaḥ prakāro ’tītānāgatakāle vartata iti cen na. vartamānatāyā adyāpy anirūpaṇena vartata ity uktvā viśeṣasya darśayitum aśakyatvāt.

[…]

[F] syād etat grāhakavijñānaviṣayo grāhakavijñānāśrayaś ca kālo vartamānaḥ, vartamānopādhiprāgabhāvāvacchinnaś ca pūrvas tatpradhvaṃsābhāvāvacchinnaś cānāgataḥ, prāgabhāvapradhvaṃsayoś ca svābhāvikam eva bhedam ādāya vyavasthā. […] iti maivam.

jñānāsvaprakāśatāpakṣe svopahitasya svayaṃ grahaṇānupapatteḥ kathaṃ vartamānatāgrahaḥ, jñānāntareṇa ca tathāgrahe vartamānatāvabhāsāṅgīkāre tadā ’sau dṛṣṭo mayeti pratyayasya tadā ’sau mayā dṛśyata ity ākāratāpattiḥ.

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Duquette, J., Ramasubramanian, K. (2017). Śrīharṣa on the Indefinability of Time. In: Wuppuluri, S., Ghirardi, G. (eds) Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44418-5_4

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