Chapter 11: Russia’s Security-Related Decision-Making: The Case of Crimea

  • Stephen FortescueEmail author


In the context of the ongoing debate over the relative importance of personalist and institutionalized arrangements in contemporary Russian policy-making, an analysis is undertaken of the Russian decision to annex Crimea. The findings, while necessarily tentative, are that, while the specific decision was probably taken within a small group of officials with close personal links to the president, those officials themselves represent significant policy institutions. Additionally, decision makers had access to a range of information sources on the potential implications of the annexation decision. However, while the presence of institutional arrangements with moderating potential should not be ignored, it is suggested that they are weaker here than in less security-related areas of Russian politics.


Foreign Policy Security Council Security Agency Military Expenditure Permanent Member 
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© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South Wales and Australian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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