Abstract
This chapter deals with the denial of the ontological sense of transcendence from a Chinese Buddhist point of view. Buddhist sources usually emphasize that everything we encounter or experience in the world we inhabit comes to our attention as a referent of our own intentional acts. This implies that all things and events are compound phenomena, built upon a manifoldness of interrelated components. The technical term for this is called “conditioned co-arising” (Sanskrit: pratītya-samutpāda, Chinese: yuanqi 緣起) and it means that there is no thing which arises apart from a relation of mutual dependence between itself and other things.
Chinese Mahāyāna sources particularly stress the “emptiness of inherent existence” (Sanskrit: śūnyatā, Chinese: kong 空), since interdependently arising things are constituted on the basis of extrinsic relationships. Emptiness sustains all interdependent arising in the sense that it denies an independent and intrinsic nature that informs the identity of particular things. What appears to be a distinctive and singular entity is not intrinsically existent and is not ultimately real. However, such unreality evades our conventional awareness like a blind spot, precisely due to the fact that this falsehood permeates all of our epistemic-propositional references. “Ontological indeterminacy” thus addresses the ontological status of an inevitable, but evading, falsehood that shapes the way in which we relate to and exist in our world. To understand the true sense of emptiness is to realize the existential relevance of falsehood and also to differentiate illusory existence from what is ultimately real.
However, this means that the stance of ontological indeterminacy excludes the transcendent sense of ultimate reality, while its concomitant awareness of falsehood includes a form of self-referential observation. This again requires the use of paradoxical language to avoid falling prey to the deceptive force of that falsehood. Hence, awareness is dynamic and constantly renews itself, realizing the always variegating blind spot in a course of self-modifying observation. This chapter discusses Seng Zhao’s (僧肇 374–414), Zhiyi’s (538–597), and Fazang’s (法藏 643–712) approaches to such emptiness of transcendence, ontological indeterminacy, and awareness of the blind spot.
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- 1.
See Seng Zhao’s commentary on the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra:僧肇《注維摩詰經》卷1〈1 佛國品水〉: 「肇曰: 欲言其有, 有不自生; 欲言其無, 緣會即形。會形非謂無, 非自非謂有。且有有故有無; 無有何所無? 有無故有有; 無無何所有? 然則自有則不有, 自無則不無。此法王之正說也。」(T38, no. 1775, p. 332, c27-p. 333, a2. The abbreviation “T” refers to the collection of the Chinese Buddhist Canon: Taishō Shinshū daizōkyō 大正信州大蔵経 [1]). The term “dharma” (in Chinese: fa 法) is derived from the Sanskrit root “dhŗ,” which means “to adhere,” “hold,” etc. “Dharma” is a noun, and its Chinese translation, “fa,” means “law,” “example,” and “imitation.” Chinese Buddhist texts use this term in different ways. Often, it conveys the sense of “thing” or “entity,” but also appears in compound expressions, such as “Buddha-dharma” (law of the Buddha’s teaching) or “dharma-king” (the one who announces Buddha’s teachings). All this expresses that the way things appear to us depends on, or determined by, our behavioral or habitual relationships to those things. The existence of an intrinsic nature does not inform about the identity of a particular thing. What constitutes a thing is rooted in our habitual tendencies, according to Mahāyāna Buddhism. Therefore, “dharma” or “fa” is often used as a synonym for the Buddhist sense of “thing.”
- 2.
The famous Central Asian Kumārajīva (343–413) introduced Indian Madhyamaka thought to China and translated Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, which is also called the Zhong lun (中論), into Chinese. Seng Zhao was one of his eminent disciples who supported his master’s teaching of Nāgārjuna’s thought in China. Seng Zhao left four short treatises, known as the Zhao lun (肇論), as well as his commentary on the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra. All this has been very influential in the further development of Chinese Buddhist thought. Kumārajīva’s Zhong lun differs from the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the Kārikā; moreover, it contains Piṅgala’s commentary, which does not exist anymore in Sanskrit and Tibetan. The Zhong lun is one of the most important root texts in Chinese Buddhist thought.
- 3.
The literal sense of the Sanskrit term “svabhāva” is “self-being” or “self-existent,” and Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation “zixing” (自性) means “self-nature” or “intrinsic nature.” The initial part of chapter 15 in the Chinese Zhong lun (Kārikā) expands on a sense of “self-nature” (zixing), or “self-being” (svabhāva), which inevitably occurs whenever we consider the reference point of our intentional acts to be an entity that really exists. However, the whole discussion actually tries to prove that, in the context of “pratītyasamutpāda” (“conditioned co-arising”), this assumption of “svabhāva” is not coherent, although our references must posit that sense, see T30, no. 1564, p. 20, a12–13. In our attempts to point at something real, we inevitably construe the svabhāva of things that are unreal. “Svabhāva” seems to indicate an inevitable reification or hypostatization that evades the awareness in our epistemic-propositional references. Hence, “emptiness of svabhāva” expresses the fact that there is no ontological equivalent of the semantic construction that we cannot cease to produce in our language use. From this point of view, it might sound misleading to examine the ontological and epistemological dimensions of this concept in the understanding of Madhyamaka. For a discussion that, nevertheless, expands on those topics, see Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka––A Philosophical Introduction, 19–53 [17].
- 4.
Chapter 23 of the Zhong lun expresses the same thought, stating that there are no “inversions” that are really existent. This entails the paradox that the claim of the real existence of inversions really is an inversion. In other words, the falsehood Nāgārjuna talks about evades our epistemic-propositional references.
- 5.
See also the chapter “Von der Beobachtung des Unbeobachtbaren (On the Observing of the Unobservable),” in Niklas Luhmann and Peter Fuchs, Reden und Schweigen [12], which deals with this issue with regard to Zen Buddhism and mysticism. I do not completely agree with their understanding of Zen as mysticism.
- 6.
《肇論》卷1: 「夫有所知, 則有所不知。以聖心無知, 故無所不知。不知之知, 乃曰一切知。… 聖應可無而為, 斯則不知而自知。」 (T45, no. 1858, p. 153, a27-b17). Liebenthal’s translation and understanding of this seems to differ from mine; he is not aware of the ambiguity in both zhi 知and buzhi 不知; see Walter Liebenthal, Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-chao, 78–86 [10].
- 7.
See (T45, no. 1859, p. 177, b12–19) and (T45, no. 1860, p. 214, a22–b5).
- 8.
See Zhiyi’s Great Calming and Contemplation (Mohe zhiguan)《摩訶止觀》卷3: 「凡情馳想種種推畫, 分別悟與不悟、心與不心。凡聖差別絕, 則待於不絕, 不思議待思議。輪轉相待, 絕無所寄。若得意亡言, 心行亦斷。隨智妙悟, 無復分別, 亦不言悟不悟、聖不聖、心不心、思議不思議等。種種妄想, 緣理分別, 皆名為待。真慧開發, 絕此諸待, 絕即復絕。」(T46, no. 1911, p. 22, b10–16).
- 9.
Zhiyi uses the term “suspension of correlative dependence” (juedai 絕待) also as a synonym for “subtle” (miao 妙) and “inconceivable” (busiyi 不思議) in the Tiantai teaching.
- 10.
See the Da zhi du lun (大智度論), (Sanskrit: *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa)—a commentary on one of the large Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (early Mahāyāna sūtras), also translated by Kumārajīva, which is currently existent only in Chinese: “Again, all dharmas are ultimately empty; this ultimate emptiness is also empty; as emptiness is devoid of dharmas, it is also devoid of [the mutual interdependence] of falsehood and reality” (T25:1509.290a4-5).
- 11.
See the Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) explanation of the “inseparability of truth and falsehood” (zhenwang hehe 真妄和合) in his commentary on the Awakening of Faith (Dasheng qi xin lun yi ji 大乘起信論義記): “If we follow the stream [and transmigrate through] birth and death, then falsehood has effect; [but] although [in these circumstances] it is falsehood that has effect, it cannot arise apart from truth. If we go against the stream [of birth and death], and are released from its fetters, then truth has effect; [but] although [under these circumstances] it is truth that has effect, it cannot be manifested apart from falsehood.…It is like the water of the great ocean: There is the motion of the waves owing to the wind, but the mark of the wind and that of the water are inseparable” (T44:1846.275a3–5, and T44:1846.254c13–14).
- 12.
The Tiantai masters call this: “dharma-nature is ignorance; ignorance is dharma-nature” (faxing ji wuming, wuming ji faxing, 法性即無明, 無明即法性). “Dharma-nature” can be understood as the nature of reality, while “ignorance” is another term for falsehood. This phrase means that to understand the nature of all dharmas is to comprehend ignorance, which also implies the reverse.
- 13.
Yang Zengwen (楊曾文) holds that the technical term “four perspectives of dharma-realm” has been coined by Chengguan, yet the idea that it expresses does not go beyond Fazang’s understanding of “dharma-realm as conditioned co-arising” (fajie yuanqi 法界緣起). See Kamata Shigeo Hakasei koshi kinenkai (鎌田茂雄博士古稀紀念會 1997), 1256 [6] and Zhang Wenliang (張文良 2008), 68 [18], as well as Kimura Kōshū (木村清孝 1977), 79 [9].
- 14.
This, for example, is clearly described by Fazang in his Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang (華嚴一乘教義分齊章), “Treatise on the Conformance and Difference between Teaching and Meaning Regarding the One Vehicle of the Huayan Sūtra.” In the fourth chapter, called “Differentiating the doctrines and expounding the schools” (fenjiao kaizong 分教開宗), the first six of ten listed schools describe the views of the Small Vehicle. The succeeding part of this section follows Fazang’s presentation from the Treatise and Chengguan’s commentary to the Huayan fajie xuanjing. An annotated translation of Fazang’s text into Japanese with a lot of references to the pre-modern commentaries is provided by Kamata Shigeo (鎌田茂雄 1995) [5]. For a detailed interpretation of this section, see Ishii Kosei (石井公成 1996) [3]. For a comprehensive survey of Huayan texts, studies, and thought, ancient and modern, see Kamata Shigeo (鎌田茂雄 1993) [4].
- 15.
Brook Ziporyn translates li (理) as “coherence,” which might be problematic with regard to the Buddhist context where it is often associated with “inconceivable,” “non-achieving” (wude 無得), or “devoid of ground” (wusuoyi 無所依), but also with “reality (true suchness)” (zhenru 真如) (Ziporyn 2012 [19]). However, Ziporyn also correctly points out that this term deals with “ironies of difference and identity.” I follow the usual translation of “principle.” In Buddhist texts, “principle” (li 理) and “things” (shi 事) often appear as a binary of coupled opposites, called li shi (理事); li expresses truth and liberation, while shi means attachment, clinging, construction, and falsehood. The binary expresses reality and unreality. “Dharma-realm as principle” means “true emptiness” (zhenkong 真空).
- 16.
See Kantor, “Philosophical Aspects of Sixth Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on Mind” 337–397 [8].
- 17.
This is the way in which Huiyuan (慧遠523-593) uses this famous Buddhist simile in his commentary to the śrīmālādevi-sūtra (X: 19:351a10–13) to explain “non-emptiness” as the reality of tathāgata-garbha.
- 18.
“Tathāgata-garbha” means that there really is an indestructible and all-pervasive potential to become (a) Buddha in every sentient being, since our ever-changing and unreal world, which we constantly produce, must be seen as inverse manifestations of buddhahood. The Sanskrit “tathāgata” is used as a synonym for Buddha, and one of the meanings of the Sanskrit “garbha” is “embryo.” The compound expression “tathāgata-garbha” seems to imply that all the delusions and defilements of sentient beings, nonetheless, contain the potential to become a Buddha probably on account of their nature as inverse instructiveness. The Chinese translation “rulai zang” (如來藏) for the Sanskrit term literally means “store of the tathāgata” and is often used in the sense of storing the innumerable Buddha-virtues and achievements that mark the whole path of transformation of all sentient beings.
- 19.
For the Huayan masters, this is described and exemplified in the Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra (T 12:374.523b12-19).
- 20.
Fazang also quotes from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra to find evidence from the sūtras for his view and interpretation of the gradual and sudden.
- 21.
Chengguan’s interpretation further includes the Chan/Zen teaching into this category of teaching.
- 22.
Mutual inclusion and inseparability of the expressible and inexpressible are explained in the initial passages of the first chapter “Constituting the One Vehicle” (jianli yisheng 建立一乘) of Fazang’s Treatise.
- 23.
Each of all particular waves retains the entire ocean with all of its waves so that the single ocean as a whole consists in this “inexhaustible complexity of mutually constitutive layers,” also called “complete integration of the primary and concomitant” (zhuban juzu 主伴俱足). Only the Huayan sūtra expresses the true meaning of the perfected teaching realizing the full sense of “dharma-realm as conditioned co-arising” (fajie yuanqi 法界緣起), according to the Huayan school.
- 24.
See footnote 21.
- 25.
See Fazang’s Treatise (T45, no. 1866, p. 499, a22–23).
- 26.
For an English presentation on Luhmann’s thought of the blind spot, see Moeller, Luhmann Explained, 71–76, 216 [14].
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Kantor, H.R. (2016). Emptiness of Transcendence: The Inconceivable and Invisible in Chinese Buddhist Thought. In: Brown, N., Franke, W. (eds) Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43092-8_6
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