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International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design

International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design

FOSAD 2016, FOSAD 2015: Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VIII pp 1–31Cite as

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 9808)

Abstract

A proof system can be used by a prover to demonstrate to one or more verifiers that a statement is true. Proof systems can be interactive where the prover and verifier exchange many messages, or non-interactive where the prover sends a single convincing proof to the verifier. Proof systems are widely used in cryptographic protocols to verify that a party is following a protocol correctly and is not cheating.

A particular type of proof systems are zero-knowledge proof systems, where the prover convinces the verifier that the statement is true but does not leak any other information. Zero-knowledge proofs are useful when the prover has private data that should not be leaked but needs to demonstrate a certain fact about this data. The prover may for instance want to show it is following a protocol correctly but not want to reveal its own input.

In these lecture notes we give an overview of some central techniques behind the construction of efficient zero-knowledge proofs.

Keywords

  • Proof System
  • Discrete Logarithm
  • Graph Isomorphism
  • Commitment Scheme
  • Arithmetic Circuit

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University College London, London, UK

    Jonathan Bootle, Andrea Cerulli, Pyrros Chaidos & Jens Groth

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  1. Jonathan Bootle
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  2. Andrea Cerulli
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  3. Pyrros Chaidos
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  4. Jens Groth
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Correspondence to Jens Groth .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Urbino , Urbino, Italy

    Alessandro Aldini

  2. University of Malaga , Malaga, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  3. National Research Council C.N.R. , Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

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Bootle, J., Cerulli, A., Chaidos, P., Groth, J. (2016). Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. In: Aldini, A., Lopez, J., Martinelli, F. (eds) Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VIII. FOSAD FOSAD 2016 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9808. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43005-8_1

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