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Cost Allocation for Horizontal Carrier Coalitions Based on Approximated Shapley Values

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Book cover Operations Research Proceedings 2015

Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings ((ORP))

Abstract

To improve competitiveness, small and mid-sized carriers ally in horizontal carrier coalitions for request exchange. A crucial aspect for the long-term viability and stability of coalitions is a fair cost allocation among the agents. Despite of the long computing time, the well-known Shapley value has been used as a scheme for cost allocation. The contribution of this paper lies on the development of a suitable sampling procedure that approximates the Shapley value applied to cost allocations for the collaborative traveling salesman problem with time windows. A computational study identifies the deviation of the values generated by the proposed sampling procedures from the actual Shapley value.

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Acknowledgements

The research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the project “Kooperierende Rundreiseplanung bei rollierender Planung”.

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Correspondence to Kristian Schopka .

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Schopka, K., Kopfer, H. (2017). Cost Allocation for Horizontal Carrier Coalitions Based on Approximated Shapley Values. In: Dörner, K., Ljubic, I., Pflug, G., Tragler, G. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2015. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_18

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