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Stable Matching in Structured Networks

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNAI,volume 9806)

Abstract

Stable matching studies how to pair members of two sets with the objective to achieve a matching that satisfies all participating agents based on their preferences. In this research, we consider the case of matching in a social network where agents are not fully connected. We propose the concept of D-neighbourhood associated with connective costs to investigate the matching quality in four types of well-used networks. A matching algorithm is proposed based on the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm under constraints of network topology. Through experimental studies, we find that the matching outcomes in scale-free networks yield the best average utility with least connective costs comparing to other structured networks. This research provides insights for understanding matching behavior in social networks like marriage, trade, partnership, online social and job search.

Keywords

  • Stable matching
  • Structured networks
  • D-neighbourhood
  • Connective cost

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Notes

  1. 1.

    With Alvin E. Roth, Shapley won the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.

  2. 2.

    Preferential attachment can be regarded as a positive feedback in a network, more connected a node is, the more likely it is to receive new links.

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Acknowledgement

This work is supported by the National Science Foundation of China Nos. 61305047 and 61401012.

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Correspondence to Tao Wan or Zengchang Qin .

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Ling, Y., Wan, T., Qin, Z. (2016). Stable Matching in Structured Networks. In: Ohwada, H., Yoshida, K. (eds) Knowledge Management and Acquisition for Intelligent Systems . PKAW 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9806. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42706-5_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42706-5_21

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