Stable Matching in Structured Networks

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9806)

Abstract

Stable matching studies how to pair members of two sets with the objective to achieve a matching that satisfies all participating agents based on their preferences. In this research, we consider the case of matching in a social network where agents are not fully connected. We propose the concept of D-neighbourhood associated with connective costs to investigate the matching quality in four types of well-used networks. A matching algorithm is proposed based on the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm under constraints of network topology. Through experimental studies, we find that the matching outcomes in scale-free networks yield the best average utility with least connective costs comparing to other structured networks. This research provides insights for understanding matching behavior in social networks like marriage, trade, partnership, online social and job search.

Keywords

Stable matching Structured networks D-neighbourhood Connective cost 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Intelligent Computing and Machine Learning Lab, School of ASEEBeihang UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.School of Biological Science and Medical EngineeringBeihang UniversityBeijingChina

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