Abstract
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the case studies and examines the scope conditions for interest group influence. I show that business is likely to prevail over policy outcomes in instances when there is unity within the business community, business groups are faced with low salience issues, and mainstream committees are in charge of dossiers. While the corporate world may, in some abstract sense, be regarded as representing a capitalist class interest, this notion is a platitude of little analytical and empirical value. This is because business is faced with countervailing forces which cap its influence—most notably, noisy politics, unsympathetic committees, and rifts within the business sector itself. Business often finds itself battling not labour unions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but itself.
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Dionigi, M.K. (2017). Conclusion. In: Lobbying in the European Parliament. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_8
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