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Network Topologies for Weakly Pareto Optimal Nonatomic Selfish Routing

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Computing and Combinatorics (COCOON 2016)

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Abstract

In this paper we study the model of nonatomic selfish routing and characterize the topologies of undirected/directed networks in which every Nash equilibrium is weakly Pareto optimal, meaning that no deviation of all players could make everybody better off. In particular, we first obtain the characterizations for single-commodity case by applying relatively standard graphical arguments, and then the counterpart for two-commodity undirected case by introducing some new algorithmic ideas and reduction techniques.

Research supported in part by NNSF of China under Grant No. 11531014 and 11222109, and by CAS Program for Cross & Cooperative Team of Science & Technology Innovation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In terminologies of [8], \(G'\) is said to be embedded in G.

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Correspondence to Zhuo Diao .

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Chen, X., Diao, Z. (2016). Network Topologies for Weakly Pareto Optimal Nonatomic Selfish Routing. In: Dinh, T., Thai, M. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics . COCOON 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9797. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-42633-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-42634-1

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