Network Topologies for Weakly Pareto Optimal Nonatomic Selfish Routing

  • Xujin Chen
  • Zhuo DiaoEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9797)


In this paper we study the model of nonatomic selfish routing and characterize the topologies of undirected/directed networks in which every Nash equilibrium is weakly Pareto optimal, meaning that no deviation of all players could make everybody better off. In particular, we first obtain the characterizations for single-commodity case by applying relatively standard graphical arguments, and then the counterpart for two-commodity undirected case by introducing some new algorithmic ideas and reduction techniques.


Nonatomic selfish routing Weakly Pareto optimal Single-commodity networks Multi-commodity networks Extension-parallel networks 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Applied MathematicsAMSS, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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