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Mearsheimer and Fear

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Book cover Realism and Fear in International Relations

Abstract

In Chapter 5, fear is assessed in the publications of Mearsheimer. This inquiry illustrates that his discussions about fear revolves around threat inflations and its endemic character. In Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, fear is primarily considered in relation to issues such as anarchy, uncertainty, survival and capabilities, as well as aggression in the form of security competition and war. Many of these issues reappear in his fear-based empirical analysis of international politics along with other subjects such as lying, demography, secrecy, cooperation and buck-passing, among others.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mearsheimer 2011c, 21–22, 46, 59, 61–62, 90–91.

  2. 2.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 33.

  3. 3.

    See, ibid., 42–45.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., 5, 15, 19–22.

  5. 5.

    Mearsheimer however abandons his unitary actor’s assumption in practice. See, Pashakhanlou, “Back to the Drawing Board,” 216–217.

  6. 6.

    Mearsheimer 2006c, 231.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Mearsheimer 2009a.

  9. 9.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 17, 422 60. Special attention is afforded to great powers as they have the largest impact on international events and shape the world in their own image. Mearsheimer claims that there is a prescriptive element to his theory as well as “[s]tates should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.” Ibid., 11, emphasis in original.

  10. 10.

    Mearsheimer 2006b, 112, 122.

  11. 11.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 32. As we will see in later parts of this chapter, Mearsheimer is actually inconsistent on which of his five assumptions that are needed to bring about fear in his offensive realism.

  12. 12.

    Mearsheimer 2006b, 112, 122.

  13. 13.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 55–56, 60–61.

  14. 14.

    Mearsheimer 2004b, 184–187.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 147–150.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., 152–153.

  18. 18.

    Mearsheimer, Tragedy, p. 155.

  19. 19.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 155–157.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., 157–159.

  21. 21.

    Just as in Waltz’s defensive realism, unipolarity is heavily under-theorized in Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Again, unipolarity also undermines the explanatory power of Mearsheimer’s theory. See, Pashakhanlou 2014.

  22. 22.

    Mearsheimer 2010b, 86–87.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., 85–88.

  24. 24.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 29.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., 30.

  26. 26.

    Al-Tamimi 2013, 6 Also see,; Phythian 2011, 131; Wagner 2007, 13.

  27. 27.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 17.

  28. 28.

    Brown 2012, 76; Rudolph and Rudolph 2008, 53 n. 15; Al-Tamimi 2013, 6.

  29. 29.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 5.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., 32.

  31. 31.

    Dierauer 2013, 32; Schmidt 2013, 233; Fettweis 2010, 64.

  32. 32.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 52 also see, 34, 46, 50, 361.

  33. 33.

    Davis 2011, 7; Lemke 2004, 54; Little 2007, 218.

  34. 34.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 334, chapter 9.

  35. 35.

    Barkin 2010, 128.

  36. 36.

    Kydd 2005, 15; Thayer 2004, 65; Wohlforth 2010, 13.

  37. 37.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 42.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 345.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 32.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., 42.

  41. 41.

    Mearsheimer 1995b, 30; Mearsheimer 2001b, 3, 43; Mearsheimer 2004, 184, 187; Mearsheimer 2006c, 231.

  42. 42.

    Mearsheimer 1995, 11; Mearsheimer 2001b, 32.

  43. 43.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 32.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., 43.

  45. 45.

    Mearsheimer 2006a, 160.

  46. 46.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 361.

  47. 47.

    Mearsheimer 1995, 31; Mearsheimer 2006c, 232.

  48. 48.

    Dierauer 2013, 32; Geunwook Lee 2002, 200 n. 14; Tang 2008, 10 n. 3; Thayer 2004, 65.

  49. 49.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 31–32.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., xi.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., 345.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., 2.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., 32.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., 42–43.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., 43.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., 44.

  57. 57.

    Ibid.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 44–45, 338, 346.

  59. 59.

    A potential hegemon is a states that has “the most formidable army as well as the most latent power among all the states located in its region” by a relatively large margin. Ibid., 45.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., 44–45.

  61. 61.

    Mearsheimer 2006c, 232.

  62. 62.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 42–43.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., 361.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., 292.

  65. 65.

    Mearsheimer 1984, 25; Mearsheimer 2001b, 151.

  66. 66.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2003b.

  67. 67.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 144, 188, 214, 297.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., 117–118.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., 43; Mearsheimer 2004, 187.

  70. 70.

    Mearsheimer 1990b, 39.

  71. 71.

    Mearsheimer 2006b, 120.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., 117.

  73. 73.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 35.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., 85.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., 56.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., 150.

  77. 77.

    Mearsheimer 1990, 39.

  78. 78.

    Mearsheimer 1984, 31 n. 31.

  79. 79.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 133.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., 474 n. 78.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., 177–178.

  82. 82.

    Mearsheimer 2002b, 27.

  83. 83.

    Mearsheimer 1998a sec. 4; Mearsheimer 2001b, 144; Mearsheimer 2005c; Mearsheimer 2006a, 162; Mearsheimer 2010a; Mearsheimer 2010b, 90; Mearsheimer 2010c, 382, 390–391; Mearsheimer 2010d.

  84. 84.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 281.

  85. 85.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 470 n. 45.

  86. 86.

    Mearsheimer 1998b, 232.

  87. 87.

    Mearsheimer 2001a, 53; Mearsheimer 2001b, 395; Mearsheimer 2010e, 396.

  88. 88.

    Mearsheimer 2006b, 117.

  89. 89.

    Mearsheimer 1998a.

  90. 90.

    Mearsheimer 2011, 90.

  91. 91.

    Mearsheimer 1993, 54.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.; Mearsheimer 2010e, 396.

  93. 93.

    Mearsheimer 2001a, 55–56.

  94. 94.

    Mearsheimer 1998b, 241 n. 39; Mearsheimer 2001b, 497–498 n. 93.

  95. 95.

    Mearsheimer 1993, 59.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., 53.

  97. 97.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 166.

  98. 98.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 254.

  99. 99.

    Mearsheimer 2011, 57.

  100. 100.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2002, 7; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 56.

  101. 101.

    Mearsheimer 2011, 31–33, 38, 45, 63–64, 67.

  102. 102.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 87, 89–90, 217.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., 76.

  104. 104.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b, 236.

  105. 105.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 292, 296.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., 324; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 43.

  107. 107.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 73.

  108. 108.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 125.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., 177.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 340–341.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., 474 n. 78.

  112. 112.

    Ibid., 221.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., 235.

  114. 114.

    Mearsheimer 1998b, 229.

  115. 115.

    Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 43.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., 254.

  117. 117.

    Mearsheimer 1984, 26.

  118. 118.

    Mearsheimer 2010c, 387.

  119. 119.

    Mearsheimer 2010b, 91.

  120. 120.

    Mearsheimer 1981b, 177.

  121. 121.

    Pashakhanlou 2013.

  122. 122.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 46.

  123. 123.

    Shaohua 2009.

  124. 124.

    Sagan and Waltz 2003.

  125. 125.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 37.

  126. 126.

    Mearsheimer 2006b, 122.

  127. 127.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 414 n. 7.

  128. 128.

    Mearsheimer 2009, 244–246.

  129. 129.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 422 n. 2; Mearsheimer 2006c, 241.

  130. 130.

    Öhman 2008, 709.

  131. 131.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 21.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., 10.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., 11.

  134. 134.

    As has already been established, the alternative readings where only one or a few of the five assumptions are responsible for bringing about this emotion have already been dismissed.

  135. 135.

    Waltz 1979a, 97–98.

  136. 136.

    Mearsheimer 2001b, 10.

  137. 137.

    Ibid., 358–359.

  138. 138.

    Ibid., 126.

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Pashakhanlou, A.H. (2017). Mearsheimer and Fear. In: Realism and Fear in International Relations . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_5

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