Advertisement

Conclusion

  • Jane McDonnell
Chapter
  • 287 Downloads

Abstract

On the face of it, physics and mathematics are about different things. The objects of physics are those which we causally interact with every day and which give us our sensations of heat, light, texture, smell and sound. Physicists assume their existence and try to discover their properties and how they cause the experiences that they do. In contrast, the objects of mathematics are usually deemed to be irrelevant to the causal nexus. If mathematical objects exist at all, then they exist outside of space and time in an eternal, unchanging state of pure being. We can’t interact with them in a sensual way, only by pure intellection, and any such interaction defies the laws of physical objects because it does not involve any interchange of energy, or any change at all in the grasped object, merely a change in our own mental state.

Keywords

Internal Model Mathematical Object Dynamic View Mathematical Idealism Consistent History 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Burch, R. 2014. Charles Sanders Peirce. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter ed.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, downloaded from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/peirce/
  2. Hohwy, J. 2013. The Predictive Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Johnston, M. 2009. Saving God: Religion after Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Kant, I. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.Google Scholar
  5. McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Nelson, E. 2011. Warning Signs of a Possible Collapse of Contemporary Mathematics. In Infinity: New Research Frontiers, edited by M. Heller and W.H. Woodin, 76–88. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Tarski, A., and J. Corcoran. 1986. What Are Logical Notions? History and Philosophy of Logic 7(2): 143–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Tieszen, R. 2000. Gödel and Quine on Meaning and Mathematics. In Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, edited by G. Sher and R. Tieszen, 232–256. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Wang, H. 1996. A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  10. Wheeler, J. 1990. A Journey into Gravity and Spacetime. New York: W.H. Freeman.Google Scholar
  11. Wheeler, J. 1996. At Home in the Universe. New York: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  12. Wigner, E. 1960. The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Communications of Pure and Applied Mathematics 13: 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Wilczek, F. 2006. Reasonably Effective: I Deconstructing a Miracle. Physics Today 59: 8–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jane McDonnell
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy Department ClaytonVictoriaAustralia

Personalised recommendations