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Where Spoiling Occurs

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Fighting Over Peace

Part of the book series: Rethinking Political Violence ((RPV))

Abstract

This chapter develops and quantitatively tests hypotheses from competing theoretical approaches on where spoiling occurs. Overall, spoiling is prevalent following peace agreements, with 65 of the 301 peace agreements and 46 of the 138 peace processes experiencing spoiling. The emergence of spoiling also follows predictable patterns. Termination spoiling is primarily a weapon of the weak. Outsiders are more likely to challenge peace agreements, particularly those that are comprehensive, in conflicts with a lack of lootable resources. Modification spoiling, on the other hand, is driven mostly by incentives: the greatest predictors are comprehensive peace agreements, civil wars fought over control of the central government, and more politically open systems—in situations where the stakes are the highest and the impact on future political power the greatest.

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  1. Department of Politics, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts, USA

    Andrew G. Reiter

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Reiter, A.G. (2016). Where Spoiling Occurs. In: Fighting Over Peace . Rethinking Political Violence. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40102-7_3

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