Abstract
This chapter discusses the area of normative ethics and introduces crucial notions that are used throughout the book. After defining normative ethics as the study of moral theories, the idea of a moral theory is anatomized and important concepts contained in it are explained. Most importantly, the theoretical component of a moral theory is distinguished from its practical component. This distinction is important for the dissection of consequentialist theories in Chap. 4.
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Notes
- 1.
For this point, see also Crisp (2006, 101).
- 2.
Plato and Aristotle count as the founding fathers of this approach to ethics. For a survey article on virtue ethics, see Hursthouse (2012).
- 3.
Immanuel Kant is perhaps the paradigmatic exponent of a rule-based approach to ethics (cf., e.g., Kant 1785). For a helpful and comprehensive commentary on his moral system in his most widely read book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) see, e.g., Timmermann (2007).
- 4.
See, also, Parfit (2011, 374).
- 5.
Our reason for this limitation is simply to keep the discussion within reasonable bounds. Note, however, that doubts may be raised as to whether we should, in fact, regard a moral theory as consequentialist if it does not adopt acts as their primary evaluative focal points. For this point, see, e.g., the exchange between Howard-Snyder (1993) and Hooker (1994). See, also, Hooker (2003, 108–111).
- 6.
- 7.
It is more common to use the expression “prima facie” principle, as proposed by Ross (1930/2002). Kagan (1989, 17), however, has pointed out, rather convincingly, that this expression seems to connote that the principle merely appears to be genuine. A pro tanto principle, however, is a genuine principle which may – and that is the important point – be outweighed by other principles.
- 8.
To support the monistic standpoint, it might be said, e.g., that a pluralistic account of morality seems somewhat arbitrary. It merely points to an “unconnected heap of duties” (McNaughton 1996) or a “patchwork quilt” (Kagan 1998, 295) of morally relevant factors, as we might metaphorically put it. That is, it does not explain why these factors matter. In contrast, a monistic account has some ultimate standard – an ultimate criterion of rightness and wrongness – which can explain why acts possess the moral status that they do. Pluralists can defend themselves against this charge by pointing out that monistic theories usually have a lower degree of fit with the common-sense moral judgements that we find intuitively plausible (cf., e.g., Ross 1930/2002, 24; Kappel 2006, 132). This fact, they might maintain, speaks against monism and in favour of their pluralist view.
- 9.
- 10.
The use of these moral properties has been subject to various criticisms. Some philosophers have argued that “thin moral concepts” such as “morally right” and “morally good” should not be used by moral theorists. What G.E.M. Anscombe says in her famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) can be interpreted in that way, as Driver (2009) points out. More recently, Roger Crisp has expressed a similar view (cf. Crisp 2006, 20–27). A recent rebuttal comes, e.g., from McElwee (2010). Other philosophers have suggested that moral properties such as rightness and wrongness are gradual rather than discrete. Bentham famously said that his principle of utility “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish (…) happiness (…).” (Bentham 1838, 1; emphasis added, NM) John Stuart Mill has asserted that “(…) actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness (…).” (Mill 1863, 9; emphasis added, NM) Both statements make it clear that these authors did not take rightness and wrongness as all-or-nothing affairs, as it is most commonly done nowadays. Alastair Norcross has supported this sort of “scalar morality” in recent times (cf. Norcross 2006). Martin Peterson has proposed a view called “Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism” which holds that “[m]oral rightness and wrongness are non-binary concepts, meaning that moral rightness and wrongness vary in degrees.” (Peterson 2012, 186) Rebuttals to such views can be found in McElwee (2010) as well as in Lawlor (2009a, 74–80, b) and Lang (2013).
- 11.
It should be noted that standard deontic logic has been criticized for its lack of neutrality between moral theories. E.g., as Sayre-McCord (1986) points out, it has the unfortunate consequence that the possibility of moral dilemmas is ab ovo excluded. Most moral philosophers believe, however, that the thesis of the impossibility of moral dilemmas, whether they believe in it or not, ought to be seen as a substantive claim and should, hence, be the result of substantive moral inquiry rather than an implicit assumption from which it starts. One may worry, then, whether standard deontic logic is, in fact, a good starting point for our inquiry. In reply, I guess, the following should be said. Firstly, since this is a study of the case against consequentialism, we should make assumptions which consequentialists are likely to accept. They commonly reject moral dilemmas. Secondly, it is, as far as I can see, not even the case that our definitional stipulations exclude moral dilemmas. We assume only a part of the standard deontic logic, viz. the “Traditional Definitional Scheme” (McNamara 2010). This scheme does not, in and of itself, exclude moral dilemmas. The impossibility of moral dilemmas arises only if this definitional scheme is combined with further assumptions, e.g. those contained the “Threefold Classification of Deontic Logic” (McNamara 2010) which states that an act is either obligatory, optional, or wrong, and that no act can fall into more than one of these classes. We do not assume this. Thirdly, and most importantly, we have to stipulate how the moral concepts are to be interpreted. We can, of course, do this one way or the other. But we might as well do it in accordance with standard deontic logic since, as McNamara (2010) says, it is still the most cited and studied version of deontic logic and it seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that it is best suited to model contemporary moral discourse on which, after all, we focus.
- 12.
Some theorists distinguish between the notion of an act and that of an action. The distinction is this: What an agent does is called an “act.” An act that is done to attain some end is called an “action.” As Christine Korsgaard explains, “making a false promise and committing suicide are what I am calling ‘acts’ (…) Making a false promise in order to get some ready cash, committing suicide in order to avoid the personal troubles that you see ahead, and committing suicide in order to avoid harming others are what I am calling ‘actions’.” (Korsgaard 2008, 219; emphasis added, NM) We, however, shall not make this distinction.
- 13.
- 14.
Many moral theorists seem to regard the assumption that negative acts are acts as a matter of course. See, e.g., Peterson (2010, 157).
- 15.
This way of talking is, in fact, imprecise. We should actually say that an agent is faced with a choice between options for action. We use a shorthand way of speaking which is intended to mean just that.
- 16.
For a critique, see Nida-Rümelin (1993).
- 17.
This point is also made by Dreier (1993, 22).
- 18.
Note, however, that Carlson (1999a) has offered a different account of alternativeness. He does not require that they be mutually exclusive, but merely that they are two things the agent might do which are not identical. Note that the difference between the standard view and Carlson’s interpretation only plays a role when it comes to complex acts , viz. acts which are made up of parts, where these parts are themselves acts. If a i and a j are not identical and do not contain parts, they are seen as alternatives on both accounts. If, however, a i and a j do comprise parts, the two accounts of alternativeness might come to different conclusions. If a i and a j have entirely different parts, they are, again, alternatives to one another on both accounts. If they have parts in common, though, they are seen as alternatives only on Carlson’s view. This might conceivably matter when we discuss problems for consequentialism that can arise from complex acts (cf., e.g., Feldman 1997, 17–35 and Mukerji 2013c, 306). However, it is not relevant in the present context since our argument does not draw on the issue of complex acts .
- 19.
For an argument to that effect, see also Mukerji and Luetge (2014).
- 20.
This tripartition is suggested by Sher (1983).
- 21.
I do not speak of a causal relation in this respect, for it seems that certain non-causal relations matter as well. Recall that we allow negative acts to count as acts. If I do not save you from drowning, it seems as though the relation of my act to the relevant future state of affairs in which you are dead is non-causal. Nevertheless, the relation should, it seems, be included on the list of future-related factors.
- 22.
The particular relation between Smith’s promise and his act of going to the party can, of course, be characterized further. Philosophers of language categorize promises as “illocutionary acts” which possess certain “conditions of satisfaction”. The relation between Smith’s act of promising and Smith’s act of going to the party is such that the latter act is a condition of satisfaction for the former (cf. Searle 1983, 10).
- 23.
The Direct Strategy and the Indirect Strategy are often discussed under different labels. Alan Goldman , e.g., calls the Direct Strategy “complete moral reasoning” (Goldman 2003, 13) and the Indirect Strategy a “second-best strategy.” (Goldman 2003, 4) David Gauthier uses a similar distinction between “straightforward” and “constrained” maximization (cf. Gauthier 1987, Ch. VI). The terminology we use is proposed, e.g., in Sumner (1987, 180–181, 1996, 222).
- 24.
- 25.
Note that the two types of heuristics do not exhaust logical space. Neither are they mutually exclusive.
- 26.
It should be noted that whether or not a moral theory has universal scope in the one sense is logically independent from whether or not it has universal scope in the other sense. A moral theory may apply only to a limited range of moral problems, but to all agents who are faced with these problems. An example of such a theory would be a bio-ethical moral conception which is concerned only with specific moral issues that pertain, in some way or other, to the sphere of biology. Also, a moral theory may apply to all moral problems, but address itself only to specific agents. Professional ethics codes, such as the Hippocratic Oath, are of that type.
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Mukerji, N. (2016). Normative-Ethical Foundations. In: The Case Against Consequentialism Reconsidered. Theory and Decision Library A:, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39249-3_1
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