Abstract
Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on average and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy maintains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cognition, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological perspective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to interpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our inner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epistemological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on knowledge (2013).
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Notes
- 1.
On the internalist and externalist conceptions of epistemic justification see Pappas (2014).
- 2.
It may be objected that the scientific realist view would be better described as follows: supposing that empirical successful theories are true (or approximately true) provides the best explanation for their empirical success. But this ‘explanationist’ formulation of scientific realism is almost equivalent to that given above. The fact is that scientific realists usually consider Inference to the Best Explanation a valid and truth-conducive inference. For example, Harman describes IBE as follows: “one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” (Harman 1965, p. 89). So, if truth is the best explanation of success, and IBE leads to truth, an IBE may be performed to conclude that it is true that a successful theory is true. So, we can infer the truth of a theory from its success. Thus, those two formulations of realism are almost equivalent. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for having raised this issue.
- 3.
Cf. e.g. Rescorla (2015).
- 4.
Many positions have been elaborated on the issue of truth, and even if truth as correspondence seems to be the most widespread view among scientific realists, not every scientific realist adopts such view. For simplicity here we will focus on correspondence.
- 5.
It may be objected that internalism is better described as the idea that justification requires awareness of the process that ultimately justifies a belief. But, in this context, such definition of internalism is equivalent to that given above. Indeed, according to PEM, what we can be really aware of are ultimately nothing but some mental states. So, even if the process that justifies a belief is an ‘external’ one, we will not be directly aware of such process. We will only be aware of the internal model of such process. So, if internalism is the view according to which justification requires awareness, and according to PEM we can be aware only of some mental states, then in this context internalism may be fairly defined as the view according to which a belief is justified by some mental state of the epistemic agent holding that belief. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for having raised this issue.
- 6.
Hohwy (2014, p. 9).
- 7.
Cf. e.g. Sankey (2008, p. 112): “The realist conception of truth is a non-epistemic conception of truth, which enforces a sharp divide between truth and rational justification.”
- 8.
Cf. e.g. Ibidem, p. 14, fn. 2: “the traditional justified true belief account of knowledge is a minimal condition for a realist conception of knowledge.”
- 9.
It may be objected that if someone does not rely on the notion of truth, she is not speaking of knowledge properly, since knowledge requires truth. Thus, it would be nonsense to speak of knowledge without referring to truth. But that knowledge necessarily requires truth is exactly what has been disputed by some of those authors who are unsatisfied with the traditional accounts of knowledge (see below, Sect. 6). Thus, if in their conception of knowledge does not figure any reference to the concept of truth, it seems unfair to conclude that they are not really speaking of ‘knowledge’, for the only reason that we assume that knowledge requires truth.
- 10.
- 11.
Rescorla (2015, p. 705).
- 12.
Ibidem, p. 702.
- 13.
Hohwy (2013, p. 42).
- 14.
See e.g. Floridi (1993).
- 15.
We refer here for simplicity to ‘reasons’ even if not every epistemological view requires ‘reasons’ in order to consider a belief to be justified. See Turri and Klein (2014).
- 16.
It may be objected that this is an unfair description of coherentism, since many coherentists usually require in their theories some additional constraint on coherence to account for the truth-conduciveness of coherence. But, as Olsson has clearly underlined, “these theories may be more fruitfully classified as versions of weak foundationalism than as pure coherence theories. An advocate of weak foundationalism typically holds that while coherence is incapable of justifying beliefs from scratch, it can provide justification for beliefs that already have some initial […] degree of warrant” (Olsson 2014, Sect. 1). This means that for our purposes, weak foundationalism, as well as foundationalism, can be fairly considered a kind of finitism, since it has to be based on some kind of beliefs that have some basic form of justification, which cannot be accounted for in terms of coherence.
- 17.
Hohwy (2015, p. 3).
- 18.
Rescorla (2015, p. 696).
- 19.
Cf. e.g. Hohwy (2014, pp. 2–5): “just as there is a schism between a statistical model and the modeled cause in statistical inference, there is a schism between the prediction-generating models of the brain and the modeled states of affairs in the world.”
- 20.
See e.g. Vlerick and Broadbent (2015).
- 21.
Psillos (2011, p. 26). See also Klein (2015, Sect. 1): “reliabilist or externalist responses to philosophical skepticism constitute a change of subject. A belief could be reliably produced [...] but the reasons available for it could fail to satisfy the standards agreed upon by both the skeptics and their opponents.”
- 22.
Sosa (1983, pp. 58–59).
- 23.
Hohwy’s view can be described as a sort of ‘Kantian scientific antirealism’, which particularly resembles Bas van Fraassen’s scientific antirealism, especially on the issue of ‘representation’ (see van Fraassen 2008). Indeed, Hohwy’s view of the relation between the internal model and the sensory input is similar to van Fraassen’s view of the relation between theoretical models and data models. We can at most compare them and make them fit, but this does not guarantee us that they reflect the world itself, since we cannot directly confront our models and the world.
- 24.
Cling (2004, p. 110).
- 25.
Cellucci (2013, p. 55).
- 26.
The analytic method has not to be confused with the analytic-synthetic method. According to the analytic-synthetic method as stated by Aristotle, the search for a solution to a problem is a finite process, and once the prime premises have been found, “the only role which remains for analysis is to find deductions of given conclusions from prime premises” (Cellucci 2013, p. 75). On the contrary, in the analytic method there is no given prime premise, the path to find hypotheses is only ‘ascending’, and it has not to terminate.
- 27.
Hintikka and Sandu (2007, p. 13).
- 28.
For a plausibility test procedure, cf. Cellucci (2013, p. 56): “(1) Deduce conclusions from the hypothesis. (2) Compare the conclusions with each other, in order to see that the hypothesis does not lead to contradictions. (3) Compare the conclusions with other hypotheses already known to be plausible, and with results of observations or experiments, in order to see that the arguments for the hypothesis are stronger than those against it on the basis of experience.”
- 29.
On the problem of the criterion of truth cf. e.g. Sextus Empiricus (1976, II.2).
- 30.
Cellucci (2015, pp. 217–218).
- 31.
Cellucci (2013, p. 154).
- 32.
This view is related to Aristotle’s definition of endoxa, see Cellucci (2013, Sect. 5.7).
- 33.
Cellucci unpublished, Sect. 3.2.
- 34.
Ibidem.
- 35.
It is worth underlining that plausibility has not to be confused with probability (Cellucci 2013, Sect. 4.4). Plausibility involves a comparison between the arguments for and the arguments against, so it is not a mathematical concept. Conversely, probability is a mathematical concept.
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Sterpetti, F. (2016). Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_36
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