Abstract
The problem of the efficacy and distribution of God’s grace was one of the main theological issues with which Leibniz dealt throughout his works. In this respect, regardless of any consideration about Leibniz’s actual and sincere commitment to the theological doctrines of his time, it seems undeniable that he spared no effort in his attempt to solve this question. From his early Confessio philosophi (1672–3), Leibniz linked the metaphysical problem of evil with the following theological concern: if God is fair and the happiness of all his creatures pleases him, why is he so unequal with the distribution of his grace? Why doesn’t he make everyone happy? Why does he condemn so many? If the distinction between the saved and the condemned is made only by grace, what’s the point of reward and punishment? When dealing with these issues, Leibniz’s main concern was to rule out any sort of despotism or arbitrariness in God’s actions and to defend him from the charge of being the author of sin and damnation. As he states in De libertate creaturae rationalis (1686), “[…] there must be a reason why God gives the grace required for salvation to one and not to another, thus permitting the latter to be damned”.
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Notes
- 1.
One may wonder whether Leibniz actually held any position on theological matters, or whether his theological statements were just attempts to resolve other people’s issues, either for pragmatic reasons or simply to protect himself from an eventual accusation of heterodoxy. Paul Lodge, in the following chapter of this volume, argues for this last position, while I am inclined to think that he actually held and sincerely believed his doctrines. Even if this question goes beyond the scope of this chapter, at least methodologically I will take Leibniz statements on these issues at face value, without expressing judgement on his eventual hidden intentions or motivations.
- 2.
CP 33: “If God is delighted by the happiness of everyone, why did he not make everyone happy? if he loves everyone, how is it that he damns so many? if he is just, how is it that he presents himself as so unfair that from matter that is the same in every respect, from the same clay, he brings forth some vessels intended for honor, others intended for disgrace? And how is it that he is not a promoter of sin if, having knowledge of it (though he could have eliminated it from the world), he admitted it or tolerated it? Indeed, how is it that he is not the author of sin, if he created everything in such a manner that sin followed? And what of free choice, when the necessity of sin has been posited, and what of the justice of punishment, when free choice has been taken away? And what of the justice of reward, if grace alone brings it about that some are distinguished from others? Finally, if God is the ultimate ground of things, what do we impute to men and what to devils?”
- 3.
A VI 4, 1590. Where no English translation is available, translations are my own.
- 4.
The most complete account of the controversy within Catholic theology is still Scheemann, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae.
- 5.
A VI 4, 1459. English translation: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm
- 6.
Molina, Concordia, pars II, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 12, 56, §1: “It can occur that among two [men] who are called by God through an equal internal aid, one converts by his own free will, and the other remains in infidelity.”
- 7.
Molina, Concordia, disp. 26, p. 170, §15: “[…] when we say that neither God, through his universal concurrence, nor the secondary causes are the complete causes of the effect, but rather partial [causes], this must be understood with regards to the partiality of the cause, as they call it, and not with regards to the partiality of the effect. Indeed, the whole effect comes from God and the secondary causes; but neither from God, nor from the secondary causes as the complete cause, but as a partial cause that at the same time require the concurrence and the influence of the other; just like when two [men] pull a ship, the whole motion comes from each of the movers, but not as the total cause of the motion, even if each of them produces with the other each and every part of the same motion.”
- 8.
Molina, Concordia, disp. 32, p. 200, §10: “Indeed, since God’s general concurrence is not a concurrence of God in the secondary cause, but in the action of that cause, and it is by its own nature indifferent, so that by virtue of the influence of the secondary cause an action of a certain species rather than other is produced, […] it occurs that the actions of the free will (such as [the actions] of any secondary cause) do not receive being such or such and, therefore, being zealous or vicious from God’s general concurrence, but rather from the free will itself.”
- 9.
Álvarez, De auxiliis, L. III, c. III, 406.
- 10.
About this conception of “sufficient grace” Pascal said: “[…] this grace is sufficient without being so”. See Pascal, Provinciales, 29 January 1656, 52.
- 11.
Álvarez, De auxiliis, L. III, c. XVII, 509: “[…] by means of the sufficient aid the man can really perform the action, by comparison of which it [the aid] is called sufficient, even though the man would never act, unless God produces the efficacious aid […]”.
- 12.
Álvarez, De auxiliis, Liber III, disp. XXI, 87b: “Not only the internal concurrence, but also the external concurrence, which pre-moves secondary causes to action, cannot be determined by the concurrence of the secondary causes, but God, by means of such concurrence, efficiently applies the secondary causes, and determines them to action.” I explain in detail Álvarez’s position in my paper “Causalidad eficiente de Dios y libertad humana: Leibniz y la metamorfosis de la ‘predeterminación física’”.
- 13.
DPG 9d: “Undoubtedly, it must be conceded that God foresees conditionally how someone would use his free choice, were certain aids afforded; and relying on knowledge of that, along with knowledge of all others, He renders his decisions concerning the division of humanity with respect to salvation.”
- 14.
MPE 143: “Here again we may ask why the divine means of succor—internal or at least external—are diversely granted to diverse persons, triumphing over wickedness in the one and vanquished by it in others”; DPG, 9b: “For one is led to ask why God decreed to give, or gave aids to, faith in these circumstances to one rather than to another circumstances in which he foresaw that the resultant salvation would follow.”
- 15.
MPE 143: “On this point, the doctrines are divided. Some think that God grants greater help to the less evil or at least to those who will resist grace with less obstinacy. Others maintain that the same help is more efficient in the former. Others, on the contrary, do not admit that certain persons are distinguished before God by the privilege of better, or in any case at least less evil, natures.”
- 16.
DPG, 34a.
- 17.
A VI 1, 536.
- 18.
A VI 4, 1459. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “Nevertheless it is certain that grace is the first active principle concerning pious actions.”
- 19.
- 20.
See the following argument (CP 127): “For let us suppose that God and a person concur in some action; it is necessary that God concur with this very concurrence of the person, and either it will proceed to infinity (nevertheless it will not any the less reduce to the same thing) or it will suffice to say right from the start that God actually produces the action, even if it is the person who acts.” Even though Murray (“Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom”, 81) interprets this argument as a global critique to the theory of divine concurrence, I consider more accurate Sleigh’s interpretation (Leibniz & Arnauld, 184–5), according to which the target of the argument is the version of the theory of divine concurrence understood as a sum of causalities.
- 21.
A VI 4, 1593.
- 22.
PPL 313.
- 23.
DPG, 11a: “It is quite true that this controversy pertains for the most part to philosophy or natural theology.” In this regard, Lloyd Strickland has shown the philosophical centrality of Leibniz’s doctrine of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace, especially in relation to the doctrines of the natural immortality of the soul, and the natural distribution of rewards and punishments. See Strickland, “Leibniz’s Harmony between the Kingdoms of Nature and Grace”.
- 24.
DPG, 27e.
- 25.
A VI 1, 535.
- 26.
A VI 1, 536.
- 27.
A VI 1, 536.
- 28.
A VI 1, 536.
- 29.
A VI 1, 536.
- 30.
A VI 1, 536.
- 31.
A VI 1, 536.
- 32.
PPL 323: “This grace of God, whether ordinary or extraordinary, has its degrees and measures; in itself it is always efficacious in producing a definite proportional effect, and furthermore, it is always sufficient not only to protect us from sin but even to accomplish salvation, provided that man meets it with his own powers. But it is not always sufficient to surmount the inclinations of man, for otherwise he would have nothing more to strive for, and this is reserved solely for the absolutely efficacious grace, which is always victorious, whether through itself or through the congruity of circumstances.”
- 33.
DPG, 16a: “Also, we must be concerned by the novelty of some of these ideas, which arose only after the Council of Trent. I mean the whole doctrine of the necessary predetermination of the foreknowledge of contingents, as well as the opinion concerning some one perfect individual aid, admitted once for all and victorious per se.”
- 34.
CP 127: “If there is no physical predetermination of free acts—if God does not penetrate into the substance of a free act, i.e., if he does not cooperate in every free act—it follows that God is not the first cause of all created entities. And that is actually to remove God from things. Since a free act is a created entity, it must receive its own existence from God.”
- 35.
A VI 4, 1521: “And so it is also necessary for every real thing that exists in a certain ultimate determination of the free substance, to be produced by God; and anything that can reasonably be said about physical predetermination consists in this”; see also DGP §56 (c): “When God physically predetermines a man, this should be understood concerning the perfections of the act and as far as he grants reality to the possibilities.”
- 36.
MPE 137: “there are always, in the efficient cause and in the concurring causes, certain preparations which by some are called predeterminations. It must, however, be stated that these determinations are only inclining, not necessitating, so that a certain indifference or contingency always remains intact.” See also H 149. For a more complete account of Leibniz’s conception of physical predetermination, see my paper “Causalidad eficiente de Dios y libertad humana: Leibniz y la metamorfosis de la ‘predeterminación física’”.
- 37.
DPG, 16a: “Augustine and Thomas seem to have looked for the efficaciousness of grace for converting man in the concurrence of various internal and external helps which are accommodated by the omniscient author of conversion to the conversion of man and circumstances, so that it might be sure that the effect would follow.”
- 38.
DPG, 34a: “Sometimes grace is victorious per se, in such a way, however, that it would certainly prevail in anyone regardless of impediments and circumstances”; MPE 141: “Moreover, I do not see why grace, in the cases where it attains its full effect, should attain it always by virtue of its own nature, that is, be effective by itself.”
- 39.
DPG, 16a: “‘Helps’ in this sense should be distinguished from the ‘grace of sanctification’, which, by the very fact that it is given, is efficacious per se and irresistibly victorious because all the obstacles have been removed.”
- 40.
MPE 141: “Nor do I see any more how, on the basis of reason or revelation, it could be proved that victorious grace is always sufficiently powerful to overcome any resistance, however strong, and the most unfavourable circumstances.”
- 41.
DPG, 9d: “Hence divine aids are not always victorious by the force of their own nature; indeed, they are not always per se efficacious, but often only per accidens, if I am permitted to speak in this manner, that is, they obtain their effect in virtue of the circumstances.”
- 42.
DPG, 4a: “Aids of grace are either efficacious (i.e., effective absolutely) or merely sufficient. Effective aids are such absolutely infallibly, but the considerations of efficacity and infallibility are distinct. Sometimes aids have efficacity per se and in virtue of their own nature. And aids have efficacity that is either complete, so that they cannot be thwarted by contrary circumstances (as they appear to have been in the miraculous conversion of Paul), or sub modo, because they are not in fact impeded by contrary circumstances. By contrast aids have efficacity per accidens (as I would put it), if they derive it from assisting circumstances. Only those that have complete per se efficaciousness have per se infallibility. Other derive their infallibility from the circumstances, which either do not impede, or, in general, assist and thus are per accidens (as I would put it) (not with respect to God, but with respect to the thing). And finally, certain ones are not efficacious, but merely sufficient, for concerning the one who wills, an outcome is lacking where the will fails.”
- 43.
A VI 4, 1459. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm
- 44.
SLT 105.
- 45.
A VI 4, 1458. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm
- 46.
For a more detailed account of the role of circumstances see Rutherford, “Justice and Circumstances: Theodicy as Universal Religion”.
- 47.
MPE 141.
- 48.
LGR 290. For a more detailed account of Leibniz’s original version of God’s antecedent will, see my paper “Leibniz’s Dilemma on Predestination”, 181–4.
- 49.
DPG 27d.
- 50.
DPG 27d.
- 51.
DPG 9d: “And it is even agreed that sometimes an example is provided from which it is evident that God softens the hardest hearts, so that Paul knows from the mercy shown to him that we should despair for no one”; also DPG, 27d: “God considers many things and in the meantime softens the hardest hearts.”
- 52.
PPL 323.
- 53.
DPG, 9d: “Besides, the economy of divine decrees concerning salvation is such that it cannot be reduced to general rules by us.”
- 54.
DPG, 30a: “In any case, it is evident that the economy or dispensation of the external means of grace involves something mysterious, and from the perspective of reasons to which we have access, something absolute”; also DPG, 9b: “In this case, in the dispensation of the external means of salvation, even the Evangelicals will admit that one must not prescribe general rules to God, and they further admit that one must revert to ‘the depths of divine wisdom’.”
- 55.
DPG, 9d.
- 56.
H 69: “For the conversion is purely the work of God’s grace, wherein man cooperates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise in the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the strength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the operation of grace, although not rendering it necessary.”
- 57.
DPG, 27c.
- 58.
A VI 4, 1458. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “And so the question in turn becomes, what is the reason of a decree forgiving grace? Therefore it is in turn to be obtained from a consideration of whatever is left in that possible concept when the decree of grace has been removed. More correctly, however, it is possible that decrees of grace are connected in innumerable ways according to certain orders of things, but God chooses only one of them. Therefore the reason for the decrees of grace or for their concourse is to be obtained from each possible order of the whole universe.”
- 59.
DPG, 2a: “For this reason it can be said in a certain sense that all decrees of God are simultaneous, even in signo rationis, that is, by the order of nature, and they are all so interconnected together that none is detached from consideration of the others. And in this sense there is an end to the dispute concerning the order of decrees since there is a decree concerning the whole series.”
- 60.
H 151; see also MPE 122–3: “Hence to speak rigorously, there is no necessity for a succession of divine decrees, but one may say that there has been one decree of God only, which decree has produced into existence the present series of the universe, all the elements of this series having been considered beforehand and compared with the elements entering into other series.”
- 61.
TI 1, 345: “And, universally, what he wanted to establish and bestow with regards to Adam, is connected with the whole human species, even more, with the whole universe; [….].
- 62.
TI 1, 345.
- 63.
A VI 4, 1458. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm: “It is not sufficient to say that the complete concept of a creature also involves each series of graces. For as divine graces are free and proceed from a decree, a complete concept will also involve divine decrees and their reasons.”
- 64.
A VI 4, 1458. http://www.leibniz-translations.com/freedomgrace.htm
- 65.
TI 1, 342–3.
- 66.
H 385–6: “It is true that God could overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so, whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly influence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be so restricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have observed already in answering the first objection.”
- 67.
For a more detailed account of Leibniz’s commitment to the universality of sufficient grace, see Echavarría, “Leibniz’s Dilemma on Predestination”, 189–93.
- 68.
MPE 141.
- 69.
DPG, 50b.
- 70.
DPG, 53b.
- 71.
In this regard, even though I agree in general terms with the considerations of Don Rutherford about the role of circumstances in damnation and salvation, I think that they are incomplete. The circumstances and the innate inclinations of the creature are not sufficient to determine damnation without an actual sin, since that would imply that God abandons some creatures in advance. On the contrary, “hardening” circumstances must come after an actual sin of the creature. See Rutherford, “Justice and Circumstances”, 82: “The last sentence suggests that a difference in the role that circumstances may play in precluding salvation (or ensuring damnation) and the role they play in facilitating salvation. In the former case, Leibniz implies that circumstances by themselves, in conjunction with an individual innate tendencies of willing, may be sufficient to ensure his downfall.”
- 72.
H 385.
- 73.
CP 75.
- 74.
For different perspectives on Leibniz’s compatibilism, see Sleigh, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge”; Murray, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom”, and “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz”.
- 75.
I am thankful to Maria Rosa Antognazza, Lloyd Strickland, Ignacio Silva, Roberto Casales and Alejandro Pérez for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
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Echavarría, A. (2017). Leibniz on the Efficacy and Economy of Divine Grace. In: Strickland, L., Vynckier, E., Weckend, J. (eds) Tercentenary Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Leibniz. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38830-4_12
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