Abstract
The probabilistic account of causation is presented in this chapter. Roughly, this account states that causes increase the probability of their effects. As a notorious problem for such a simple characterisation of causation, the case of spurious causation will be explained. This permits introducing the notion of screening off, which is crucial to the discussion of overdetermination cases. In general, redundant causes screen other causes off from their effects. Again, a notion of causation with regard to some context will be illuminating with respect to overdetermination scenarios.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Although conditional beliefs based on ranking functions and conditional probabilities are independent notions, they are similar in various aspects. Ranking theory has advantages regarding extreme cases of belief—i.e. cases involving true and false beliefs (Spohn 2012, p. 218). Note that while conditional probabilities are not well-defined when the value of the condition is zero, conditional beliefs based on negative ranking functions are well-defined for conditions with extremely high values.
- 2.
This is an instance of Simpson’s paradox, which receives its name from the work of Edward Simpson (1951). Simpson shows that statistical correlation changes depending on the groups with regard to which the data is considered.
- 3.
If an event A is causally redundant for another event C, it is causally irrelevant to C. That is, \({\text{P}}({\text{C}}\,|\, {\text{A}} ) = {\text{P}}({\text{C}}\,|\, \neg {\text{A}})\). This may occur because there is a further event B involved in the background context that screens off A from C, namely, \({\text{P}}({\text{E}}\,|\, {\text{A}}\,\&\,{\text{B}}) = {\text{P}}({\text{E}}\,|\, \neg {\text{A}}\,\&\,{\text{B}})\). Event A would increase the probability of C given the absence of B. That is, \({\text{P}}({\text{E}}\,|\, {\text{A}} \,\&\, \neg \,{\text{B}}) > {\text{P}}({\text{E}}\,|\, \neg {\text{A}}\,\&\,\neg \,{\text{B}})\).
References
de Finetti, B. (1937). La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives. In Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincaré 7: 1–68. Translated as: Foresight. Its logical laws, its subjective sources. In H. E. Kyburg, Jr. & H. E. Smokler (Eds.), Studies in subjective probability. Robert E, Krieger Publishing Company, 1980.
Eells, E. (1991). Probabilistic causality. Cambridge University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1910). Notes on the doctrine of chances. In C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burks (Eds.), Collected papers of charles sanders peirce (1931–1958, Vols. 8).
Popper, K. (1957). The propensity interpretation of the calculus of probability and the quantum theory. In S. Körner (ed.). The Colston Papers, 9: 65–70.
Reichenbach, H. (1949). The theory of probability. University of California Press.
Simpson, E. H. (1951). The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 13(2): 238–241.
Skyrms, B. (1980). Causal necessity: A pragmatic investigation of the necessity of laws. Yale University Press.
Spohn, W. (2012). The Laws of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Suppes, P. (1970). A probabilistic theory of causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Venn, J. (1876/1962). The logic of chance. New York: Chelsea Publishing Co.
von Mises, R. (1957). Probability, statistics and truth. New York: Macmillan.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Céspedes, E. (2016). The Probabilistic Account of Causation. In: Causal Overdetermination and Contextualism. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33801-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33801-9_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33800-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-33801-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)