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How “China” Frames “Taiwan”

Chapter
Part of the The Nottingham China Policy Institute Series book series (NCP)

Abstract

In this chapter Brady uses framing theory to understand the Chinese Communist Party’s information controls on Taiwan affairs and outlines the links between Beijing’s Taiwan propaganda organizations and the CCP’s domestic and international propaganda system. Brady shows that China’s Taiwan frames are aimed at molding domestic and global public opinion on Taiwanese affairs, at placing limits on the Republic of China’s global political and commercial space, and, ultimately, on resolving the sovereign status of Taiwan. China’s Taiwan frames are in direct conflict with the emerging “Taiwanese identity” frames coming out of the ROC.

Keywords

Chinese Communist Party Chinese Mainland Democratic Progressive Party Taboo Word Confucius Institute 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CanterburyChristchurchNew Zealand

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