Abstract
In this chapter I begin to address the issue of collective affective intentionality by discussing some of the considerations that animate the general debate on collective intentionality—a debate that turns on the question of what it is to share an intentional attitude in a sufficiently demanding sense of the verb ‘to share’. I eventually express my preference for a membership account that stresses the relational nature of collective intentionality as well as the normative character of the tie between the participants. In accordance with an objection repeatedly leveled against Margaret Gilbert’s account of so-called collective guilt feelings—which constitutes one of the most prominent exceptions to the tendency to neglect the realm of the affective in the early debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy—, I argue that a theory of collective affective intentionality able to capture the affective, the intentional, and the collective nature of the phenomenon at issue has to take as its point of departure the idea that collective affective intentionality is a matter of joint actualizations of our human faculty to feel-towards together. My main goal here is to provide a first glimpse of what has to be done in order to offer a philosophical account of collective affective intentionality which could be considered adequate in light of important insights gained in the course of both the debate on affective intentionality and the general debate on collective intentionality.
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Notes
- 1.
It is a central part of my task in this book to specify the respect in which the experience that we (the participants) are emotionally responding to some occurrence in a joint manner differs from the experience that we are doing so in a purely parallel way. Since this difference can be argued to be a special case of the general difference between doing something together and doing it alongside each other, to understand what a joint action amounts to is of great relevance to our discussion.
- 2.
For an empirically oriented philosophical exploration of the phenomenology of joint action, see Pacherie (2012). For a psychological study that supports the intuition that two individuals who are involved in a joint action automatically form a pre-reflective plural agentic identity (what the authors call a ‘we’ identity), see Obhi and Hall (2011).
- 3.
Given the primary interest in the notion of a joint agency, the term ‘collective intentionality’ has not always been directly associated with the notion of intentionality Brentano re-introduced into the contemporary philosophical discussion about mental phenomena. At the beginning, it was mainly the idea of having a common aim, purpose, or goal that attracted the interest of philosophers.
- 4.
Cognitive psychologists have also been interested in the topic of joint action. (For a concise review of some recent findings from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience that have contributed to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying pluripersonal, coordinated action, see Sebanz et al. 2006.) However, their notion of a joint action is often more permissive than the one defended by certain philosophers whose work we are going to discuss in this chapter (e.g. Searle, Tuomela, and Gilbert). Sebanz et al., for instance, offer the following working definition: ‘joint action can be regarded as any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment’ (2006, p. 70). As we shall see, it could be objected that such a definition fails to stress that, independently of the degree of coordination exhibited by the participants’ behaviors, we can speak of a properly joint action just in case we can also speak of a joint intention (as opposed to having to speak of a sheer convergence of individual intentions).
- 5.
There are philosophers who have offered what we, following Margaret Gilbert (1989), could call summative accounts of collective intentionality (other authors have preferred to call them aggregative accounts). The intuition defended (or the assumption made) by these philosophers is that the ascription of an intentional state to a collective just suggests that this intentional state may be ascribed to all (or, at least, to most of) the individuals involved. For reasons we shall discuss in this section, the defenders of this view amount to a minority. According to Gilbert, even Anthony Quinton (1975–1976), who is often mentioned as an exemplary defender of this sort of view, ‘[just] assumes the simple summative account en passant’ (2004, p. 105, note 12). As we shall immediately see, not all the authors who find these summative accounts of collective intentionality inadequate share the intuition that a collective intention cannot be exhaustively explicated in terms of formally individual intentions plus a number of principles of interaction (cf. Bratman [1993, 1999], Kutz [2000a], and Miller [1992]). For two very informative and, at the same time, introductory overviews of the general debate on collective intentionality, see Tollefsen (2004) and Schweikard and Schmid (2013).
- 6.
The concept of a joint action still amounts to one of the central issues in the debate on collective intentionality. There certainly are good reasons for this. As Margaret Gilbert puts it: ‘If one does not understand what it is for one person to do something with another, one cannot have much of a grasp of the social domain’ (2007, p. 32).
- 7.
According to Georg Theiner and Timothy O’Connor (2010, p. 78), the group mind thesis fell out of grace with the rise of behaviorism and operationalism. Referring to Wegner et al. (1985), Theiner and O’Connor observe that ‘the main problem was that the group mind seemed to lack its own body. Hence it remained unclear where to look for its properties, and how to measure them’ (ibid.). In the context of cognitive science, some philosophers of mind have been defending for over 20 years the idea of distributed cognition. But not even in this frame we find a clear sense in which we could speak of a phenomenal consciousness the bearer of which is the collective itself (cf. the discussion in Sect. 1.2).
- 8.
Searle argues that ‘the notion of a we-intention […] implies the notion of cooperation’ ([1990] 2002, p. 95). This leads him to reject the proposals of philosophers who, as he thinks, have tried to analyze a we-intention in terms of I-intentions plus common knowledge (Searle, in particular, targets Tuomela and Miller [1988]). Searle writes: ‘One can have a goal in the knowledge that others also have the same goal, and one can have beliefs and even mutual beliefs about the goal that is shared by the members of the group, without there being necessarily any cooperation among the members or any intention to cooperate among the members’ (ibid.). Searle’s point is that even the most promising attempts to reduce we-intentions to I-intentions fail to provide sufficient conditions for cooperation.
- 9.
Tuomela has rejoined that Searle’s criticism misfires, the reason being because Searle has failed to see that the analysis offered by Tuomela and Miller (1988) ‘is not meant to be reductive but is rather meant to elucidate the irreducible notion of we-intention in a functionally informative way’ (Tuomela 2005, p. 358).
- 10.
This idea of a common world that is at the root of our human capacity to (actively or passively) constitute communities of different sorts and degrees of complexity is one we shall intensively deal with below (in Sect. 5.3).
- 11.
A view has begun to circulate, according to which the phenomenological tradition of thought would have ‘anticipated’ some insights that guide the current analytic philosophical debates on collective intentionality and social ontology (cf. Calcagno 2012; Schmid 2005, 2009; Schmid and Schweikard 2009). A reference to Husserl’s work is, however, not the best way to anchor the idea of a genuinely collective world-relatedness in the tradition of phenomenology. As Caminada writes, ‘since his “transcendental turn” [Husserl] has often been accused of being a representationalist and therefore of falling victim to a monological, solipsistic account of intentionality’ (2014, p. 197). Most defenders of the view just mentioned refer rather to the work of Adolf Reinach (1922), Edith Stein ([1922] 1970), Gerda Walther (1923), and Dietrich von Hildebrand ([1930] 1955). For a compelling attempt to bring to light the phenomenological ‘prehistory’ of the analysis of collective intentionality, see Schmid (2005). Here I am only concerned with the idea of a formally plural intentionality that may be argued to be at the root of any collective intentional state.
- 12.
We shall come back to this idea of a sense of ourness below (in Sect. 4.3).
- 13.
Let me make a remark aimed at preventing a possible misunderstanding related to this talk of a subject’s mode. The term ‘mode’ has been used in the context of analytic philosophy of mind to designate the psychological mode (belief, desire, hope, etc.)—or, if you prefer, the attitude—the content of which is captured, for the sake of analysis, by a given proposition. In this order of ideas, Tim Crane (2001, p. 32), for instance, argues that the general structure of intentionality may be captured as follows: Subject—Intentional Mode—Content. What we, following Tuomela, are calling here a ‘we-mode’ corresponds to a mode of what Crane calls the subject.
- 14.
Konzelmann Ziv takes up the expression ‘membership account’ from Margaret Gilbert’s (1997) membership account of shared guilt. As we shall see, Gilbert changed her mind and ended up providing a collectivist account of so-called shared guilt feelings (cf. Gilbert 2002). Appealing to Schmid’s distinction, one could preliminarily characterize what we are calling here a collectivist account of collective intentionality as an account that is both subjectively and formally collectivist.
- 15.
It would be fair to count the summative (or aggregative) view as a third class of accounts of collective intentionality, although, as already mentioned, few philosophers defend it.
- 16.
Gilbert (2007) critically discusses Searle’s approach to what he calls collective intentions. She tends to deny Searle’s account the status of an account of collective intentionality. Gilbert writes: ‘As [Searle’s] discussion develops, indeed, it seems that his main interest is not so much in developing a complete account of we-intentions, but rather in emphasizing that the primary constituents of we-intentions are we-intentions, not I-intentions’ (p. 39). By ‘we-intention’ (boldly written) Gilbert means ‘the intention of a group [as such]—whatever that may amount to’ (p. 35, footnote 19).
- 17.
Gilbert illustrates the problem by means of the following example. ‘Suppose Ben is currently thinking, with respect to himself and Elaine, “We intend to get married”. Indeed, he expresses himself thus to his parents. Elaine is in a similar position. And each assumes the other would sincerely say the same thing if prompted to do so. If a we-intention was a series of correlated we-intentions, and so on, then it would be the case that there was a we-intention to get married, the members of the “we” being Ben and Elaine. But surely the description of the situation so far is not enough to show that they do. If Ben’s parents learn that Ben and Elaine have never discussed getting married with one another, they would surely judge Ben’s announcement to be inaccurate’ (2007, pp. 42–43).
- 18.
Being an account that brings to the fore the relational nature of the phenomenon at issue, Bratman’s proposal should be understood as a subjectively individualist account of collective intentionality, i.e. as an account that seeks to respect the idea that only individuals are legitimate subjects of intentional (psychological) states. In fact, Bratman’s account is, furthermore, formally individualist, since it seeks to explain shared intentions in terms of formally individual intentions (I-intentions).
- 19.
Bratman writes: ‘We intend to J if and only if[:] 1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J[.] 2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b. 3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’ (1993, p. 106).
- 20.
In the passage from which I am quoting, Gilbert is not defending Bratman, but criticizing Searle.
- 21.
As far as this point is concerned, Schmid’s view of collective intentions is similar to the one just exposed. Schmid writes: ‘Collective intentions are not intentions of the kind anybody “has” not single individuals, and not some super-agent. For collective intentionality is not subjective. It is relational’ (2003, p. 214).
- 22.
I agree with Sellars, Tuomela, and Searle, among others, that, in order to account for a collective intentional act, we are compelled to invoke non-reducible we-intentions. As my reader shall see, the idea that there are formally plural mental states (that cannot be reduced to their formally singular counterparts) is also central to my account of collective affective intentionality, and particularly to my notion of an act of feeling-towards together.
- 23.
- 24.
There is a relatively recent development in the debate on joint action that may be argued to challenge the distinction between highly coordinated pluripersonal behavior and genuinely joint action. The advocates of the challenging view (cf., for instance, Pacherie 2011; Tollefsen 2005; Vesper et al. 2010) accuse ‘classical’ theorists of joint action of having offered a picture of collective behavior that ‘imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and […] requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents’ (Pacherie 2011, p. 173). Contrary to what the central figures of the established debate have done, these authors do not try to characterize that which makes joint actions intentionally collective. Aiming at a minimalist model of collective behavior, they rather emphasize the online coordination exhibited by some of the movements and perceptual processes of the individuals involved. In this way, they seek to evade the idea of a structure of interconnected (formally collective) intentions. One can hardly accuse these authors of claiming that highly coordinated (in the sense of sufficiently synchronized) pluripersonal behavior just is joint action. Matti Heinnonen distinguishes two kinds of contribution these minimalist accounts make to the debate on joint action. He writes: ‘The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which functional characterization of joint action is the appropriate one’ (2016, p. 168; my emphasis). But precisely for this reason one can also hardly understand these accounts as alternative accounts of the sort of collective (intentional) behavior that has interested the ‘classical’ theorists of joint action. As discussed above (cf. the discussion in Sect. 1.1), the point of departure of the present study is the thought that, at a minimum, a theory of collective affective intentionality has to be able to in a principled way differentiate those situations in which the involved individuals are feeling together from those other situations in which they merely are doing this alongside each other. A phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality has to articulate the principle at issue with regard to the participants’ emotional responses as experienced by them. Without further qualification, the idea of a sufficiently high degree of online coordination (or synchrony) does not serve as a basis for the formulation of such a principle. The reason is because it does not exclude cases of highly synchronic emotional responses that are experienced by the participants as responses they are exhibiting in a merely parallel way. This is the reason for not discussing these minimalist accounts of collective behavior in the main text. In line with the minimalist approach, John Michael offers an account of ‘how shared emotions can facilitate coordination without presupposing common knowledge of complex, interconnected structures of intention’ (2011, p. 355). Unfortunately (for our purposes), he operates with an extremely undemanding notion of shared emotions—one which rather captures cases of emotion that is perceived (from a second- or third-person point of view), and which, at any rate, does not offer a basis for a robust concept of collective affective intentionality. Michael writes: ‘Shared emotions are defined for the purposes of this paper as affective states that fulfill two minimal criteria: (a) they are expressed (verbally or otherwise) by one person; and (b) the expression is perceived (consciously or unconsciously) by another person’ (ibid.).
- 25.
Anthony Meijers (2003) raises a similar objection against Searle’s account.
- 26.
We shall discuss this claim in detail below (in Sect. 8.2).
- 27.
- 28.
Already in her paper ‘Modeling Collective Belief’ Gilbert (1987) offered an account of collective beliefs along these lines. This account, however, can be understood as an extension of her plural subject account of joint action (cf. 1989). Gilbert herself explains why: ‘Due to the vagaries of publishing, the 1987 article was written after the 1989 book was sent to the press’ (2004, p. 104, note 6).
- 29.
Among the theories mentioned above, the one defended by Schmid (2005 and elsewhere) most closely corresponds to my view of collective intentionality. The theory of collective affective intentionality I am to develop in the second part of this book also elaborates on some motives of Schmid’s (2008, 2009) view of what it is to share a feeling (in a strong sense of the verb ‘to share’). My proposal also builds significantly on Bennett Helm’s (2008, 2010) work on shared evaluative perspectives and plural agents. This work does not figure centrally in debates on collective intentionality, but it definitively has to be seen as an important contribution to this area of scholarship. The only reason for ignoring this contribution here is that I extensively discuss Helm’s work elsewhere in the book (cf. the discussion in Sects. 5.2 and 6.2).
- 30.
Michael Tomasello (2008) suggests that this ability (or set of abilities) is at the ground of other faculties that are commonly taken to differentiate us from other primates.
- 31.
This book treats both the acts that actualize our capacity to feel together and the moments of affective community I call episodes of collective affective intentionality. As mentioned above, my main goal is to explicate the claim that there is a distinct form of human world-relatedness that deserves to be called collective affective intentionality. This goal may seem to exclusively concern the pertinent ability. A complete understanding of our ability to feel together, however, involves an understanding of the type of state of affairs the individuals who take themselves to be participating in a moment of affective intentional community assume to be the case. In the course of this discussion, we shall, therefore, also get a clear idea of what an episode of collective affective intentionality amounts to.
- 32.
Schmid makes the point by writing that ‘[p]otential joint intenders have to see each other in a different light than simply as agents who act on their own private agenda and who have social cognition of whatever order’ (2014a, p. 8). The idea has also been articulated in terms of a sense of community (or sense of ‘us’) that is central to a genuinely collective intentional act (cf., for instance, John Searle [1990] 2002). It is important to note that the participants must be able to understand themselves as constituting some particular ‘we’ on the basis of the intentional states through which they participate in the relevant episode of collective intentionality.
- 33.
Were we not to include such a factual relationship in our picture, we would not be able to differentiate between situations in which the individuals involved are in a we-intentional state in a merely parallel way and situations in which they are in a we-intentional state in a properly joint manner. Schmid makes the point as follows: ‘the mere fact that you happen to have the belief that we are a team, and that I, by some coincidence and perhaps in a dream, happen to have the same thought, does not make us a team. It is not enough for you to have the appropriate belief, and for me to have that belief; at least, it has to be true that we have the belief together’ (2014a, p. 10). In the course of the discussion developed in the second part of this book, I shall explicate what this relationship amounts to.
- 34.
I furthermore believe that there is an implication of this particular kind of relationality that characterizes a collective intentional act. This implication concerns the issue that one’s membership in a particular ‘we’ in the context of a collective intentional episode is not factually but normatively determined. If one, on a given occasion, fails to participate (as expected) in some collective intentional act, one is not necessarily immediately excluded from the relevant intentional community. In many cases one is only urged to justify one’s failure. In principle, only in those cases in which this failure becomes the rule, the membership in the relevant group becomes questionable.
- 35.
Schmid articulates the criticism as follows: ‘Forming a plural subject, it might seem, is something that has to be done, and we can only do it together. If, however, plural subjects are the result of joint actions or even just joint attitudes, we are in an infinite regress, since ex hypothesi, joint actions and attitudes presuppose a joint subject’ (2014a, p. 11).
- 36.
We are going to deal with this idea below (in Sect. 4.3).
- 37.
Here, I am trying to characterize my view of collective intentionality in terms of Schmid’s (2009; cf. also Schweikard and Schmid 2013) differentiation of theories that locate the collective character of genuinely collective intentionality in either the content, the mode, or the subject of the relevant intentional states.
- 38.
The reason why this should not come as a surprise is not only because, as already mentioned, the idea of a collective responsibility surrounds the idea of a joint action, but also because the issue of collective guilt (broadly construed as collective bad conscience) constitutes a rather common philosophical topic. Indeed, when reading the first part of the mentioned paper in which Gilbert motivates her account, one gets the impression that she has not been driven to extend her plural subject account to the realm of the affective by a general interest in emotional phenomena, but by an interest in collective moral responsibility.
- 39.
For a criticism concerning the first of these points, see Konzelmann Ziv (2007). (Cf. footnote 42 below.)
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
There are other objections that are worthy of mention. Taking for granted that emotions are routinely ascribed to groups, Gilbert claims that these ascriptions are not based on some ‘sense of fantasy or metaphor’ (2002, p. 121). As already mentioned in the main text, she asserts that ‘[the fact t]hat people are prepared to speak in this way, and frequently do, at least suggests that they think that there is something, something real, to which [these ascriptions] refer: the feelings of a group’ (p. 118; my emphasis). Konzelmann Ziv (2007) casts doubt on both the assumption that ascriptions of guilt feelings to groups are common and the claim that people making these sorts of ascriptions are normally referring to a feeling they think to be had by the group itself. A further objection Konzelmann Ziv raises concerns an assumption of what she takes to be Gilbert’s second line of argument. The assumption is that self-ascriptions that display the form ‘We feel p’ necessarily refer to feelings of collectives. Konzelmann Ziv observes that plural sentences in general are open to both distributive and collective analyses: ‘A collective analysis of the proposition “These books are expensive”, for example, states that the proposition is true if the collection of books referred to is expensive, while a distributive analysis takes it to be true if each of the books is expensive’ (p. 478). Konzelmann Ziv points out that ‘[t]he logical grammar of [such a] proposition does not determine which analysis is the right one; this depends largely on contextual parameters’ (ibid.).
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
The example Konzelmann Ziv gives is very illustrative: ‘People feeling desperate towards the state of values of crashing stock markets fulfill both characteristics without immediately co-feeling their despair’ (p. 101). This is a point we have already touched on.
- 46.
I am aware that, in framing the issue in terms of a subjective sense of togetherness, I am making my proposal susceptible to an objection we are already familiar with: the objection concerning the possibility of a solipsistic (formally) collective intentional state. I believe that there is no real threat posed by the recognition that someone could experience a misguiding intentional feeling that is marked by what I am calling here a sense of togetherness, since this does not invalidate the whole approach. For it is possible to argue that the existence of such a feeling is, in a sense, parasitic on the very possibility we have to participate in real collective affective intentional episodes (whatever exactly this turns out to mean). One way in which one could begin to dismantle the worries at issue here, I think, is by addressing not only the concrete situation in which someone is experiencing such a feeling, but also what we could call the historical preconditions of such a feeling, thereby making clear that a genuine collective affective intentional state is grounded in some already existing relationship between the participants. At any rate, what this (anticipated) objection reminds us of is that collective affective intentionality (and collective intentionality more generally) cannot merely be a matter of feeling togetherness—although, as I have been arguing, it is absolutely fundamental to have some sense that the relevant experience is our experience. This, however, is not really a problem, since collective affective intentionality may be preliminarily argued to be a matter of feeling affective togetherness in a genuinely joint manner (whatever exactly this turns out to mean).
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Sánchez Guerrero, H.A. (2016). Our Ability to Feel-Towards Together: Collective Affective Intentionality Preliminarily Conceived. In: Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33735-7_3
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