Abstract
Whereas the previous two chapters responded to philosophical challenges to our scientific knowledge this chapter explores a more practical threat to scientific knowledge. This challenge comes from research which suggests we are subject to a number of biases and irrational processes when forming our beliefs. Numerous studies have seemingly shown that people are prone to make systematic errors of reasoning in particular kinds of cases. Some take this evidence of human irrationality to undercut our knowledge in general, and hence, our scientific knowledge as well. This chapter argues that this challenge does not pose a significant threat to our scientific knowledge. Although there is evidence for human irrationality, we have ways of keeping this sort of irrationality contained so that it does not “infect” all of our beliefs. So, while we are prone to make systematic errors in certain cases, we are aware of our proclivities, and we can take steps to counteract our natural shortcomings.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
The reason that committing the conjunction fallacy is irrational is that it makes one susceptible to a “Dutch book”. A Dutch book is a series of bets which are such that no matter what the outcome of the series of events betted upon the person accepting the series of bets will lose all of her money. When someone commits the conjunction fallacy she is accepting a distribution of probabilities which could be used to construct a Dutch book against her. For more on how committing the conjunction fallacy makes one Dutch bookable see Stein (1996). For an accessible general discussion of Dutch books see Skyrms (1986).
- 4.
- 5.
Cohen’s (1983) defense of this response is quite sophisticated, and it is worthy of careful consideration. However, for our purposes it is enough to grasp the general nature of this sort of response and some reasons that one might be skeptical of its effectiveness. For detailed critical discussion of Cohen’s arguments concerning human irrationality see Stein (1996) and Stich (1990).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
See Fielder (1988).
- 10.
See Gilovich (1991) for discussion.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
We will discuss these issues further in the final part of the book when we examine some of the social aspects of scientific knowledge.
References
Bonner, B. L., Baumann, M. R., & Dalal, R. S. (2002). The effects of member expertise on group decision making and performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88, 719–736.
Cohen, L. J. (1983). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, 317–370.
Davidson, D. (1985). Incoherence and irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–354.
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Fielder, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 123–129.
Fine, C. (2006). A mind of its own: How your brain distorts and deceives. Cambridge, UK: Icon books.
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond “heuristics and biases”. European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83–115.
Gilovich, T. (1991). How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: Free Press.
Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., & Legrenzi, M. (1972). Reasoning and a sense of reality. British Journal of Pyschology, 63, 395–400.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kelly, T. (2008). Disagreement, dogmatism, and belief polarization. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 611–633.
Laughlin, P. R., & Ellis, A. L. (1986). Demonstrability and social combination processes on mathematical intellective tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 177–189.
Lord, C., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2098–2109.
Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and justification. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57–111.
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Moshman, D., & Geil, M. (1998). Collaborative reasoning: Evidence for collective rationality. Thinking and Reasoning, 4, 231–248.
Nisbett, R., & Borgida, E. (1975). Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 932–943.
Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Skyrms, B. (1986). Choice and chance (3rd ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth.
Slavin, R. E. (1995). Cooperative learning: Theory, research, and practice. London: Allyn and Bacon.
Sober, E. (1981). The evolution of rationality. Synthese, 46, 95–120.
Sperber, D., & Mercier, H. (2014). Reasoning as social competence. In H. Landemore & J. Elster (Eds.), Collective wisdom: Principles and mechanisms (pp. 368–392). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Stein, E. (1996). Without good reason: The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stich, S. P. (1990). The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.
Wason, P. (1966). Reasoning. In B. Foss (Ed.), New horizons in psychology (pp. 135–151). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Wason, P. (1968). Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20, 273–281.
Wason, P., & Johnson-Laird, P. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wason, P., & Shapiro, D. (1971). Natural and contrived experience in a reasoning problem. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 23, 63–71.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
McCain, K. (2016). Empirical Evidence of Irrationality. In: The Nature of Scientific Knowledge. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33405-9_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33405-9_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33403-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-33405-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)