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The Law and the Symbolic Value of the Body

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Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 4))

Abstract

This chapter explores the debates over the legal classification of the body and of bodily material. It argues that the choice of legal classification symbolises a particular vision of the biological nature of the body and the legitimacy of interests in the body. It argues that treating the body as property would symbolise an image of the body as a static, self-contained and independent entity. This image would itself be a symbol that would give significance to the individualised values of autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity. This chapter claims that in fact bodies are mutable, interdependent and leaky. We need to recognise the communal and relational values in bodies, as well as the interests that the individual has in the body. This would support rejecting the property model in favour of a more flexible approach that recognises the range of different interests that can be claimed in relation to different body parts in different situations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this chapter I have drawn on ideas I have developed in Herring and Chau (2007, 2013); Chau and Herring, ‘Interconnected, inhabited and insecure: why bodies should not be property’ (2014) and Herring (2014).

  2. 2.

    See, for example, the support of a majority for a property approach among of contributors to Goold et al. (2014).

  3. 3.

    I first heard this phrase in a lecture given by Jesse Wall and am grateful for his permission to use it.

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Correspondence to Jonathan Herring .

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Herring, J. (2016). The Law and the Symbolic Value of the Body. In: van Klink, B., van Beers, B., Poort, L. (eds) Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw. Legisprudence Library, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33365-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33365-6_8

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