Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Order Ethics and the Problem of Social Glue

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy

Abstract

This article discusses the question whether modern societies require some kind of a social glue in order to remain stable. This social glue (termed the ‘moral surplus’) is regarded as a moral capacity or capability which goes beyond the individual quest for advantages and benefits. Four positions in contemporary social philosophy which postulate a moral surplus are discussed and criticized: J. Habermas, J. Rawls, D. Gauthier and K. Binmore. The conception of order ethics is outlined as an alternative view which abandons the idea of a moral surplus.

This chapter reproduces revised material that has previously been published in C. Luetge, 2016. “Order Ethics and the Problem of Social Glue”, University of St. Thomas Law Journal 12, 2: 339–359. We thank the publisher for their permission to reproduce it here.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For accounts of the phenomenon of globalisation, cf., e.g., Stiglitz (2002) and Bhagwati (2004).

  2. 2.

    For this term, cf. Luetge (2015).

  3. 3.

    For conceptualizations of the prisoners’ dilemma, cf. Axelrod (1984).—Sometimes this situation is also called the prisoner’s dilemma. I deliberately use the plural because it is an interaction problem for both actors, not just a unilateral decision problem for a single actor.

  4. 4.

    Iterating PD situations means introducing sanctions, i.e. incentives. If this is done by way of institutions, then this is in agreement with my approach (cf. Sect. 6). If not, then it is unclear what could be meant by iterating a PD situation ‘in real life’, without relying on institutions for stability.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Habermas (1981/1984/1987), vol. 1, pp. 26 and 29; Habermas (1983/1990), pp. 58 and 109; Habermas (1992/1996), p. 5.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Habermas (1983/1990), p. 58.

  7. 7.

    Habermas (1981/1984/1987), vol. 1, p. 29; cf. also Habermas (1981/1984/1987), vol. 1, p. 42.

  8. 8.

    Habermas (1981/1984/1987), vol. 1, p. 26, fn. 28 (p. 411).

  9. 9.

    Cf. Habermas (1983/1990), pp. 58, 72, 109.

  10. 10.

    Habermas (1983/1990), p. 58.

  11. 11.

    For further explication, cf. Habermas (1983/1990), pp. 80f.

  12. 12.

    In Habermas (1983/1990).

  13. 13.

    Habermas (1983/1990), p. 102.

  14. 14.

    Habermas (1991/1993), p. 33.

  15. 15.

    Habermas (1991/1993), p. 34.

  16. 16.

    Binmore (1994, 1998) and Homann (2002) both assign the PD a central role in their ethical or ethically relevant approaches.

  17. 17.

    In some (earlier) works (cf. Habermas 1983/1990), he makes extensive use of L. Kohlberg’s developmental psychology.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Habermas (1992/1996), pp. 17f. and 459ff.

  19. 19.

    Habermas (1992/1996), p. 34.

  20. 20.

    Habermas (1992/1996).

  21. 21.

    Like Binmore (1994, 1998).

  22. 22.

    Cf. Rawls (1971, 1993).

  23. 23.

     There are some interesting differences between the “Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism”, but I cannot go into detail here.

  24. 24.

    First in Rawls (1985).

  25. 25.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 10f.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 58ff.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 11f.

  28. 28.

    Here again, I use the wording employed in Rawls (1993), p. 5.

  29. 29.

    Rawls (1993), 6.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 22ff.

  31. 31.

    Cf. already Dworkin (1975).

  32. 32.

    Cf. Rawls (1995), p. 203.

  33. 33.

    Rawls (1993), 35.

  34. 34.

     The sense of justice appears first in “The Sense of Justice” (Rawls 1963).

  35. 35.

     A society is well-ordered according to Rawls if (a) the two principles of justice are generally accepted, (b) the basic structure conform with these principles, and (c) the citizens possess a sense of justice (cf. Rawls 1993, pp. 35ff.).

  36. 36.

    I use the more elaborated wording in Rawls (1993), p. 302 (my italics) rather than the shorter version on p. 19.

  37. 37.

    Rawls (1993), p. 302, my italics.

  38. 38.

     Cf. also Rawls (1993), p. 35, where he writes that the “citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions” (my italics).

  39. 39.

    For the following, cf. Luetge (2015), ch. 3.4.2.

  40. 40.

    The difference between the rational and the reasonable has been widely analysed, cf., e.g., Davion and Wolf (2000) and Kukathas and Pettit (1990).

  41. 41.

     A modus vivendi is thus not comparable to a ‘cease fire’ as opposed to a peace treaty, but is rather a ‘simple’ (exchange) contract. .

  42. 42.

    Rawls (1993), p. 147.

  43. 43.

    Id.

  44. 44.

    Rawls (1993), p. 38.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 133ff.

  46. 46.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), p. 148.

  47. 47.

    Id.

  48. 48.

    Rawls (1993), p. 147.

  49. 49.

    Id.

  50. 50.

    Cf. Rawls (1993), pp. 158f.

  51. 51.

    Rawls (1993), pp. 164ff.

  52. 52.

    Id.

  53. 53.

    Rawls (1993), p. 167.

  54. 54.

    Rawls (1993), p. 168.

  55. 55.

    Rawls (1993), p. 168.

  56. 56.

    For a critical account of this, cf. Mills (2000).

  57. 57.

    He writes that a “constitutional consensus will prove too narrow”, as a democratic people will have to be “sufficiently unified and cohesive” in order to cover, among others, basic matters of justice. Otherwise, “conflict will arise about these” (Rawls 1993, p. 166).

  58. 58.

    Cf. Gauthier (1986), pp. 12, 82, 103f.

  59. 59.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 157.

  60. 60.

    Cf. also Gauthier (1997).

  61. 61.

    For the following, cf. Luetge (2015), ch. 3.5.

  62. 62.

    Hobbes (1651/1991), ch. 15.

  63. 63.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 163.

  64. 64.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 1.

  65. 65.

    Gauthier (1986), pp. 164ff.

  66. 66.

    Gauthier (1986), 15f.

  67. 67.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 157.

  68. 68.

    Gauthier (1986), ch. VIII.

  69. 69.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 181.

  70. 70.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 169.

  71. 71.

    Cf. Gauthier (1986), pp. 169f. esp. fn. 19.

  72. 72.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 319, italics in original.

  73. 73.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 319.

  74. 74.

    Cf. Gauthier (1986), p. 179.

  75. 75.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 197.

  76. 76.

    Gauthier (1986), ch. VII.

  77. 77.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 9.

  78. 78.

    Cf. Gauthier (1986), pp. 182ff.

  79. 79.

     Cf. also Gauthier (1997), which stresses, too, the importance of education (esp. p. 148).

  80. 80.

    Gauthier (1986), p. 351.

  81. 81.

    To some extent, this has been recognized by Buchanan (1988/1991, p. 195) and Harman 1988, who doubts whether rational actors would accept a distribution as a result of a hypothetical contract. However, in my view, it is not the hypothetical character of the contract that poses a major problem, but rather the kind of social structures in effect (PD situations).

  82. 82.

    According to Binmore (1994, pp. 26f. and 80), Gauthier invents a non-existent enforcement mechanism.

  83. 83.

    Binmore (1994), p. 161.

  84. 84.

    Id.

  85. 85.

    Id.

  86. 86.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), p. 162.

  87. 87.

    This goes back to Harsanyi’s “extended sympathy preferences”, cf. Harsanyi (1977). By employing the concept of ‘empathetic preferences’, Binmore wants to highlight the difference between the classic concept of sympathy in D. Hume’s works and his modern one. Cf. Binmore (1994), pp. 28, 58ff., ch. 4.3.1 and Binmore (1998), ch. 2.5.4.

  88. 88.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), p. 286.

  89. 89.

    Binmore (1994), p. 290.

  90. 90.

    I prefer to use the term ‘ability to empathize’, as it is a more general concept than the empathetic preferences. The latter are preferences that a particular actor reveals in a concrete case with regard to one or several other actors. These may change from one actor to another and from case to case.

  91. 91.

     But according to Elster (1989), ‘love and duty’, i.e., sympathy in Binmore’s terms, are the “cement of society”. Binmore (1994, p. 24) responds that modern societies do not need cement, rather they are like a dry-stone wall in which each stone is kept in place only by the other stones, i.e., by reciprocity. To maintain reciprocity, however, greed and fear suffice.

  92. 92.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), pp. 57 and 288ff.

  93. 93.

    Binmore (1994), ch. 1.3.

  94. 94.

    Id.

  95. 95.

    Cf. Binmore (1998), ch. 4.6.8.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), p. 90.

  97. 97.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), ch. 1.3.

  98. 98.

    Id.

  99. 99.

    Binmore (1994), p. 65. Cf. also ibid., ch. 1.2.7, 1.3, and pp. 290ff.

  100. 100.

    Cf. Binmore (1994), p. 88. For the Nash equilibrium, see Nash 1950, 1951.

  101. 101.

    Binmore (1994), p. 133, (1998), p. 182. He does not rely entirely on genetic concepts, however, but uses Dawkins’ (1976) concept of the “meme”. Cf. Binmore (1994), pp. 65f.

  102. 102.

    Binmore (1994), p. 241.

  103. 103.

     Cf. Rawls’ strict separation between the modus vivendi, the constitutional consensus and the overlapping consensus (see Sect. 3).

  104. 104.

    However, this can also be seen as a shortcoming of Binmore’s work: He does rely exclusively on evolutionary game theory, as Dore (1997, pp. 236f.) emphasizes, too. While this is certainly relevant to modern societies, we cannot however go without other branches of economics and other social sciences for the detailed design of institutions.

  105. 105.

    Cf. Homann (2002), p. 98; Homann and Luetge (2013), p. 35.

  106. 106.

    For the order ethics approach, see Luetge (2014, 2015), Homann (2002), Luetge et al. (2016), Homann and Luetge (2013), Luetge (2005). The corresponding idea in Binmore’s approach is the requirement to first regard only the relevant equilibria and then pick one of them as the desirable.

  107. 107.

    For such a view on Ancient Greece, see Meier 1998.

  108. 108.

    Cf. Luetge (2015), ch. 2.

  109. 109.

    Cf., e.g., Luhmann (1997).

  110. 110.

    Cf. Ackermann (1980).

  111. 111.

    Ackermann (1980), p. 34.

  112. 112.

    Cf. also Hayek (1973), ch. 2.

  113. 113.

    As in Gauthier and Binmore, PD situations occupy a pivotal place in this approach.

  114. 114.

    Cf. Hart (1987), Hart and Holmström (1987) and Luetge (2005).

References

  • Ackerman, B. A. 1980. Social justice in the liberal state. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhagwati, J. 2004. In defense of globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K. 1994. Game theory and the social contract: Vol. 1: Playing fair. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K. 1998. Game theory and the social contract: Vol. 2: Just playing. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M. 1988/1991. The Gauthier enterprise. In Paul (1988), 75–94, reprinted in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1991, 195-213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davion, V., and C. Wolf (eds.). 2000. The idea of a political liberalism: essays on Rawls. Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, R. 1976. The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dore, M. 1997. On playing fair: Professor Binmore on game theory and the social contract. Theory and Decision 43: 219–239.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. 1975. The original position. In Reading Rawls, ed. N. Daniels. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elster, J. 1989. The cement of society: a study of social order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gauthier, D. 1986. Morals by agreement. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gauthier, D. 1997. Political contractarianism. Journal of Political Philosophy 5(2): 132–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. 1981/1984/1987. The theory of communicative action, 2 vol., Boston: Beacon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. 1983/1990. Moral consciousness and communicative action, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. 1991/1993. Justification and application: remarks on discourse ethics, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas, J. 1992/1996. Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. 1988. Rationality in Agreement: A Commentary on Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, in: Paul (1988), 1–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J. C. 1977. Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, O.D. 1987. Incomplete contracts. In J. Eatwell et al. (Eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Vol. 2: 752–759. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, O.D., and B.R. Holmström. (1987). The theory of contracts. In T. F. Bewley (Ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Ch. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F. A. v. 1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 1: Rules and Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes, T. 1651/1991. Leviathan, ed. by R. Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Homann, K. 2002. Vorteile und Anreize: Zur Grundlegung einer Ethik der Zukunft. Ed. by C. Luetge. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Homann, K., and C. Kirchner. 1995. Ordnungsethik. Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 14: 189–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Homann, K., and C. Luetge. 2013. Einführung in die Wirtschaftsethik, 3rd ed. Münster: LIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kukathas, C., and P. Pettit. 1990. Rawls: a theory of justice and its critics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luetge, C. 2005. Economic ethics. Business ethics, and the idea of mutual advantages, Business Ethics: a European Review 14(2): 108–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luetge, C. 2014. Ethik des Wettbewerbs: Über Konkurrenz und Moral. München: Beck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luetge, C. 2015. Order ethics or moral surplus: what holds a society together?. Lanham, Md.: Lexington.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luetge, C., Armbrüster, T., and Müller, J. 2016. Order ethics: bridging the gap between contractarianism and Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming

    Google Scholar 

  • Luetge, C., and H. Rusch. 2013. The Systematic Place of Morals in Markets: Comment on Armin Falk & Nora Szech “Morals and Markets”, Science 341 (6147), 16th August 2013, p. 714.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann, N. 1997. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 2 vols., Frankfurt/M..

    Google Scholar 

  • Meier, C. 1998. Athens: A portrait of the city in its golden age. New York: Metropolitan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mills, C. 2000. Not a mere Modus Vivendi: The Bases for Allegiance to the Just State. In Davion und Wolf (2000), 190–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J. 1950. Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36: 48–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nash, J. 1951. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, E. F. (ed.). 1988. Gauthier’s new social contract. Social Philosophy and Policy 5, No. 2, Social Philosophy and Policy Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1963. The sense of justice. Philosophical Review 72(3): 281–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge: Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1985. Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical. Philosophy & Public Affairs 14: 223–251.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1993. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1995. Reply to Habermas. Journal of Philosophy 92(3): 132–180.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. 2002. Globalization and its discontents. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of Business Ethics, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Christoph Luetge

Authors
  1. Christoph Luetge
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christoph Luetge .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Peter Löscher Chair of Business Eth, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Christoph Luetge

  2. München, Bayern, Germany

    Nikil Mukerji

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Luetge, C. (2016). Order Ethics and the Problem of Social Glue. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation