Abstract
We offer a concise introduction to the methodology of order-ethics and highlight how it connects aspects of economic theory and, in particular, game theory with traditional ethical considerations. The discussion is conducted along the lines of five basic propositions, which are used to characterize the methodological approach of order ethics.
This chapter reproduces some material that has previously been published in Mukerji and Schumacher (2008). We thank A B Academic Publishers for their permission to reproduce it here.
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Notes
- 1.
Petrick and Pies (2007) summarize a few views regarding this claim.
- 2.
Mukerji (2013) offers a brief and accessible overview over some of the most common criticisms of utilitarianism.
- 3.
This aspect of Pareto-efficiency has first been pointed out by Wicksell (1896).
- 4.
In Kant’s terminology, playing C would be an “imperfect duty”, rather than a “perfect duty”. For the distinction between the two see, e.g., Johnson (2012).
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Mukerji, N., Schumacher, C. (2016). Order Ethics, Economics, and Game Theory. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_7
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