Order Ethics, Economics, and Game Theory

  • Nikil MukerjiEmail author
  • Christoph Schumacher


We offer a concise introduction to the methodology of order-ethics and highlight how it connects aspects of economic theory and, in particular, game theory with traditional ethical considerations. The discussion is conducted along the lines of five basic propositions, which are used to characterize the methodological approach of order ethics.


Economic ethics Business ethics Methodology Game theory Prisoner’s dilemma Dilemma structures Pareto-efficiency Kaldor-Hicks-criterion 


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and the Study of ReligionLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMunichGermany
  2. 2.School of Economics and FinanceMassey UniversityAucklandNew Zealand

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