Abstract
In view of the enormous pressure to solve problems that exists today in the current international situation, more than a few people expect a contribution to be made by business ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
Despite two new endowed chairs at the TU München (Prof. Dr. Christoph Luetge, since fall 2010) and at the Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Prof. Dr. Philipp Schreck, since spring 2015), my chair at the LMU München has since adopted a different focus (Prof. Dr. Julian Nida-Rümelin, philosophy and political theory).
- 2.
- 3.
The question of why people often do not adhere to moral norms has hardly been systematically analyzed in the Western tradition of ethics; typically, reference is made to evil or weak wills.
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- 7.
As, for instance, in the discourse ethics of the Frankfurt School; see e.g. Apel (1973/1980), Habermas (1981/1984/1987, 1983/1990, 1991/1994). P. Ulrich and his followers draw on this version of discourse ethics. H. Steinmann and his followers draw on the Erlanger variant of a discourse ethics, whose founder is P. Lorenzen; see Lorenzen (1989/1991). Steinmann and Löhr (1992/1994). In recent years, there seem to have been efforts to merge the two discourse ethics concepts, such as when Steinmann's proponent A.G. Scherer increasingly takes recourse to Habermas; see Palazzo and Scherer (2006, 2007).
- 8.
The assessment of psychology in the work of J. Rawls is quite compelling in this context. He developed a “moral psychology: philosophical and not psychological,” and describes its role as follows: “We have to formulate an ideal of constitutional government to see whether it has force for us and can be put into practice successfully in the history of society.” Rawls (1993) p. 87.
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- 10.
See Kohlberg (1981) and the extensive discussion of the Piaget-Kohlberg approach.
- 11.
- 12.
The number is taken from Singer (2009), p. 4.
- 13.
This translation is to be regarded as an equivalent of the German “Motivwelt”, picked up from Nassehi (2010) p. 156.
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- 17.
D. Gauthier and R. Pippin attribute this to the fact that, in the Christian Middle Ages, the question of the justification of the individual soul before God was central; see Gauthier (1998) p. 131; Pippin (2005) p. 65. This is even the case with Calvin, whose theology has been regarded since M. Weber as the driving force behind the capitalist economy: An individual's wealth is interpreted as a sign that his soul has been chosen by God.
- 18.
The few representatives of an autonomous ethics of philosophy who even seriously discuss the prisoner's dilemma consistently try to overcome it by means of individual morality, dispositions, or virtues: Mackie (1977); Gauthier (1986). [Instead of the referenced “Willensschwäche,” which might be translated into English as “a lack of moral feeling or concern, or a lack of some other particular interest or attitude.” Gauthier (1986) p.103?] In P. Ulrich's “Integrative Wirtschaftsethik,” the prisoner's dilemma is only mentioned once on less than half a page and is also to be overcome by means of individual morality; see Ulrich (1996) p. 84 and Ulrich (1997/2008) p. 68.
- 19.
von Weizsäcker (1964) p. 104 (with reference to the physics of Aristotle).
- 20.
The formulation is based on Hegel. I have shown in Homann (2004) that Hegel himself uses such an ought, as well as in what context.
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Rawls (1971) pp. 84, 126.
- 24.
Not compatible with this type of ethics are a deontological ethics, a cognitivist ethics and all types that rely on “metaphysical” conditions. Utilitarianism is not compatible either, in all its variants, since it cannot avoid aggregating individual utility.
- 25.
Following Rawls (1993).
- 26.
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- 30.
See Pippin (2005) pp. 59–70 (Hegel und das Problem der Freiheit).
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- 32.
This idea lies behind Hegel’s much-criticized notion of “world history as the world’s court of judgment [Weltgericht],” Hegel (1821/1986) p. 503 (§ 340). The sentence to which Hegel refers here comes originally from F. Schiller's poem “Resignation”: “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.” Schiller (1786) p. 68.
- 33.
This principle has not been explicitly questioned by any ethical conception. But in dualistic conceptions of ethics and business ethics, it finds only a weak echo, namely in the concept of “reasonableness”: Obviously not everything that is morally required is also “reasonable,” whereby this restriction is never systematically explicated, but always remains ad hoc. See, for example, Ulrich (1996) p. 448f and Ulrich (1997/2008) p. 429 [“the question whether the corporation itself can be reasonably expected to recognize the claims made on it.”; emphasis in the original]; without using the concept of “reasonableness,” P. Singer makes completely ad hoc deductions about what, in his opinion, is morally necessary; see Singer (2009) p. 151 ff., esp. 160ff. As to the ad-hoc nature of this concept, the following passage in J. Habermas is particularly revealing. It makes an especially strong claim in reference to the “validity,” i.e. here: invalidity, of moral commandments, only to then subsequently weaken it by taking recourse to “reasonableness”: “The validity of moral commandments is subject to the condition that they be generally followed as the basis of a general practice. Only if this condition of reasonableness is satisfied, are they able to give expression to that which everyone might want. “Habermas (1991) p. 136, emphasis in the original [Engl .: “autonomy can be reasonably expected (zumutbar) only in social contexts that are already themselves rational in the sense that they ensure that action motivated by good reasons will not of necessity conflict with one’s own interests. The validity of moral commands is subject to the condition that they are universally adhered to as the basis for a general practice. Only when this condition is satisfied do they express what all could will.” Habermas (1991/1994) p. 34; emphasis in the original)]. How are we to understand, for example, the “validity” of the ban on corruption in the countries of the world where corruption is common practice?
- 34.
In the mainstream interpretation of Kant traced back to the famous first sentence of the first section of “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” from 1785: “Es ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja überhaupt auch außer derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille.” Kant (1902 ff.) Vol. IV, p. 393; emphasis omitted. [Engl .: “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will.” Kant (1785/1786/2011) p. 15; emphasis omitted]. The “mainstream interpretation” refers to Kant's remarks in the “Groundwork “ and in the “Critique of Practical Reason” to the concrete actions of people; many of the examples provided by Kant himself suggest this reference. Recent research shows that these writings were not specifically concerned with behavior, but “metaphysics,” that is, the principles of behavior. Principles, however, only apply “in principle,” not in every specific case. Here, Kant is much more flexible, for he also takes empirical conditions into consideration. Instructive for the business ethics here is Kant's discussion of competition or, more precisely, “Wetteifer” (rivalry); see Schönwälder-Kuntze (2013).
- 35.
Hence the title of Homann (2014).
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- 37.
The prisoner’s dilemma is used exclusively to outline the problem, not to describe reality, and certainly not to make a recommendation for (economic) action.
- 38.
See Luhmann (1984): “The methodological recipe for this is to seek theories that can succeed in explaining the normal as improbable.” Luhmann (1984) p. 114. Luhmann is opposed to the “banality” of just referring the problem “back to the world experienced in everyday life, to historical facticity”; Luhmann (1984) p. 115.
- 39.
See Alchian (1950). Besides the fact that “motives” can only be attributed to natural persons and the attribution of self-interested striving to companies must be taken as an indication that a “motive” is not at issue, it should further be noted here that vast numbers of people strongly dislike “selfishness” and “greed,” even though they must also defend their legitimate interests against exploitation in competition. Such a “motive” is best understood as an imposed motive. These remarks are in line with the notion of a “system imperative.”
- 40.
In the English version of the “Leviathan” from 1651, Hobbes specifies the following three causes of the struggle of all against all in the state of nature: competition, diffidence, glory: “So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. (…) the second, to defend them.” Hobbes (1651/1996) p. 88. In the Latin version, which Hobbes published 17 years later, diffidence is not so much translated as it is replaced by “defensio”; [Lat .: “Itaque in natura humana simultatum inveniuntur tres praecipuae causae, Competitio, Defensio, Gloria” Hobbes (1668/1676) S.64] Defensio already appears in “De Cive” from 1648; it is not necessary to provide supporting evidence here.
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- 42.
See Hegel (1821/1991) p. 16f. (Preface): “That right and ethics, and the actual world of right and the ethical, are grasped by means of thoughts and give themselves the form of rationality—namely universality and determinacy—by means of thoughts, is what constitutes the law; and is this which is justifiably regarded as the main enemy by that feeling which reserves the right to do as it pleases, by that conscience which identifies right with subjective conviction.” Hegel (1821/1991) p. 17; emphasis in original.
- 43.
In reference, for instance, to most important and influential moral philosopher of modern times, I. Kant; see footnote 34 above.
- 44.
- 45.
This idea has been developed in greater detail—and analogously to Böhm-Bawerk's famous essay “Macht oder ökonomisches Gesetz?”—in Homann (2009).
- 46.
See also Pies (2011).
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Homann, K. (2016). Theory Strategies of Business Ethics. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_3
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