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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 116))

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Abstract

Recent debate in moral and political philosophy has been concerned with constructivism. Constructivism is the thesis that objective values are constructions of reason and that their validity is determined by rational criteria. Constructivism poses a challenge to Kelsen’s position that justice is a subjective value. Kelsen’s critique of practical reason and deontic logic in General Theory of Norms is best understood as a response to constructivism. Kelsen’s arguments can be a contribution to contemporary debates about constructivism, particularly the constructivism of Rawls.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rawls’ dissertation references the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre, General Theory of Law and State, and The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence (Rawls 1950: 4) . Of note is that the dissertation predates Rawls’ time at Oxford, where he was in contact with H.L.A. Hart.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to George Mazur for an informative discussion and for pointing me in the direction of Foundations of Democracy. Thanks to Jeremy Telman and Valparaiso University Law School for organizing Hans Kelsen in America. Finally, thanks to Jessica Wielgus for her hospitality during my stay in Chicago.

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Correspondence to Joshua W. Felix .

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Felix, J.W. (2016). Kelsen, Justice, and Constructivism. In: Telman, D. (eds) Hans Kelsen in America - Selective Affinities and the Mysteries of Academic Influence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 116. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33130-0_16

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