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Security Analytics for EMS Modules

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
  • Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman
Chapter
  • 655 Downloads
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 67)

Abstract

In modern energy control centers, the energy management system (EMS) refers to a set of computational tools which are employed for system wide monitoring, analysis, control, and operation. A schematic diagram of EMS and its modules are shown in Fig.  1.6 in Chap.  1 State estimation is the core module in EMS that estimates the system state variables from a set of real-time telemetered measurements (from meters) and topology statuses (from breakers and switches). The term “states” denotes bus voltages, from which power flows through transmission lines can be computed. As seen in Fig.  1.6, the output of state estimation is required by several other modules, i.e., optimal power flow (OPF) , contingency analysis , and automatic generation control (AGC) , for economic dispatch calculations and security assessment.

Keywords

Power Flow Optimal Power Flow Security Architecture Energy Management System False Data 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
    • 1
  • Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Software and Information SystemsUniversity of North Carolina, CharlotteCharlotteUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceTennessee Tech UniversityCookevilleUSA

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