Abstract
The military element in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, most notably the rapid “non-war” that led to the takeover of Crimea and the sudden eruption of an armed conflict in the Ukrainian oblasts (counties) Donetsk and Luhansk, has generated a lot of speculation regarding new and unknown capacities in the Russian Armed Forces. The more than ten-years-old term “hybrid war” was revitalized and given a new meaning (or a number of new meanings), and mushroomed to explain everything known and unknown about events that seemed to be a mixture of novel enigmas and brute force. What were the Russians actually doing? Will they do it again—against a NATO-country?1
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Ydstebø, P. (2016). Russian Operations: Continuity, Novelties and Adaptation. In: Haaland Matlary, J., Heier, T. (eds) Ukraine and Beyond . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9_8
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