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Russia’s Social Media Propaganda Warfare

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Abstract

This chapter is about the controversial use of contemporary social media in local and global conflicts. The particular focus is on Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, the United States, and the rest of civilized world. The chapter’s aim is to demonstrate how easily social media, which are used as effective drivers of positive change in some states, are becoming an instrument of propaganda, misinformation, and disorientation of the audience. The chapter argues that without significant intellectual and critical development, fake news and post-truth will no longer belong only to state TV channels and mainstream media in Russia, but that multiple audiences in other countries will be vulnerable to manipulation.

Keywords

  • Arab Spring
  • Disinformation
  • Fake news
  • Monetization
  • Post-truth
  • Propaganda
  • Revolution of Dignity
  • Russian hybrid warfare
  • Social change
  • Social media
  • Social media ethics
  • Social networks

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  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5_65
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Notes

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  76. 76.

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  81. 81.

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  87. 87.

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    See We Are Social & Hoodsuite, “Digital 2020: Ukraine.”

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    See VOX Ukraine, “About Us.”

  91. 91.

    See Stop Fake, “About Us.”

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  107. 107.

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Zaliznyak, Y.B. (2021). Russia’s Social Media Propaganda Warfare. In: Ward, S.J. (eds) Handbook of Global Media Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32103-5_65

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