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Side-Channel Attacks on SHA-1-Based Product Authentication ICs

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Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9514))

Abstract

To prevent product counterfeiting, a common practice is to cryptographically authenticate system components (e.g., inkjet cartridges, batteries, or spare parts) using dedicated ICs. In this paper, we analyse the security of two wide-spread examples for such devices, the DS28E01 and DS2432 SHA-1-based authentication ICs manufactured by Maxim Integrated. We show that the 64-bit secret can be fully extracted using non-invasive side-channel analysis with 1,800 and 1,200 traces, respectively. Doing so, we present the, to our knowledge, first gray-box side-channel attack on real-world devices employing an HMAC-like construction. Our results highlight that there is an evident need for protection against implementation attacks also for the case of low-cost devices like product authentication ICs.

D. Oswald—Part of this work was carried out while the author was at the Chair for Embedded Security, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christof Paar, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany.

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Oswald, D. (2016). Side-Channel Attacks on SHA-1-Based Product Authentication ICs. In: Homma, N., Medwed, M. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9514. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_1

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31271-2

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