Advertisement

New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and Non-OECD Countries

  • Enrico Alemani
  • Caroline Klein
  • Isabell Koske
  • Cristiana VitaleEmail author
  • Isabelle Wanner
Chapter
Part of the International Law and Economics book series (ILEC)

Abstract

This chapter presents the new OECD competition law and policies (CLP) indicators which measure the strength and scope of competition regimes in 49 jurisdictions (34 OECD and 15 non-OECD, including Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa). The indicators cover areas for which there is a broad consensus among member countries on what constitutes ‘good’ practice for competition regimes. The results suggest that competition regimes are broadly similar across countries in these areas because most countries have adopted all or a large number of the ‘good’ policy settings captured by the indicators. On average, the design of competition laws and policies appears to be closer to best practice in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries. The four BRICS jurisdictions show a more mixed picture, with Brazil and Russia closer to best practice, while in India and South Africa there appears to be room for improvements. Jurisdictions differ relatively more on the enforcement of competition law than on the competition law itself.

Keywords

Competition law and policy Indicators 

JEL Classification Codes

K21 L4 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Jørgen Elmeskov, Jean-Luc Schneider, John Davies, Alain de Serres, Romain Duval, Pier Carlo Padoan, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Jeremy West, Joao Azevedo, Yunhee Kim, Lorenzo Ciari, Antoine Goujard, and Zsofia Tari for their helpful comments and suggestions, as well as Caroline Abettan and Celia Rutkoski for excellent technical support. The opinions expressed in this chapter are the authors’ and do not necessarily correspond to those of the OECD or its member countries.

References

  1. Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Do people mean what they say? Implications for subjective survey data. American Economic Review, 91(2), 67–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2011). Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy the competition policy indices. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7, 1–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013). Competition policy and productivity growth: An empirical assessment. The Review of Economic and Statistics, 95(4), 1324–1336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. European Commission. (2004). Commission notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities. Official Journal of the European Union, C 101/43.Google Scholar
  5. Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., & Boylaud, O. (1999). Summary indicators of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection legislation (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No 226).Google Scholar
  6. OECD. (2007). Guidance to business on monopolisation and abuse of dominance. Policy Roundtable, Competition Law and Policy. OECD.Google Scholar
  7. OECD. (2012). The role of efficiency claims in antitrust proceedings. Policy Roundtable, Competition Law and Policy. OECD.Google Scholar
  8. Olken, B. (2009). Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality. Journal of Public Economics, 93(7–8), 950–964.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enrico Alemani
    • 1
  • Caroline Klein
    • 2
  • Isabell Koske
    • 3
  • Cristiana Vitale
    • 4
    Email author
  • Isabelle Wanner
    • 2
  1. 1.Competition and Market AuthorityLondonUK
  2. 2.Economics DepartmentOECDParisFrance
  3. 3.Office of the Secretary-GeneralOECDParisFrance
  4. 4.Directorate for Financial and Enterprise AffairsOECDParisFrance

Personalised recommendations