A History of Collusion: The Persistence of Cartels in South Africa
- 660 Downloads
This chapter discusses the persistence of cartels in South Africa. In 1996, South Africa’s first democratic administration took significant steps to liberalize many of the formerly price regulated markets. Deregulation and liberalisation led to the break-up of regulated cartels. We argue in this chapter that liberalisation may have inadvertently, by increasing competition in formerly protected markets, have increased the incentives for firms to participate in cartels.
KeywordsHistory of collusion Liberalisation of regulated markets Firm incentives
- Harrington, J. (2015). Thoughts on why certain markets are more susceptible to collusion and some policy suggestions for dealing with them. Global Forum on Competition, OECD. DAF/COMP/GF(2015)8.Google Scholar
- Kirsten, J. F., & Van Zyl, J. (1996). The contemporary agricultural policy environment: Undoing the legacy of the past. Cape Town: OUP.Google Scholar
- Vink, N., & Kirsten, J. (2000). Deregulation of agricultural marketing in South Africa: Lessons learned. The Free Market Foundation, Monograph.Google Scholar