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Models of Monopoly in the Quarter-Century Development of Russian Competition Policy: Understanding Competition Analysis in the Abuse of Dominance Investigations

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Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

Part of the book series: International Law and Economics ((ILEC))

Abstract

The article explains an approach to the economic analysis in antitrust enforcement in Russia during 25 years of development. Based on adoption of European-style competition rules it is worth seeing how the industrial organization and competition economic models are applied during transition from socialist to market economy. The most specific feature, among the standards of enforcement, is the prevalence of enforcement against unilateral exploitative conduct of a large company that is not directly related to the restrictions of competition. Not only harm but individual harm is central and often sufficient evidence of competition legislation violation. Both the intellectual and technological legacies of transition, industrial structure of the economy and supportive institutions explain the unique application of theoretical models as a background for the actions of Russian antitrust authority.

Chapter is an outcome of the project supported by Basic Research Program, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Author thanks Y. Katsoulacos, F. Jenny and the participants of CRESSE-2014 and CRESSE-2015 conferences for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. Any errors are my own.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The LCAP dataset represents a general population of the claims submitted to the first instance commercial courts of the Russian Federation to annul the infringement decision of the Federal Antitrust Service under art. 10 and 11 of the law ‘On competition’ during the period 2008–2012. The claims cover more than 1/3 of all infringement decisions under these articles. The dataset enables the classification of the cases in different ways, including according to the legal status of the company that is found violating the law (natural monopoly or not), as well as according to the content of practice in question.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

    Svetlana Avdasheva

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  1. Svetlana Avdasheva
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Correspondence to Svetlana Avdasheva .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. ESSEC Business School, Cergy-Pontoise, France

    Frederic Jenny

  2. Athens Univ. of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

    Yannis Katsoulacos

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Avdasheva, S. (2016). Models of Monopoly in the Quarter-Century Development of Russian Competition Policy: Understanding Competition Analysis in the Abuse of Dominance Investigations. In: Jenny, F., Katsoulacos, Y. (eds) Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries. International Law and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_10

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