Models of Monopoly in the Quarter-Century Development of Russian Competition Policy: Understanding Competition Analysis in the Abuse of Dominance Investigations

  • Svetlana AvdashevaEmail author
Part of the International Law and Economics book series (ILEC)


The article explains an approach to the economic analysis in antitrust enforcement in Russia during 25 years of development. Based on adoption of European-style competition rules it is worth seeing how the industrial organization and competition economic models are applied during transition from socialist to market economy. The most specific feature, among the standards of enforcement, is the prevalence of enforcement against unilateral exploitative conduct of a large company that is not directly related to the restrictions of competition. Not only harm but individual harm is central and often sufficient evidence of competition legislation violation. Both the intellectual and technological legacies of transition, industrial structure of the economy and supportive institutions explain the unique application of theoretical models as a background for the actions of Russian antitrust authority.


Competition enforcement Abuse of dominance Exclusion Exploitation Russia 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Research UniversityHigher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia

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