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Automatically Extracting Threats from Extended Data Flow Diagrams

  • Bernhard J. BergerEmail author
  • Karsten Sohr
  • Rainer Koschke
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9639)

Abstract

Architectural risk analysis is an important aspect of developing software that is free of security flaws. Knowledge on architectural flaws, however, is sparse, in particular in small or medium-sized enterprises. In this paper, we propose a practical approach to architectural risk analysis that leverages Microsoft’s threat modeling. Our technique decouples the creation of a system’s architecture from the process of detecting and collecting architectural flaws. This way, our approach allows an software architect to automatically detect vulnerabilities in software architectures by using a security knowledge base. We evaluated our approach with real-world case studies, focusing on logistics applications. The evaluation uncovered several flaws with a major impact on the security of the software.

Keywords

Architectural risk analysis Threat modeling Automatic flaw detection 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under the grant 16KIS0069K (ZertApps project).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bernhard J. Berger
    • 1
    Email author
  • Karsten Sohr
    • 1
  • Rainer Koschke
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Computing Technologies (TZI)Universität BremenBremenGermany

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