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Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science pp 103–118Cite as

Models and Explanation

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Abstract

Detailed examinations of scientific practice have revealed that the use of idealized models in the sciences is pervasive. These models play a central role in not only the investigation and prediction of phenomena, but also in their received scientific explanations. This has led philosophers of science to begin revising the traditional philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in order to make sense of this practice. These new model-based accounts of scientific explanation, however, raise a number of key questions: Can the fictions and falsehoods inherent in the modeling practice do real explanatory work? Do some highly abstract and mathematical models exhibit a noncausal form of scientific explanation? How can one distinguish an exploratory how-possibly model explanation from a genuine how-actually model explanation? Do modelers face tradeoffs such that a model that is optimized for yielding explanatory insight, for example, might fail to be the most predictively accurate, and vice versa? This chapter explores the various answers that have been given to these questions.

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Abbreviations

3M:

mechanism-model-mapping constraint

DN:

deductive-nomological

FEL:

fast enabling link

HS:

hypothetico-structural

RL:

reinforcement learning

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Philosophy and History of Science, Boston University, 745 Commonwealth Ave., MA 02215, Boston, USA

    Alisa Bokulich

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  1. Alisa Bokulich
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Correspondence to Alisa Bokulich .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Humanities, University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, 27100, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani  & Tommaso Bertolotti  & 

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Bokulich, A. (2017). Models and Explanation. In: Magnani, L., Bertolotti, T. (eds) Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science. Springer Handbooks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30526-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30526-4_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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