Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Deep Interpretive Disagreements and Theory of Legal Interpretation

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Pragmatics and Law

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 7))

Abstract

This paper deals with deep interpretive disagreements (DID): very profound divergences that may occur in legal interpretation (on single cases, or on similar cases) among judges and jurists. These divergences involve alternative interpretations of certain expressions or phrases (for instance, “human person”, “dignity”, “personal autonomy”, “life”, “health”) and may lead, under certain conditions, to incompatible interpretations of the legal sentences that incorporate these expressions. The most important examples of this kind of legal sentences are constitutional provisions that express principles asserting legal rights. The main thesis of this paper is that DID represent genuine, faultless and unsolvable disagreements, and share many important features with other kinds of disagreement much discussed today in contemporary philosophy of language. In particular, after inquiring into the properties of these kinds of disagreements, and exploring their implications in law (also through the discussion of two Italian legal cases, the famous cases Englaro and Welby), the author examines two very important questions that may be raised about these disagreements: a meta-ethical question (“In what ways can we justify or settle or even solve these disagreements?), and an epistemological question (“How to explain disagreements?”) and offers an original answer to both.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In the domain of political philosophy see, for instance, the books of Waldron (1999), and Gaus (1996), and the collection edited by Macedo (1999). In the domain of ethics, see, for instance, the works of Harman (2000) and Larmore (1996), and the collection edited by Gowans (2000).

  2. 2.

    On alternative interpretations of constitutional provisions, see Celano 2013: 103–105.

  3. 3.

    On this point I disagree with Brian Leiter (2012: 79 ff., 85–87), according to whom interpretive disagreements do not constitute a key phenomenon in our rule of law systems, either in quantitative, or in qualitative terms.

  4. 4.

    I’m not able here to give an extensive analysis of the notion of “balance” in legal interpretation. Cf., anyway, Pino (2010: chapter 8), Bin (1992), Guastini (2011: part. II, chapter 6).

  5. 5.

    These expressions could be inserted in the general category of natural language’ terms that today philosophy of languages calls interpretation sensitive terms (cf. Cappelen 2008b: 23–46).

  6. 6.

    On the background assumptions as presuppositions of communication, see Searle (1980: 221–232).

  7. 7.

    Moreso builds on an essay by Stalnaker (2002: 701–721) on the same matter. But it seems to me that for Stalnaker, too, common ground is the point of departure, and not of arrival, of a discussion among dissenting speakers.

  8. 8.

    On this discussion, cf. at least Kölbel (2002: 98–106), MacFarlane (2014: 133–136), O’Grady (2010: 203–226), and Wright (2006: 58 ff.)

  9. 9.

    On the notion of propositional contentfulness see Brandom (1994: 79–83).

  10. 10.

    For a relativistic interpretation of Dworkin’s right answer thesis, see Moore (1991–1992: 2424–2533).

  11. 11.

    An interesting question, which I cannot concern myself with in the space of this essay, is if a judge, in his interpretive activity, can legitimatelly use arguments drawn from the sacredness’ dimension.

  12. 12.

    For a detailed critical analysis of this perspective see my (1984: chapter IV).

  13. 13.

    For a position that in legal philosophy shares this kind of dichotomy, see Leiter (2007: 238 ff.).

  14. 14.

    It is the idea that Crispin Wright labels as “investigation independence thesis” and that criticizes adopting the wittgensteinian rule following argument (Wright 1987: 148–149).

  15. 15.

    For this view of scientific research programs see Lakatos (1978: 48–51).

  16. 16.

    For the meaning of “conceptual definition” I refer to my (2004, 18–20).

  17. 17.

    For a good example of a very strong version of metaethical objectivism, see Moore (1991–1992: 2425–2533).

  18. 18.

    Cappelen (2008a: 265–2686, b: 23–46). I thank Samuele Chilovi very much for his suggestions about Cappelen’s theses.

  19. 19.

    It is Kölbel (2002: 91) who speaks of sharing of different perspectives, in order to explain his thesis about the relativity of truth. Here I use the notion to characterize the crucial element in the contexts of interpretation.

  20. 20.

    On the ultimate values of an ethical system (the so-called first principles) see Scarpelli (1976: 24). Cf. also Harman (2000: 21).

  21. 21.

    In these cases Wittgenstein (1953: §217) would say that “if I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned”.

  22. 22.

    For this objective view of constitutional principles, see Luciani (1991: 170 ff.), Baldassarre (1991: 639–658) and Ruggeri (1998: 1–33). I thank Giorgio Pino very much for his precious suggestions about this idea of Constitution and its implications for constitutional interpretation.

  23. 23.

    This is also the opinion of our scholar of criminal law, Giovanni Fiandaca, in his very stimulating essay (2011: 383–414).

  24. 24.

    For a good analysis of the contextualist approach in philosophy of language, see Bianchi (2001).

  25. 25.

    For a well known analysis of background context, see these two essays of John Searle (1979: 117–131, 1980: 221–232).

  26. 26.

    See, for instance, the essays of Poggi (2012: 55–65), Vignolo (2012: 67–75) and Kristan (2013: 143–200).

  27. 27.

    These critical observations resemble, to some extent, those addressed by Toulmin (1972: 105–129) to the kuhnian notion of paradigm.

References

  • Alexy, R. (1998). Teoria dell’argomentazione giuridica, it. trans., Giuffré: Milano.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atienza, M. (2012). Diritto come argomentazione. Concezioni dell’argomentazione, it. trans. Napoli: ESI.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ayer, A. J. (1952). Language, truth and logic. New York: Dover Books (first edition 1936).

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldassarre, A. (1991). Costituzione e teoria dei valori. Politica del diritto, 639–658.

    Google Scholar 

  • Besson, S. (2005). The morality of conflict. Reasonable disagreement and the law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bianchi, C. (2001). La dipendenza contestuale, Per una teoria pragmatica del significato. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bin, R. (1992). Diritti e argomenti. Milano: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, R. B. (1994). Making it explicit, representing and discursive commitments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cappelen, H. (2008a). Content relativism and semantic blindness. In M. Garcia Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.), Relative truth (pp. 265–286). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Cappelen, H. (2008b). The creative interpreter: Content relativism and assertion. Philosophical Perspectives, 22(1), 23–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carston, R. (1982). Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Celano, B. (2013). I diritti nello stato costituzionale. Bologna: Il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiassoni, P. (2009). Tre esercizi per una critica dell’oggettivismo morale. Analisi e diritto. 61–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiassoni, P. (2012). Conceptos toxicos en la filosofia moral: desacuerdo etico objectivism style. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 241–257). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (1985). A matter of principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s empire. London: Fontana Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (1996). Freedom’s law. The moral reading of the American constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs. Harvard: Belknap.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiandaca, G. (2011). I temi eticamente sensibili fra ragione pubblica e ragione punitiva. Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, LIV(4), 1383–1414.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallie, W. B. (1955–1956). Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXI, 167–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gargani, A. (1985). Lo stupore e il caso. Laterza: Bari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaus, G. F. (1996). Justificatory liberalism. An essay on epistemology and political theory. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gowans, C. W. (Ed.). (2000). Moral disagreements. Classic and contemporary readings. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guastini, R. (1990). La “costituzionalizzazione” dell’ordinamento italiano. Ragion Pratica, 11, 185–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guastini, R. (2011). Interpretare e argomentare. Milano: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guastini, R. (2012). Para una taxonomia de las controversia entre juristas. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Cómo y por qué los juristas discrepan (pp. 61–72). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (2000). Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen, H. (1945). General theory of law and state. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kölbel, M. (2002). Truth without objectivity. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kristan, A. (2013). I revirements giurisprudenziali: una sfida per i contestualisti. Nota critica sul nuovo libro di Vittorio Villa. Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 13, 143–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kristan, A., & Pravato, G. (2014). Faultless disagreements in matters of law. Paper held at XXI Seminario Hispano–Franco–Italiano de Teoria del Derecho, Alicante, 12–13 June 2015.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scientific research programmes, philosophical papers (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Larmore, C. (1996). The morals of modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Leiter, B. (2007). Naturalising jurisprudence. Essays on American legal realism and naturalism in legal philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Leiter, B. (2012). Cómo explicar los desacuerdos entre juristas. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 75–109). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luciani, M. (1991). Corte costituzionale e unità nel nome dei valori. In P. Romboli (Ed.), La giustizia costituzionale a una svolta. Torino: Giappichelli, 170 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luque Sanchez, P. (2012). Los desacuerdos juridicos. Una mapa conceptual. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 23–59). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macedo, S. (1999). Deliberative politics. Essays on democracy and disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment sensitivity. Relative truth and its applications. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule following. In S. Holzmann & C. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: To follow a rule (pp. 141–162). London: Routledge & Kegan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, M. (1991–1992). Moral reality revisited. Michigan Law Review. 90, 2424–2533.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moreso, J. J. (2012). Iuspositivismo y desacuerdos juridicos. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos., Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 229–240). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Grady, P. (2010). Disaccordi legittimi. In V. Villa et al. (Eds.), Il relativismo. Temi e prospettive (pp. 203–226). Roma: Aracne.

    Google Scholar 

  • Papayannis, D. M., & Ramirez Ludena, L. (2012). Una respuesta pluralista al problema de los desacuerdos juridicos. In P. Luque Sanchez & G. B. Ratti (Eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Como y por qué los juriustas discrepan (pp. 203–225). Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pino, G. (2010). Diritti e interpretazione. Bologna: Il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pino, G. (2014). Positivism, legal validity, and the separation of law and morals. Ratio Juris, 27(2), 190–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pino, G. (2015). Tre concezioni della Costituzione, to be published in “Rivista di teoria e critica della regolazione sociale”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poggi, F. (2012). Contextualism, but not enough. A brief note on Villa’s theory of legal interpretation. Revus, 17, 55–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ratti, G. B. (2013). Studi sulla logica e sulla scienza giuridica. Madrid: Marcial Pons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism (Expanded Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodriguez Blanco, V. (2001). ‘Genuine’ disagreements: A realist reinterpretation of Dworkin. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 649–671.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ruggeri, A. (1998). Giurisprudenza costituzionale e valori. Diritto pubblico. 1–3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scarpelli, U. (1976). Introduzione: la filosofia. La filosofia dell’etica. La filosofia di indirizzo analitico in Italia. In U. Scarpelli (Ed.), Diritto e analisi del linguaggio (pp. 7–35). Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. (1979). Expression and meaning. Studies in the theory of speech (pp. 117–131). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. (1980). The background of meaning. In J. Searle, F. Kiefer, & M. Bierwish (Eds.), Speech act theory and semantics (pp. 221–232). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 701–721.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toulmin, S. (1972). Human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Travis, C. (1989). Pragmatics. In B. Hale & C. Wright (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of language (pp. 87–107). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vignolo, M. (2012). A relativistic note on Villa’s pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation. Revus, 17, 67–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (1984). Teorie della scienza giuridica e teorie delle scienze naturali. Modelli e analogie. Milano: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (1990). La metagiurisprudenza analitica e la dicotomia descrittivo/prescrittivo. In A.A.V.V. (Ed.), Studi in memoria di Giovanni Tarello. Volume II. Saggi teorico-giuridici (pp. 617–665). Milano: Giuffrè.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (1999). Costruttivismo e teorie del diritto. Torino: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (2004). Il positivismo giuridico. Metodi, teorie e giudizi di valore. Torino: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (2010). Relativism. A conceptual analysis. Eidos, 13, 166–191.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (2012a). Una teoria pragmaticamente orientata dell’interpretazione giuridica. Torino: Giappichelli.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (2012b). Theory of legal interpretation and contextualism. Replies to Kristan, Poggi and Vignolo. Revus, 18, 151–178.

    Google Scholar 

  • Villa, V. (2013). Contestualismo e teorie dell’interpretazione. Risposte ai miei critici. Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 13, 303–363.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldron, J. (1999). Law and disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (2006). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Routledge (first edition 1985).

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (2nd ed. 1958). Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (1981). Rule following, objectivity and the theory of meaning. In S. Holzmann & C. Leich (Eds.), Wittgenstein: To follow a rule (pp. 99–117). London: Routledge & Kegan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (1987). Realism, meaning and truth. London: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (2006). Intuitionism, realism, relativism and rhubarb. In P. Greenough & M. P. Lynch (Eds.), Truth and realism (pp. 38–60). Oxford: Clarendon.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (2008). Relativism about itself. Haphazard thoughts about the very idea. In M. Garcia Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.), Relative truth (pp. 157–185). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze giuridiche, della Società e dello Sport, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Vittorio Villa

Authors
  1. Vittorio Villa
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vittorio Villa .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Humanities, University of Messina, Messina, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

  2. Dept. "Cesare Beccaria", University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Francesca Poggi

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Villa, V. (2016). Deep Interpretive Disagreements and Theory of Legal Interpretation. In: Capone, A., Poggi, F. (eds) Pragmatics and Law. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-30383-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-30385-7

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation