The Elbphilharmonie Hamburg

Abstract

The Elbphilharmonie scored ninth on a list of the ten most expensive skyscrapers ever built (MMO 2014). With its southeastern corner at 110 m, it marginally enters the skyscraper category but is in the prominent company of Taipei 101, Burj-al-Khalifa, or One World Trade Center. Alas, the city of Hamburg never desired a position in this ranking. When the city signed the construction contract in 2006, it planned for total project costs to be €351.8 million and to open the Elbphilharmonie in 2010 (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg 2014). Over the following years, costs progressively escalated, while project progress was delayed. It became a planning disaster, with total project costs rising to €560.8 million by 2008 (Bürgerschaft der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg 2008c, 5; B/PUA 2014, 25).

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Appendix 3.1. Project Timeline

1997	The “HafenCity” project starts.
2000	Previous plans for the Kaispeicher A premise to host a cultural site are dropped in favor of plans to erect the “Media City Port,” an office tower.
2001	The investor and project developer Alexander Gerard and his wife, Jana Marko, start to develop the idea of a concert hall at the Kaispeicher A site.
September 23, 2001	A coalition of CDU, FDP, and the Schill-Party win the Bürgerschaft election; Ole von Beust becomes Hamburg’s First Mayor.
October 31, 2001	Patrick Taylor, old and new business partner of Alexander Gerard, sends a letter to the Mayor, bringing up the idea of a concert hall in the Kaispeicher.
December 21, 2001	The first meeting between Gerard and HdM takes place, in which the architects craft the idea of a “wave” atop the Kaispeicher.
2002, Fall	Hamburg’s government looks into the possibilities of a new concert hall for the city and plans for an “AquaDome” concept at Magdeburger Hafen. Gerard counters by publishing his concept of a cultural use for the Kaispeicher and an office tower next to it to receive cross-financing.
March 2003	Since the project does not get hold, Gerard tasks HdM to develop a project study including visualization.
June 6, 2003	First press coverage of Gerard’s project.
June 26, 2003	Gerard and Marko hold a press conference introducing the Elbphilharmonie concept, using a wooden-and-plastic model made by HdM and elates Hamburg with the Elbphilharmonie idea. The public concert hall in the center of the building is financed by a private envelope around it, consisting of gastronomy, apartments, a parking garage, and a hotel. The city should not provide funding and just present investors with the premise.
August 21, 2003	Open letter by renowned Hamburg architects to the Mayor, pleading him to enable the Elbphilharmonie and to select the HdM sketch.
September 26, 2003	The SPD opposition requests the Senate to drop the “AquaDome” project and concentrate on the Elbphilharmonie project. AquaDome is dropped on October 24, 2003.
October 7, 2003	Patrick Taylor, previous business partner of Alexander Gerard, leaves the project. Gerard’s new partner would be Dieter Becken.
December 16, 2003	The Senate officially announces to continue investigating the possibilities of the Elbphilharmonie project.
December 30, 2003	Following the Schill-Scandal, the Bürgerschaft decides for new elections.
February 29, 2004	Elections for the Bürgerschaft, a new CDU-only government emerges; Karin von Welck becomes the new Senator for Cultural Matters.
May 3, 2004	Alexander Gerard and Jana Mako meet Christoph Lieben-Seutter in Vienna.
May 4, 2004	Meeting between Ole von Beust and Hartmut Wegener. Following that, Wegener becomes the Project Coordinator, and the Realisierungsgesellschaft Hamburg (ReGe) is tasked with project lead. Soon after, Wegener hires Heribert Leutner as ReGe’s second and Düsseldorf-based lawyer Ute Jasper to accompany the project. On the city’s site, the city-development agency is responsible for the project.
2004, Summer	Yasuhisa Toyota is tasked with the acoustics of the large concert hall.
November 3, 2004	Hamburg buys Alexander Gerard and Dieter Becken, the original investors, out of the project for €3.48 million.
January 19, 2005	ReGe signs the general planning contract with architects HdM.
January 20, 2005	The Senate decides to pursue the project under the proposed investor model.
February 25, 2005	The Europe-wide tender process starts.
April 22, 2005	The architects finish their predesign planning and estimate the constructions costs at €196.7 million.
April 25, 2005	The first phase of the Europe-wide tender process ends, 25 bidders have participated, 6 get selected for round two.
July 12, 2005	The Hamburg Senate receives the feasibility study, which estimates construction costs at €186.7 million.
August–October 2005	Three large private donations contribute €50 million (a single €30 million donation and two €10 million donations) to the project.
October 31, 2005	The Elbphilharmonie Foundation starts working.
October 26, 2005	The Bürgerschaft formally agrees to the tender process.
December 8, 2005	The NDR-Sinfoniker is selected as the orchestra-in-residence for the Elbphilharmonie.
January 6, 2006	The second phase of the tender process ends.
April 12, 2006	ReGe selects STRABAG and IQ2 (consortium consistent of Hochtief, Commerzleasing, ArabellaSheraton, APCOA, Nordmann, Gartner, HSH Nordbank, Bayerische Landesbank, and Quantum) as the final bidders.
April 2006	The architects deliver the design phase plans and estimate construction costs at €228.6 million.
June 2006	ReGe formulates its cost goal of €210 million for the project.
June 2, 2006	The designated general director of the Elbphilharmonie, Christoph Lieben-Seutter, arrives in Hamburg.
June 16, 2006	The architects warn that a premature construction that begins with unfinished planning in this complex project could easily entail large financial claims.
June 27, 2006	ReGe receives an email from the cultural department listing all ongoing change requests: integration of a cafeteria, different partition of offices and backstage area, enlargement of the ticketing area, and integration of a third concert hall.
June 28, 2006	Hamburg decides to forego the previously favored investor model for the forfeit model.
September 15, 2006	Within the deadline, only one remaining bidder, Hochtief (IQ2), delivers a proposal—with construction costs at €274 million.
September 29, 2006	Following a meeting with the First Mayor, it is decided to adapt Hochtief’s proposal to ensure “positive cross-financing.” Postnegotiation talks begin the following day.
November 24, 2006	Hochtief delivers their final offer; construction costs are at €241.3 million.
November 28, 2006	ReGe finds an agreement with STRABAG to settle the claims against the tender process.
December 18, 2006	Hamburg signs the contract with construction company Hochtief. The Senate agrees to the contract 1 day later.
January 16, 2007	A parliamentary information session takes place in which the members of the Bürgerschaft are informed about the contractual setup.
February 2007	The city establishes the Bau KG, with which it installs a board of supervisors to oversee ReGe’s activity.
February 28, 2007	The Bürgerschaft unanimously agrees to the Elbphilharmonie contracts.
March 8, 2007	The first PÄM arrives at the ReGe office.
April 1, 2007	Project Leader Heribert Leutner leaves ReGe.
April 2, 2007	Foundation stone ceremony.
May 31, 2007	A 2-day teambuilding exercise with participants from HdM, Hochtief, and ReGe takes place.
June 1, 2007	Annette Kettner is hired as a replacement for Heribert Leutner as Project Lead.
June 18, 2007	PÄM 75 arrives; Hochtief’s claim sum up to just under €10 million. The same day, The integration of the investor planning is finished, which will turn into PÄM 100.
June 19, 2007	First meeting of the Bau KG’s board of supervisors.
September 2007	The project receives a private donation equivalent to €2 million for the main concert hall’s organ.
October 25, 2007	Hartmut Wegener decides to pass on architect’s plans to the construction company without checking them.
November 7, 2007	The Elbphilharmonie Foundation holds a charity auction to raise money for the project.
November 26, 2007	The second meeting of the board of supervisors takes place.
December 2007	Between December 10 and 18, a series of letters between ReGe and HdM is exchanged with which ReGe wants HdM to clarify whether arriving plans are continuations or changes. HdM refuses and declares about 4 months later that they cannot clarify the planning situation for the city.
December 21, 2007	ReGe hires law firm “Heiermann Franke Knippe” as a legal consultant.
January 24, 2008	The culture department asks Wegener to correct a meeting protocol in which Wegener acknowledged that the tender process’ schedule was chosen because of upcoming elections.
February 1, 2008	A protocol of a Jour-Fixe meeting reveals the destructive work relationship between HdM and Hochtief.
February 24, 2008	Elections for the Bürgerschaft. CDU loses the majority but stays in power, forming a coalition with the Green Party.
March 7, 2008	First handwritten note of Wegener to the Mayor mentioning possible cost overruns (around €50 million).
June 2008	The city-side responsibility shifts from the city development to the culture department.
June 19, 2008	Meeting of the board of supervisors, the day before, Hochtief informed ReGe of their €90 million claim for construction hold-ups, which ReGe delivers at the meeting.
July 1, 2008	A first summit including HdM, ReGe, and Hochtief take place chaired by the First Mayor.
July 29, 2008	A second summit including HdM, ReGe, and Hochtief (with Hochtief and HdM in different sessions) takes place chaired by the First Mayor.
August 8, 2008	Wegener declares the negotiations for contract amendment three to have failed.
September 10, 2008	The board of supervisors allows Wegener a negotiation mandate of €75.2 million, provided a synchronized schedule between Hochtief and HdM exists.
September 11, 2008	A meeting reveals there is no synchronized planning but only a Letter of Intent to establish one.
September 12, 2008	Wegener and Henner Mahlstedt (Hochtief board of directors) meet for another (second) informal negotiation of contract amendment three. The scheduled official meeting on September 17 does not take place.
September 2008	Harald Wegener leaves ReGe; Heribert Leutner returns as the new head of ReGe.
October 9, 2008	Johann C. Lindenberg, former CEO of Unilever Germany, becomes the new head of the board of supervisors. The board members are rotated.
November 10, 2008	HdM project leader David Koch warns in an email of a premature closure of contract amendment four; he renews the warning on November 19 and November 20.
November 26, 2008	Contract amendment four is signed, worth €137.8 million.
January 6, 2009	Wegener writes a letter to von Beust, claiming the expensive contract amendment would not have happened under his leadership.
January 23, 2009	Karin von Welck claims that contract amendment four was a success.
March 4, 2009	Within the Bürgerschaft, the contract amendment four passes against the votes of SPD.
December 19, 2009	The first element of the glass façade is installed.
January 12, 2010	In a concerted visit to the construction site, HdM, Hochtief, and city acknowledge that construction is 8–10 weeks behind. The same day, Hochtief sends a message claiming the opening must be delayed another year.
January 18, 2010	Parliamentary party leaders are informed of the current claim status in a closed session.
2010, Spring	The city files a lawsuit against Hochtief, claiming the delivery of a fixed construction schedule to determine the party responsible for delays.
May 5, 2010	A Parliamentary Inquiry Commission is installed.
May, 2010	HdM delivers a report claiming 4494 lacks in construction quality.
May 28, 2010	Roofing ceremony.
July 18, 2010	Ole von Beust announces his resignation, so does Karin von Welck and other project participants.
August 25, 2010	The Bürgerschaft votes for Christoph Althaus (CDU) as new First Mayor. Reinhard Stuth returns as new head of the cultural department.
November 28, 2010	The Green Party cancels the coalition. The Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, therefore, only publishes a status report.
February 20, 2011	The SPD wins the election with a majority; Olaf Scholz becomes the new First Mayor. New Senator for the cultural department is Barbara Kisseler. The Inquiry Commission is reinstalled.
April 19, 2011	Mahlstedt and Lindenberg agree to a settlement through an arbitrating body, but Hochtief cancels the agreement shortly thereafter.
June 2011	Hochtief conveys to the city that construction would only be finished in April 2014.
June 29, 2011	ReGe presents a document including possible scenarios for a contract termination.
July 13, 2011	Mahlstedt presents to Kisseler the cornerstones of suggested options, including a restructuring of the governance setup and contract termination.
September 20, 2011	Hochtief announces it will stop the work on the concert hall’s main roof in mid-October, due to concerns over the calculated statics.
September 30, 2011	Hochtief announces it will stop its share of planning.
October 2011	The Senate informs the public of the current status, ReGe starts talks with subcontractors to see if they were willing to continue working for the city outside of the Hochtief contract.
November 2011	Hochtief corrects the envisaged construction finish from April to November 2014. The city claims €40.6 million from Hochtief for hold-ups.
January 16, 2012	ReGe threatens Hochtief to withdraw the right for planning shares for the technical equipment, if not provided by February 28.
February 2, 2012	Ole von Beust, questioned by the Inquiry Commission, takes full responsibility for the project.
March 2012	Leutner and new Hochtief-Europe CEO Rainer Eichholz develop ideas for a restructuring but drop them again.
April 12, 2012	The city threatens contract termination if the roof was not lowered by end May. Hochtief answers it will prepare working continuation.
June 13, 2012	Eichholz cancels the previous formal agreements in a letter.
June 14, 2012	A meeting between Kisseler, Leutner, Margedant, Hill, and Eichholz fails to deliver progress.
June 21, 2012	Hochtief receives a third ultimatum: The agreed cornerstones should be signed by June 28 or negotiations would be cancelled. Hochtief asks for a prolongation until July 5.
2012, Spring	Spanish construction company ACS, who has previously taken over Hochtief, makes Marcelino Fernández Verdes as CEO of Hochtief Solutions AG.
May 2012	Verdes and David Koch, HdM’s partner in charge of the Elbphilharmonie, meet in Hamburg.
July 3, 2012	Following his call from July 1st, Kisseler and Fernández Verdes meet in Hamburg.
July 5, 2012	A first agreement paper is signed: According to the text, the roof will be lowered, HdM and Hochtief continue planning together, construction will finish in Mid-2015, and cost claims will be settled by an arbitration body.
August 21, 2012	The Senate gives a status report, highlighting that the construction stop was ongoing for 11 months.
August 27, 2012	Kisseler, Hill, Margedant, Fernández Verdes, and Koch meet in Venice. They agree that the July 5 paper is not a viable solution, as long, mutually unsatisfactory arbitration processes would be necessary to settle all cost claims. Kisseler, nevertheless, requests the roof to be lowered as a sign of good faith. In the evening, Kisseler meets with de Meuron, who makes clear that only a complete restructuring including Hochtief is a viable option for HdM—both meetings take place without ReGe and the public knowing.
August 29, 2012	Scholz and Fernández Verdes meet, together with Kisseler, Hill, and Koch. Scholz requests the lowering of the roof. Thereafter, Hochtief allows the city review their accounting statements to clarify on their financial situation.
September 17, 2012	The lowering of the roof begins.
September 19, 2012	ReGe asks for permission to start a contract termination. They put projected €349 million costs in project continuation without Hochtief against €346 million continuing with Hochtief. In a termination scenario, they calculate with a 50–80 % success chance in claiming up to €244 million.
November 2012	Fernández Verdes becomes CEO of Hochtief Solutions AG.
November 23, 2012	Hochtief announces the successful lowering of the roof.
December 4, 2012	A Hamburg-intern summit chaired by Scholz assesses the risk of the alternatives. In the following weeks, several new offers by Hochtief come in.
December 14, 2012	The board of supervisors discusses the final Hochtief restructuring offer but comes to no conclusion.
December 15, 2012	During a special session of the Senate, Scholz receives a message from Hochtief giving in to the last of the city’s demands (the right to contract termination and immediate access to the construction site if the new contracts would not be ready by February 28). The Senate agrees.
January 7, 2013	Leutner resigns.
March 1, 2013	The Senate announces the finish of contract negotiations, only appendices would remain unfinished. They are finished on April 9.
June 19, 2013	With only the votes of the SPD, the contract amendment five passes the Bürgerschaft.
November 2013	Shell construction is finished.
December 2013	Fitting of the “White Skin” starts.
January 2014	The glass façade is finished.
August 2014	The roof is rain-proof.
January 12, 2015	During a press visit to the large concert hall, Olaf Scholz announces that January 11, 2017, is envisaged as the date for the first concert. The Plaza should be opened in November 2016.
April 14, 2015	Following the elections in February, the new SPD–Green coalition is formed.
April 30, 2015	Projected finishing time for the fitting of the White Skin.
January 31, 2016	Projected finishing time for the large concert hall.
October 31, 2016	Projected transfer to the city.

1. Sources: B/PUA (2014), Abendblatt (2013), elbphilharmonie.de.