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Global Constitutionalism and International Economic Law: The Case of International Investment Law

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 7))

Abstract

Are there discernable the outlines of an emergent global economic constitutional order? If the current global scene is understood as hybrid and plural, there will be no single, unitary global economic constitution in place at the present moment. There only will be partial manifestations—observable, regime-specific instances—of what might become part of such a global order. Regime specific instances can be found, for instance, in the domain of international investment law. Though there is variation among the web of 2800 bilateral investment treaties, there are sufficient commonalities that will be familiar to constitutional lawyers. It also is apparent that the body of jurisprudence produced by investment tribunals resembles, in some important ways, the output of high court decision making under national constitutional law. The paper begins by outlining two principal modes of understanding global constitutional developments, identifies some familiar constitutional tropes found in investment law, and closes with a discussion, by way of illustration, of an investor’s claim, unresolved on the merits, that resembles an early nineteenth century US constitutional dispute concerning the sanctity of contracts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kennedy (2009), p. 40.

  2. 2.

    Dunoff and Trachtman (2009a, b), p. 10.

  3. 3.

    Dunoff and Trachtman (2009a, b), p. 13.

  4. 4.

    Dunoff and Trachtman (2009a, b), p. 14.

  5. 5.

    Kennedy (2009), p. 40.

  6. 6.

    Petersmann (1991), p. 406; Petersmann (1992), p. 33; Petersmann (2000), p. 22.

  7. 7.

    Petersmann (2012, 2013, 2014).

  8. 8.

    Cass (2005), p. 19.

  9. 9.

    Cass (2005), p. 23.

  10. 10.

    Cass (2005), pp. 172, 176 and Alston (2002).

  11. 11.

    Walker (2002), p. 355.

  12. 12.

    Howse and Nicolaïdis (2001), p. 229.

  13. 13.

    Dunoff (2006), p. 675.

  14. 14.

    For the purposes of this essay, I do not distinguish between notions of ‘constitutional law’, ‘constitutionalism’, and ‘constitutionalization’. For a parsing of these terms, see Peters (2006).

  15. 15.

    I am operating here under the influence of Pierre Bourdieu. See, for instance, Bourdieu (2000), p. 71.

  16. 16.

    Dezalay and Garth (1996), p. 91.

  17. 17.

    Sell (2003), p. 163.

  18. 18.

    Büthe and Walter (2011), p. 221.

  19. 19.

    For a discussion situating this approach to post-national constitutionalism, see Anderson (2012).

  20. 20.

    I am grateful to Gavin Anderson for this point. For a more general discussion of constitutionalism as critique, see Anderson (2014).

  21. 21.

    Kennedy (2009), p. 61.

  22. 22.

    Twining (1993).

  23. 23.

    Schneiderman (2008), p. 4.

  24. 24.

    Peters (2006), p. 582.

  25. 25.

    Also Twining (2000), p. 89.

  26. 26.

    See e.g. Kurtz (2009).

  27. 27.

    As does Krisch (2012).

  28. 28.

    Walker (2002), p. 337.

  29. 29.

    Colley, L ‘Written Constitutions and Writing World History’ Margaret MacMillan Lecture in International Relations, University of Toronto, 4 April 2013 [unpublished].

  30. 30.

    de Sousa Santos (2006).

  31. 31.

    Weiss (2005).

  32. 32.

    We should attend, in other words, to the complex ways in which power operates. See, for instance, the three-dimensional view of power in Lukes (2005), p. 25–29.

  33. 33.

    Teubner (2012).

  34. 34.

    Peters (2006).

  35. 35.

    Habermas (2006), p. 83.

  36. 36.

    The phrase is from Stepan (2001).

  37. 37.

    Habermas (2006), p. 81.

  38. 38.

    Schneiderman (2013). Thornhill’s proposal that rights regimes generate de facto constituent power that can legitimate law-making authority at transnational levels is intended to elide this problem. See Thornhill (2013), p. 555. The problem is that this looks like a version of constitutionalism without a demos that can be likened to earlier practices of imperialism. On this, see Newton (2006).

  39. 39.

    Cass (2005), p. 23; Walker (2002), p. 50.

  40. 40.

    Dezalay (1990).

  41. 41.

    Borchard (1915).

  42. 42.

    Neo-liberalism’s curse, Peck observes, “has been that it can live neither with, nor without the state” in Peck (2008), p. 25.

  43. 43.

    Both Michel Foucault, in his discussion of the origins of modern neoliberalism, and Christian Joerges, in his discussion of the European model of governance, have resuscitated an interest in the mid-war economic and legal thought of the Freiburg school. See Foucault (2008), Joerges (2005). Crouch, by contrast, denies that ordoliberalism “realistically describes today’s economy” in Crouch (2011), p. 165.

  44. 44.

    Compare Vanberg (1998) and Dardot and Laval (2013).

  45. 45.

    Muchlinski, P (2011) Corporations and the Uses of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a ‘Multilateral Legal Order.’ Oñati Socio-Legal Series. 1 (4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832562 (last accessed 24 May 2015).

  46. 46.

    Schneiderman (2010a), p. 383.

  47. 47.

    See Sornarajah (2008); Yackee (2008).

  48. 48.

    For example, Bolivia, Ecuador, South Africa and, for a time, Australia. See discussion in Schneiderman (2013).

  49. 49.

    Or a ‘mirror comparator’ in Methanex Corp. v. USA, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, 44 ILM 1345–1464 (2005).

  50. 50.

    S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 40 ILM 1408 (2001).

  51. 51.

    E.g. ‘all exporters’ in Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL LCIA Case No UN3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004, 43 ILM 1248 (2004).

  52. 52.

    Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 1 SCR 143.

  53. 53.

    See Withler v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011) 1 SCR.

  54. 54.

    Wild (1939), p. 10.

  55. 55.

    Schneiderman (2008), ch. 2.

  56. 56.

    Ziff (2005) and Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999) 68 LCR 1 (NSCA).

  57. 57.

    Schneiderman (1996).

  58. 58.

    Chemtura Corporation v Canada Award, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2 August 2010).

  59. 59.

    Chemtura Corporation v Canada Award, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2 August 2010), p. 266.

  60. 60.

    Other cases only hinted at its availability. See Lévesque (2011), p. 427, fn. 93. The Methanex case (Methanex Corp. v. USA, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, 44 ILM 1345–1464 (2005)) might be interpreted as having vindicated the exercise of police power jurisdiction in the state of California, but the tribunal did not use that term. Nor does the tribunal’s reasoning resemble the structure of analysis associated with the exercise of police powers jurisdiction. Instead, the tribunal was focused on ‘method,’ namely, whether the state was intentionally targeting Methanex. On the tribunal’s focus on method, see Paparinskis (2011), who does not, curiously, acknowledge that police powers jurisdiction plays a role in the regulatory expropriation jurisprudence.

  61. 61.

    Compare Been and Beauvais (2003) and Johnston and Volkov (2013) with Parvanov and Kantor (2012).

  62. 62.

    Parvanov and Kantor (2012), p. 779.

  63. 63.

    Schneiderman (2013), pp. 81–83.

  64. 64.

    Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (1977) 438 US 104, p. 124.

  65. 65.

    United States Trade Representative [USTR] (2014) The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement. Tradewinds: The Official Blog of the United States Trade Representative (March), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors (last accessed 23 May 2015).

  66. 66.

    Penny Pritzker, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, interviewed by Al Hunt on “Charlie Rose” (airing on PBS 11 May 2015), http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60560245 (last accessed 24 May 2015) and Miller S, Hicks G, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check. A Report of the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business, January 2015, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield/CSIS, http://csis.org/files/publication/150116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf (last accessed 16 June 2015), p. 4. A better explanation for this record, discounting the unmeritorious claims, is that arbitrators are acting strategically so as to dampen blowback from the U.S. Congress. See discussion in Schneiderman (2010a).

  67. 67.

    Emmott, B, A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty’s Great Advance. The Economist, 28 June 2003, p. 4.

  68. 68.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, ILM 44, 1205-63, 12 May 2005, para. 267.

  69. 69.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, ILM 44, 1205-63, 12 May 2005, para. 161.

  70. 70.

    See discussion of these disputes in Alvarez and Brink (2012) and Schneiderman (2014).

  71. 71.

    Spector (2008), p. 141.

  72. 72.

    Smith, Carlos Antonio v. PE.N./medidas cautelares (2002) CSJN, 1/2/2002, Fallos (2002-325-28).

  73. 73.

    Provincia de San Luis v. Estado Nacional/amparo (2003) CSJN, 5/3/2003, Fallos (2003-326-417).

  74. 74.

    Spector (2008), p. 140.

  75. 75.

    The Court reverted to its prior stance in Bustos, Alberto Roque v. Estadio Nacionale/amapro (2005) CSJN, 26/10/2004, J.A. (2005-III-189).

  76. 76.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Award. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, ILM 44, 1205-63, 12 May 2005, para. 215.

  77. 77.

    The investor declined to waive any claim for damages in U.S. courts while also seeking damages on similar grounds before an investment tribunal.

  78. 78.

    See Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Michigan_International_Bridge_Initiative,_Proposal_6_(2012) (last accessed 1 July 2015).

  79. 79.

    Detroit International Bride Company v Canada (2013) Amended Notice of Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2012-25 (15 January 2013).

  80. 80.

    Detroit International Bride Company v Canada Amended Notice of Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2012-25, 15 January 2013.

  81. 81.

    U.S. Constitution of 1787, section 10, ¶ 1.

  82. 82.

    Generally, see Kutler (1971).

  83. 83.

    Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, p. 628. Compare Providence Bank v. Billings (1830) 4 Peters 514.

  84. 84.

    Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837) 36 U.S. 420, p. 546.

  85. 85.

    Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837) 36 U.S. 420, p. 607.

  86. 86.

    Stone Sweet (2010).

  87. 87.

    Kingsbury B, Schill S (2009) Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law. International Law and Justice Working Paper 2009/6, http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf (last accessed 1 July 2015), p. 50; also Kingsbury and Schill (2010) and Schill (2012).

  88. 88.

    Stone Sweet (2010), p. 68.

  89. 89.

    Kingsbury B, Schill S (2009) Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law. International Law and Justice Working Paper 2009/6, http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf (last accessed 1 July 2015), p. 52.

  90. 90.

    Kingsbury B, Schill S (2009) Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law. International Law and Justice Working Paper 2009/6, http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf (last accessed 1 July 2015), p. 40.

  91. 91.

    Stone Sweet (2010), p. 75; Stone Sweet and Matthews (2008).

  92. 92.

    Schneiderman (2011), pp. 491–494. In the period 1994–2010, I identified a total of 23 decisions where proportionality was mentioned expressly or impliedly in tribunal decisions. Of these, in only 13 decisions did tribunals approvingly invoke proportionality analysis in discussing the law and, of these, only eight tribunals applied some semblance of a proportionality analysis, p. 491.

  93. 93.

    Krommendijk and Morijn (2009), p. 444.

  94. 94.

    Leonhardsen (2012), p. 124. Perrone calls this a ‘double check’ on whether there has been a compensable event in Perrone, N (2013) The International Investment Regime and Foreign Investors’ Rights: Another View of a Popular Story. A thesis submitted to the Department of Law of the London School of Economics for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2013, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/776/1/Perrone_International_Investment_Regime.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2015), p. 240. Another problem with Tecmed: (Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, Final Award, 29 May 2003, 43 ILM 133 (2004)) the tribunal considered that public protests could not be reconciled with the impact on investor rights, deliberately ignoring the environmental considerations that prompted those protests. On this, see Guntrip, E (2014) International Human Rights Law, Investment Arbitration and Proportionality Analysis: Panacea or Pandora’s Box? EJIL: Talk! 7 January 2014, http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-human-rights-law-investment-arbitration-and-proportionality-analysis-panacea-or-pandoras-box/ (last accessed 15 June 2015).

  95. 95.

    Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2013), pp. 12–13.

  96. 96.

    Lazzarato (2012), p. 7.

  97. 97.

    Spector (2008), p. 140; Zumbansen (2013).

  98. 98.

    Waldron (2012), p. 72.

  99. 99.

    Streeck (2011), p. 28.

  100. 100.

    Underkuffler (2003).

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Schneiderman, D. (2016). Global Constitutionalism and International Economic Law: The Case of International Investment Law. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2016. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_2

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