Abstract
One key element of Boorse’s view on health and disease is its definition of Normal Functions. In this paper, we question his reference to survival and reproduction both in this definition and within the general framework of BST. We suggest that, beyond the naturalistic stance of BST, this reference is motivated by what we may call Hempel’s problem, that is, the necessity to make explicit the background of functional ascriptions in scientific contexts. We offer reasons to doubt that Boorse’s solution of Hempel’s problem coincides with standard medical thought and we suggest an alternative.
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Notes
- 1.
In the literature, the concept of function analyzed by Cummins in his paper of 1975 has received different names: Amundson and Lauder speak of “causal role functions” (Amundson and Lauder 1994), Craver of “role functions” (Craver 2001), Godfrey-Smith and Millikan of “Cummins functions”, (Godfrey-Smith 1993; Millikan 2002). Without having reservations on alternative choices, we shall use “Cummins functions” in the rest of the present paper.
- 2.
Garson and Piccinini (2014) have suggested that we substitute “survival and inclusive fitness” to “survival and reproduction” to handle cases like the one of the stingers of bees. While clearly an improvement on the original formulation, this proposal has little consequence for human medicine and it remains within the framework of evolutionary biology in its definition of normal functions.
- 3.
In this paper, we do not address the question of the possibility of defining normal psychological functions on the model of normal physiological functions. All we claim is that if we can define them, it will be in their relation to capacities of the type defined here.
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Acknowledgement
We thank Christopher Boorse for his comments on the oral presentation of the first version of this paper. We also thank Lawrence Dewaële who has read the final version and suggested several improvements.
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Forest, D., Le Bidan, M. (2016). In Search of Normal Functions: BST, Cummins Functions, and Hempel’s Problem. In: Giroux, É. (eds) Naturalism in the Philosophy of Health. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29091-1_3
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