Abstract
In a compromise, two or more parties agree to an arrangement—the content of the compromise—but they regard the arrangement as a mere second-best. Wendt distinguishes two accounts of agreement or consent, he distinguishes moral and non-moral compromises, and he spells out what compromises need not be: compromises need not be agreed to for reasons of self-interest, they do not have to mirror the distribution of power, no process of bargaining need precede a compromise, and the parties need not have a cooperative mindset.
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Notes
- 1.
This book is an exercise in systematic political philosophy. I do not engage very much in the history of ideas. For a conceptual history of compromise, see Fumurescu 2013.
- 2.
Jones and O’Flynn 2013: 119–120.
- 3.
The notion of a ‘second-best’ is not to be understood in the technical sense as discussed in economics (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956–1957).
- 4.
Sen 1977: 326. Harsanyi ’s distinction between ethical and subjective preferences is related (1955), although ‘ethical preferences’ are much more narrowly defined than Sen ’s ‘commitments’; they are necessarily based on impartial considerations (Sen 1977: 336–337). For an extensive discussion of the distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of value, see Willems 2015: chs. 1–5.
- 5.
Bellamy 1999: 103.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Dobel 1990: 8.
- 9.
Wertheimer 2003: 144.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
See Benjamin 1990.
- 14.
Wertheimer 2003: 146.
- 15.
Physical strength, financial resources, and military strength are not always the most important assets (Schelling 1960: Ch. 2).
- 16.
- 17.
See Gaus 2011a: 393–409.
- 18.
See Golding 1979: 16–19, Benditt 1979: 26–27, Benjamin 1990: 5, Bohman 1995: 268, Weinstock 2006: 244, Lister 2007: 17–18, Margalit 2010: 39–41, also Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 16–17, 101–117. Skeptical about the distinction between compromises and mere bargains are Jones and O’Flynn 2013: 120.
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Wendt, F. (2016). What Compromises Are. In: Compromise, Peace and Public Justification. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28877-2_2
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