Abstract
Wendt makes some explorations in what he calls the deontic morality of compromising. He proposes and partly defends some principles regarding people’s moral duties in the process before a compromise is made, and some principles regarding people’s moral obligations after a compromise was made.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Habermas 1992/1996: 167.
- 3.
Because these things are harder to realize in moral conflicts, it is a generally good advice to try to focus on ‘interests, not positions’ in bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1981).
- 4.
See Jones and O’Flynn 2013: 121.
- 5.
Jones and O’Flynn suggest that the notion of a fair compromise may not even apply in moral conflicts (2013: 122): the idea of fair compromise, they write, ‘applies much more readily to conflicts of interest or preference than to conflicts of principle.’
- 6.
Horton 2010: 439.
- 7.
Wendt 2016b. Of course, public justification also applies to other things besides modus vivendi arrangements, but as modus vivendi arrangements are constituted by some set of laws, moral rules, or institutions, they are also capable of being either publicly justifiable or not.
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- 9.
Thomson 1990: 314.
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Thomson 1990: 314–315.
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Gill 2012: 508.
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- 15.
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Wendt, F. (2016). The Deontic Morality of Compromising. In: Compromise, Peace and Public Justification. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28877-2_15
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